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ABSTRACT  
 
There are substantial bodies of theoretical literature regarding learning by individuals, 
organizations, and regions. There appears to be no theory that applies at all levels, or explains 
how learning at one level relates to learning at other levels. This study reviews the theoretical 
literature on individual, organizational, and regional learning, applies textual analysis to chart the 
gap between these bodies of literature, and posits an explanation that fills this gap. The 
fundamental theory proposed here is that community yields learning, or that community makes 
people smarter. A conceptual framework is provided for explicating and evaluating the proposed 
theory, and it is illustrated via a thought experiment. Community is presented as a phenomenon 
or process, rather than a place or thing, and learning as a gain in capabilities, which are equated 
to real freedoms: specifically, liberty, prosperity, and wellness. This study details how 
community functions result in increased capabilities, and provides suggestions on how this 
proposition might be applied in practice and investigated through research. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview and Background to the Problem 
This dissertation will suggest and explicate a multilevel theory of learning. My intention 
is to provide an explanation of learning at the individual, organizational, and regional levels, and 
how learning at each level of social aggregation relates to learning at other levels. Rather than 
suggesting an entirely new theory, I identify a gap between bodies of literature and propose a 
synthesis of a wide range of theories related to learning. And, I provide a conceptual 
framework—which builds on and extends existing concepts—that can be used to apply and test 
the theory. Finally, I illustrate use of the proposed theory and conceptual framework by applying 
them to broadband high-speed internet services and higher education. 
Statement of the Problem 
Individuals learn. Organizations learn. Even regions learn. These assertions are well 
established by substantial bodies of empirical, practical, and theoretical literature, which are 
reviewed below. While there is some literature that relates learning at different levels of social 
aggregation—Coleman (1988) and Upton and Egan (2010) for examples—there is no theory that 
clearly links all three levels; and there is no theory that applies at all levels. The literature review, 
below, will substantiate these assertions. 
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There are numerous theories of learning, a multitude of theories related to learning, and 
even more literature on the application of the theoretical literature. All behavioral sciences, 
major areas of philosophy, and several academic disciplines that combine other disciplines 
(communication and information sciences, management science, political science, policy 
science, and economic geography and regional science) contribute to the development of a 
comprehensive, multilevel theory of learning. Similarly, such a theory could contribute to 
criticism, explanations, improvements, and predictions in many domains of human endeavor. 
Thus the core problem of this dissertation is to propose a theory that is broadly inclusive and 
widely applicable. 
The problem may be best understood in a specific context: How individuals, 
organizations, and regions acquire and use high-speed internet access, or broadband, and how 
that interacts—or doesn’t—with higher education. In order to use broadband, individuals must 
have some understanding of internet applications and content (i.e., the worldwide web), a 
computer or similar device, skills necessary to make use of that device, and broadband. More 
importantly, individuals must have a purpose for using the technology, even if that purpose is 
mere curiosity or to pass the time. Organizations face similar knowledge requirements to make 
use of broadband, but with even greater emphasis on purpose. Hypothetically, an organization 
can increase efficiency and efficacy via broadband—becoming more productive and profitable—
but only if members of the organization know how to use the technology for the organization’s 
purpose. Of course, the knowledge and technology must be available in the region—particularly 
broadband, which is physical infrastructure—for individuals and organizations. But, why deploy 
the infrastructure unless people know how and why to use it?  
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Higher education presents similar practical problems in need of a theoretical explanation. 
As a subject, it is useful for illustrating different aspects of this theory. Individuals learn—at 
least in part—via higher education. That learning is applied via organizations, and contributes to 
a region’s knowledge base. At the same time, colleges and universities must learn as 
organizations to accomplish their purposes, and so must the individuals who comprise them. If 
regions are to build and capitalize on institutions of higher education, they must learn, too. 
Broadband is increasingly important to such efforts, and higher education can impact the value 
of broadband as a purveyor of knowledge. There is an interaction between infrastructure and 
institutions that has implications for learning across levels. 
Broadband and higher education seem to require learning at the regional, organizational, 
and individual levels. And, both are nominally useful for learning at and across levels. They are 
prime examples of interdependence of learning at various levels of social aggregation. How and 
in what ways such things are interdependent is just the type of thing I hope to provide a way of 
explaining. The intersection of these two topics—broadband and higher education—provides a 
specific context for detailing the problem and for illustrating a possible solution. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to propose a theory not from empirical observation but from 
analysis of existing, validated theories. I propose to identify a gap between theories about 
learning at different levels of social aggregation and then extend and integrate those theories to 
suggest an explanation that links them together. My purpose is also to illustrate my concepts and 
conjectures about how learning occurs across levels by applying them to broadband and higher 
education. 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
What is the relationship between learning at the individual, organizational, and regional 
levels? As will be shown from the literature review, there is currently no theory to explain how 
they relate. The goal of my dissertation will be to explain this relationship, and to provide a 
multilevel model of learning that is useful for measuring and predicting, for describing and 
explaining, and for critiquing and improving learning in such context. I address learning by 
individuals, organizations, and regions in a way that is consonant with and synthesized from 
accepted theory: The problem is not with existing theories, but with the gaps between them. So, 
my goal is to provide a potential explanation that bridges those gaps, and can be used to generate 
hypotheses about how learning occurs across levels of social aggregation. 
Hypothetically, there is a relationship between learning at various levels of social 
aggregation. Further, we can surmise that this relationship is positive, that learning at the 
individual level complements and promotes organizational learning, which has a similar 
relationship to regional learning, and vice versa. What is the effect of learning at one level on 
learning at other levels, and what is the mechanism of this effect? How might we explain and 
predict this effect, let alone improve learning across levels? These are the questions I intend to 
address in my dissertation. I present a tentative explanation, and provide a specific consideration 
of how that explanation might be applied to acquiring and using broadband.  
Conceptual Framework 
Part of the problem is that we have no conceptual framework for examining the 
relationship between learning at different levels of society, and for assessing whether and to what 
extent learning at one level contributes to learning at other levels. This means we have an 
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incomplete understanding of learning, so there is a scholarly problem. If theory at one level is 
inconsistent with, even contradicts, theory regarding another level, then there are possible 
problems with these explanations. Practically, the problem is that current understanding of 
learning at different levels may be incomplete and fragmented, and an impediment to 
performance improvement. I propose to provide a conceptual framework that is theoretically and 
practically useful for understanding learning across levels of society. 
That said, the conceptual foundations of this study are human agency and social 
construction. Human agency is the concept that humans act in their own interests. It is prevalent 
in economic (Coase, 1960; Arrow & Hurwicz, 1977), psychological (Simon, 1991; Bandura, 
2001, 2006), and sociological (Thibault & Kelley, 1952; Roloff, 1981; Latour, 2005) theories. 
Social construction is the concept that concepts, institutions, and knowledge are created, and 
reality is defined, via human interaction (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969; Vygotsky, 
1978; Habermas, 1984; Giddens, 1986; Bruner, 1990). This primarily a sociological theory but 
been applied to psychology (Bandura, 2001) and economics (Cooke & Leydesdorff, 2006) has 
implications for all forms of knowledge, including science: As Kuhn (1996) famously noted, 
what passes as scientific knowledge is socially constructed. 
As a theoretical dissertation, theory and theorizing are also conceptually important. My 
conceptual approach to theory is that of post-positivism and postmodernism, particularly drawing 
on Kuhn (1996), Popper (2003), Lyotard (1984), Lakatos (1976, 1978). Generally, this 
perspective theory is simply a conjecture about the nature of reality. The fundamental criteria for 
theory is that it be falsifiable because, as Popper (2003/1963) pointed out, it is impossible to 
prove something true. Kuhn (1996) holds that the primary role of science is to advance and/or 
support normal science via accretion of evidence. The build up of evidence and elaboration 
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happens within the confines of narrow scientific worldviews. Lakatos (1976, 1978) occupies 
something of a middle ground between Popper and Kuhn, holding that theories should provide 
more explanatory power than their predecessors. Lakatos noted that various scholarly disciplines 
have a core set of ideas that are inviolate, and a periphery that is constantly evolving. He 
essentially concludes that theory must be judged by its consistence with accepted knowledge, its 
heuristic value, and the novelty of its predictions. Feyerabend (1993) encouraged—to put it 
mildly—skepticism toward scientific claims, maintaining that it science has no grounds for 
priority over other claims about the world. All of this can be seen in the context of what Lyotard 
(1984) termed the postmodern condition. To Lyotard, science is but a general metanarratives 
about what is real and true, and the postmodern condition is seeing metanarratives for what they 
are: stories told to validate the teller. 
Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) define theory as, “a set of statements about the relationship(s) 
between two or more concepts or constructs” (p. 28). Theory is a conceptual tool for thinking 
and acting. “It may be decisive though not authoritative,” as Lindblom and Cohen (1979, p. 79) 
note. I do not seek to make authoritative statements about relationships between concepts or 
constructs. Instead, I simply hope to point out potential consilience between various research 
programs (to use Lakatos’s term). I come with a Feyerabendian appreciation for the limits of 
science, and a Lakatosian recognition that evidence enhances but does not make theory. Purely 
conceptual work is important for advancing scholarship and promoting emancipation.  
Rationale for the Study 
This is a theoretical dissertation, the data for which are prior theories. A theoretical 
dissertation answers its research question by identifying and filling the gaps in existing literature 
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(Calabrese, 2009). Also referred to as a desk, library, or literature-based dissertation, a 
theoretical dissertation requires one to:  
EVALUATE the literature as it stands and/or SYNTHESIZE (bring 
together) more than one body of literature to see what one can add to the 
other or where there might be similar or different sorts of claims being 
made. … ¶ … The idea is to look for gaps, weaknesses, problems or biases 
in the existing literature—to undertake a CRITICAL ANALYSIS—in 
order to lay the ground for future research. (University of Leicester, n.d., 
para 3-5, emphasis in the original). 
A theoretical dissertation might extend or integrate existing theories, or introduce new theories 
(Institute for the Psychological Sciences, 2012). And, it should discuss the practical implications 
of the theory, as well as implications for future research (London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 2011).  
The criterion for including existing theories has to be their relevance to learning and their 
intersubjective validity: How well accepted are they across academic disciplines? Valid theory 
should provide a consistent, complete, and falsifiable explanation of its topic (Popper, 
1963/2003; Lakatos, 1976, 1978; Moore, 2001). And, of course, practical utility provides another 
criterion (Lakatos, 1976, 1978; Feyerabend, 1993). These criteria also apply to the output of this 
dissertation. This will be an attempt to synthesize a consistent, complete, and falsifiable 
multilevel theory of learning that has explanatory power and usefulness. These criteria are also 
the rationale for the study. 
Significance of the Study 
This dissertation will address gaps between theoretical literature regarding learning by 
individual persons, organizations, and geographic regions. In their review of literature on 
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organizational learning Bapuji and Crossan (2004) conclude that there is a need for better 
understanding of levels of learning beyond single organizations. The literature review, below, 
maps out these gaps. In his study of how place-based communities learn, Morse (2004) suggests 
that, “the relevance of group and individual learning should not be ignored, and indeed, a rich 
model of organizational, interorganizational, or community learning ought to consider the 
linkages between levels” (p. 58). I propose to provide such a model (actually three models, from 
a single general, proposed theory), identify opportunities for empirical research and practical 
application, and illustrate how the models apply, including guidelines for empirical research, 
focusing on how broadband is acquired and used. Basically, the significance of this study is that, 
by addressing a gap between existing bodies of literature, it generates opportunities for research 
and for improving learning practices. 
Definitions of Terms 
In this proposal, level refers to extent of social aggregation. Individual means a single 
person. Organization refers to a group of individuals brought together for some purpose. A 
region is a large number of individuals (and organizations) in a geographic area. And, community 
is the phenomenon of persons sharing a sense of belonging, commitment, and influence. 
Capability is ability given capacity. Knowledge is informed true belief. Learning is the action, 
phenomenon, or process of gaining capabilities and knowledge. A theory is simply an 
explanation or rationale for why something occurs or how different things are related. All of 
these terms will be discussed in detail. 
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Delimitations of the Study 
This is to be a theoretical dissertation. And, it is concerned with relations between levels 
of social aggregation. It will not involve analysis of primary data. The analysis is limited to 
theoretical literature regarding learning by individuals, organizations, and regions, and 
specifically to identifying commonalities and gaps among/between these bodies of literature. 
Discussion of the theory will be limited to the adoption and use of broadband, and to the 
transformation of higher education. 
Limitations of the Study and Assumptions 
The primary limitation of this study is that, while it will provide a conceptual framework 
and suggest an explanation, I do not test the conjecture other than conceptually. The proposed 
theory will be consonant with diverse existing theories, and will provide potential means for 
filling the gap between bodies of literature, but it will not involve primary data gathering and 
analysis. 
Summary and Dissertation Outline 
I propose to synthesize an explanation and rationale for how learning occurs, and is 
related, across levels of social aggregation. First, I review essential literature of individual, 
organizational, and regional learning, including relevant literature from economics, philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, and other disciplines, based on the criterion of relevance. Second, I 
summarize methods for analyzing texts, and delve into theory building and model building 
methods. Then I’ll provide an analysis of the literature to identify differences and gaps as well as 
commonalities. The proposed theory and conceptual framework will comprise the bulk of the 
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third section, including general models derived from the theory. Lastly, I illustrate the theory by 
applying it to broadband and higher education. This illustration will also provide guidance on 
how to operationalize variables, develop metrics, and apply the proposed theory for practical and 
scholarly purposes. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Learning by individuals 
The major early theories of learning were wholly behavioral and do not allow for 
intentions or mind. Mind is defined as the faculty of living things that allows them (us) to sense, 
respond to, and remember the world; the organ of consciousness, emotions, and imagination 
(mind, n.d.).  Behaviorist theorists, most notably Thorndike (1910), Pavlov (1927/2003), and 
Skinner (1950), equate learning to conditioning. Changes in behavior come from negative or 
positive reinforcements of responses to stimulus. Cognitivist theories of learning see the mind as 
an information-processing mechanism. For cognitivists, such as Ebbinghaus (1913), Piaget 
(1973), and Bruner (1966, 1990), the mind changes via the acquisition of information and 
processing it into knowledge, which leads to changes in behavior. Frames or models for 
organizing knowledge—schemata (Kant, 1781/2000; Piaget, 1973, 1983; Hirsch, 1987)—are 
applied to data generated by the senses, allowing for recognition, decision-making and sense-
making, and the connection and transfer of knowledge from one setting to another (for example, 
knowing that “night is dark” is automatically associated with other concepts about darkness and 
night). 
Cognitive science describes mental processes in terms of automaticity (effortless 
cognition) (Bargh and Ferguson, 2000), accessibility (salience, priming, effects of experience) 
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(Baldwin, et al., 1996), and assimilation/accommodation (incorporation of new information into 
existing/new schemas via accretion, tuning, and restructuring) (Piaget, 1983). These processes 
operate through frames of reference, models, theories, or worldviews—schemata (Kant, 
1781/2000; Neisser, 1967; Rumelhart, 1980; Piaget, 1983; Hirsch, 1987) that focus learning but 
can also interfere with it via confirmation bias (cognitive dissonance and group-think) 
(Nickerson, 1998). All of these basically define the structure of knowledge, how schema relate to 
each other, are created, recalled, used, and changed. Increasingly, schemata are seen as 
embodied—integrated with behavior—rather than just something in our heads (Rumelhart, 1980; 
Isanski & West, 2010). 
The cognitivist approach is built on an input-output model that is explicated by general 
systems theory (Bertalanffy, 1950, 1968). It is also closely related to the general models of 
communication (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), economics (Leontief, 1986; Miller & Blair, 2009), 
and various biological and social phenomena, as well as the most widely applied design of 
computers, known as the von Neumann model (Godfrey & Hendry, 1993; Barney, 2011). 
Multiply input-output models and connect them as a network, and you have the basis of the 
connectionism (Marcus, 2001). The networks are essentially sets of rules and strategies, which 
are analogous to neurons, for dealing with uncertainty (Marcus, 2001). There is no central 
processor, as in the cognitivist model; intelligence is distributed throughout the network’s simple 
components (Marcus, 2001). Connectionism sees learning as changes, driven by data, in the 
patterns of activation of those components; changes that result in improved outcomes (Marcus, 
2001).  
Constructivism is based on the sociological recognition that institutions—at very least—
are built via social interaction (Berger & Luckman, 1966). The psychological implication is that 
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individuals construct knowledge as they learn (Bruner, 1990), informed by interacting with 
others (Vygotsky, 1978). Schemata are constructs or theories developed via variation and 
selection/testing (Piaget, 1973); and development depends on the learner’s existing knowledge 
and social setting (Vygotsky, 1978). The practical implication for education is that powerful 
learning occurs as we build things, and even more so when we build them together (Papert, 
1980), allowing collaborative creation and selection of schema. Wittrock (1992) sees learning as 
“the process of generating relations both among concepts and between experience or prior 
learning and new information” (p. 532). His approach is similar to constructivism but he 
downplays structural elements such as schemata and emphasizes the generative functions. 
Each theory of learning has its critics. Chomsky (1967) identified fundamental 
weaknesses in behaviorism when he pointed out its fundamental weakness for explaining how 
we learn language. Pinker and Mehler (1988) almost do the same for connectionism. Hacking 
(1999) points out the limitations of constructivism. But each has its strengths. Latour (2003) 
could be speaking of any theoretical approach as he calls for preserving the aspects of 
constructivism that are useful for improving learning.  
Bandura (1977, 1986, 1997, 2001, 2006) provides theoretical framework that 
accommodates the stronger points of other learning theories. Individuals are agents who 
regulate—to some extent—their own behaviors. Behavior is determined by personal and social 
factors, which are affected by behavior. One’s perceived self-efficacy and expected outcomes 
influence learning, as it occurs via experience and vicariously via behavioral models, and are 
influenced by it. Fundamentally, Bandura’s (2001) theory is based on a simple idea; or, more 
accurately, an axiom: 
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A functional consciousness involves purposive accessing and deliberative 
processing of information for selecting, constructing, regulating, and 
evaluating courses of action. This is achieved through intentional 
mobilization and productive use of semantic and pragmatic representations 
of activities, goals, and other future events. (p. 3) 
Bandura carefully defines terms and variables, and his theoretical approach—social 
cognition and sociocognitive learning theory—is flexible enough to accommodate tests of 
conflicting hypotheses and allow theoretical enhancements.  
Drive and related theory 
In drive theory the fundamental issue is drive. While the field has largely moved beyond 
Freud’s (1961/1930) drive theory, Freud nonetheless provides a basis with his concepts of eros 
and thantos as being opposing drives that are activated by biology and circumstances, motivating 
behavior to satiate, and to repress when it is not beneficial or practical to fulfill them. Hull 
(1951) and Spence (1958) theorized that responses to stimuli are a function of basic drives 
mediated by learned behaviors. Maslow (1970) suggests a more detailed and nuanced drive 
theory, based on a hierarchy of needs in which higher-level needs for belonging, esteem, and 
self-actualization are addressed after more basic physiological and safety needs are fulfilled.  
Lawrence and Nohria (2002) update Freud’s drive theory, based on findings in cognitive 
science. They argue that behind our motivations and needs are four fundamental, biologically-
based drives: to acquire, to bond, to defend, and to learn. The drives are the basis for human 
behavior, decision-making, emotion, and reason. There are tensions between these drives, which 
are resolved via innate human skills (communicating, cooperating, gathering, hunting, etc.). The 
basic biological drives to acquire, bond, defend, and learn are the rule-base for human cognition, 
forming emotions, guiding reason, and giving rise to complex dynamic behaviors and systems 
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via innate skills. The innate skills provide the basis for more complex and specialized 
capabilities. Learning is the drive to improve skills and better acquire, bond, and defend. 
Drive can include internal/intrinsic and external/extrinsic motivations (Deci & Ryan, 
1985), instrumental motivation to achieve means to some end, and integrative motivation to 
belong (Carreira, 2005). Some external factors may motivate, while others can dampen 
motivation if not present (Herzberg, 1959). Motivation is related to intentions and self-concept, 
particularly vis-à-vis other persons, the object of need, what is required to fulfill the motive, and 
perceptions of societal norms (Rotter, 1954; Heider, 1958; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Bandura, 
1997). 
Ryan and Deci (2000; Pink, 2009) identify needs for autonomy, competence, and 
relatedness as fundamental human motivators. These needs emerge as intrinsic motivations. 
When actions meet needs, motivation to act is internalized. Internalized motivation drives 
intention. So, when actions meet needs, one is to act on one’s own. Extrinsic motivations such as 
punishments and rewards disconnect actions from these fundamental needs, undermining 
internalization (Kohn, 1993; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Pink, 2009). Other scholars, particularly those 
studying second-language acquisition, have made a further distinction between behavior as a 
means that is instrumental and integrative motivations (Carreira, 2005). According to Carreira 
(2005), behavior motivated by desire to belong is more efficacious than behavior motivated by 
desire to achieve, and both motivations are more powerful than extrinsic motivation but less so 
than fully intrinsic motivation. 
Reflection is consideration of one’s self, of one’s actions and their outcomes. It seems to 
be essential to learning. Schön (2008) discusses how practitioners reflect as they act, and how 
they reflect afterward. The critical difference between short-term reasoning and careful analysis 
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is further explicated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979; Kahneman, 2011). Some cognitive 
processes occur rapidly and transparently. These processes are inherently conservative and much 
more sensitive to risk of loss than to prospect of gain. Slower cognitive processes, in contrast, 
allow the self to be disengaged in order to better balance potential benefits and risks via 
calculation. Schön (2008) says that practitioners maintain a repertoire of intellectual tools for 
applying as they reflect. They use these tools to choose a course of action. Bandura (2001) 
emphasizes self-reflection as essential to self-regulation and foresight, guided by intention. More 
fundamentally, reflexivity—cause is shaped by effect, the self authors the self, the actor is driven 
by the action, agents create institutions that define agents—can be seen as essential to action and 
cognition, as well as critical for learning (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Maturana & Varela, 1980; 
Giddens, 1986; Bandura, 2001). Society serves as a mirror by which the individual comes to 
know herself or himself. 
The human-capabilities approach to development (Sen, 1988, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000; 
Clark, 2005) sees the ultimate result of development as freedom and equates capabilities with 
freedom. The capabilities approach distinguishes between actual state-of-being (“functioning,” in 
Sen’s terms) and possible states of being, emphasizing ability to choose functionings from 
numerous possibilities, and between “negative” freedom from constraint on capabilities and 
“positive” freedom that enables capabilities. Sen, Nussbaum, and Clark do not specifically link 
capabilities to drives, but they do note that capabilities generally involve fulfilling one’s needs. 
Their focus is not so much on what is chosen as on the nature and number of possibilities from 
which one can choose; the opportunity costs of each possibility, and the results of each choice. 
Conceptually, drives—whether autonomy, competency, and relatedness, or to acquire, belong, 
and defend—fit with the capabilities approach.  
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Frankl (1984) maintains that, “Man’s search for meaning is the primary motivation … 
meaning [that] is unique and specific in that it must and can be fulfilled by him alone” (p. 105). 
It is also our primary responsibility, according to Frankl, to respond to life with a unique answer. 
The same can be said for all entities—corporations, associations, institutions, etc.—and 
especially for leaders. The drive for meaning dovetails theoretically with theories of motivation 
and drive theory. These drives represent the why of learning—to acquire, bond, defend, and 
learn; to be autonomous, competent, and related; for instrumental, integrative, and intrinsic 
purposes, and perhaps extrinsic ones as well.  
In summary, the authors of the literature review above are all talking about basically the 
same (or at least closely interrelated) elements—about capabilities, why capabilities are 
important, and what causes capabilities to increase. According to this literature, freedom 
involves how we connect to others. Positive freedoms support drive fulfillment, and negative 
freedoms suppress it. The literature reviewed above says, in sum, that freedom doesn’t just allow 
drive fulfillment. Freedom is a fundamental objective of human drives.  
Paradoxically, negative freedoms motivate action, while positive freedoms can make us 
lazy. Fear of losing can itself be a negative freedom. Promise of rewards can reduce interest in 
positive freedoms. We tend to respond stronger to risk of loss than to opportunity for gain 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The works referenced in this section, taken together, explain this 
paradox. Essentially, the mind continually seeks to improve its abilities in order to make the 
most of its limited capacity.  
The question becomes what, in conjunction with drives and motivations, determines 
increases in capabilities? What factors maximize learning at all levels? What maximizes it at any 
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level? Are the factors for learning at any level different from the factors at other levels? How do 
we learn, and how do we improve our ability to learn? 
Regardless of our drives, how and whether one acts can be predicted by intention to act, 
mitigated by perceived external cultural, economic, physical, social, etc., constraints (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1985, 1991). It is important to recognize that characteristics of objects in the 
environment, and the environment itself, variably afford, or are latently conducive to, certain 
action possibilities that are independent of one’s abilities (Gibson, 1977; Norman, 1999), but 
recognizing that such affordances increase agency. If one believes the outcomes of an action will 
be beneficial and desirable, and her or his significant others value the action, he or she will have 
a strong intention to act, and is highly likely to do so. With such beliefs, the individual will 
investigate what is involved in acting, and this information will inform intention.  
Agency in socioeconomic context 
Agents make use of various assets—facilities, information, materials, relationships, tools, 
etc.—as they act. A simple fact of reality, which forms the basis of economics, is that assets are 
relatively scarce; There are more agents and uses than there are available assets. Fundamental 
economic theory (Smith, 1776/1904) holds that assets naturally accrue to the most-valued uses 
via the market. Consumers express their preferences via purchases. Those who efficiently 
produce what consumers demand, acquire more assets. Market efficiency—connecting demand 
with supply with minimal added costs—depends on free flow of information. Productive 
efficiency comes from structuring the production process, dividing tasks among workers.  
Agents do not act in a vacuum; they interact with other agents. They associate with others 
and with places, and they exchange information and resources, based on self-interest. This 
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exchange is the basis of groups (Thibault & Kelley, 1952), of societal change and constancy 
(Roloff, 1981), and of networks that enable or resist change (Latour, 2005). Identity inherently 
involves self-awareness and self-concept, which shape interaction. Agents’ identification with a 
group, and acting in the groups’ interests, defines personal and group identities, based on the 
inherent human tendency to categorize, to differentiate, and desire to be part of the ingroup 
(Tajfel, 2010). Action to establish and maintain relations is based on judgments about the 
outcomes of interactions, and on the alternatives to or dependence on the relationship (Homans, 
1958; Befu, 1977). 
Identity, interaction, and intention all rest on an infrastructure of beliefs. They are 
learned, but they are also constructed. They are built on beliefs about autonomy, competency, 
and relatedness—beliefs about what these things are, about criteria for each, and beliefs of how 
well others and self meet these criteria. Identity is built via interaction, which informs intention, 
which leads to action. All of this—all knowing—occurs in cultural and natural context. It is 
situated in (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Lave & Wenger, 1991), and is dependent on the 
physical aspects of the body (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Isanski & West, 2010; Wilson 
& Foglia, 2011). 
A fundamental issue for agents is information and uncertainty—information is, for 
present purposes, that which reduces uncertainty. As with other assets, information is unevenly 
distributed, and agents have limited cognitive capacity (Simon, 1991). Asymmetrical information 
can lead to sub-optimal choices, cheating and exploitation, and costs and risks being foisted on 
those who do not receive concomitant benefits (Coase, 1960; Arrow & Hurwicz, 1977). Agents 
often work on behalf of others—principals, in economic terms—but tend to place their own 
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interests above those of the principals. Agents may also act collectively as means to more 
effectively pursue their common interests.  
Rational decision-making requires agents to identify alternatives, determine the 
consequence of choices, and compare the consequences; the best, most rational choice is the 
alternative with the best consequences (Simon, 1976). People in close proximity—crowds—
often behave as one (Blumler, 1951), yet it can be difficult for those with common interests to 
act together (Olsen, 1965). Smelser (1965) identifies the components of collective behavior as 
values, norms, motivation, organization, and situational facilities—pretty standard fare for social 
sciences—but he goes on to note:  
The major determinants are structural conduciveness, strain, 
crystallization of a generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization 
for action, and social control. ¶ We conceive the operation of these 
determinants as a value-added process. Each determinant is a necessary 
condition for the next to operate as a determinant in an episode of 
collective behavior. As the necessary conditions accumulate, the 
explanation of the episode becomes more determinate. Together the 
necessary conditions constitute the sufficient condition for the episode. It 
should be stressed, moreover, that we view the accumulation of necessary 
conditions as an analytic, not at temporal process. (Smelser, 1965, pg. 24-
25) 
Decisions to act collectively are based on how benefits and costs are distributed, and they 
accrue to those involved in collective action (Olson, 1965). The greater the costs are, the larger 
the group is, and the less the subjective value of action is, Olson (1965) posits, the less likely it is 
that group members will act collectively. Under such conditions Smelser’s analytical, value-
added process cannot get started or progress. Inevitably, those with the most assets must lead the 
collective decision, and those with the least participate and benefit without contributing (i.e. they 
are “free riders”).  
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Communities, markets, and organizations arise from a need to minimize the free-rider 
problem. They are means to reduce the transaction costs of searching, contracting, and 
coordinating (Williamson, 1981), to maximize social sense-making via environmental scanning, 
interpretation, and guides for action (Weick, 1995), and to decision-making process of analysis, 
design, and execution (Simon, 1976). Communities emerge wherever agents find a sense of 
belonging, influence, needs fulfillment, and shared emotional commitment (McMillan & Chavez, 
1986).  
Decision-making—as well as community-building, organizing, and sense-making—is a 
social undertaking because information is accessed via social ties, particularly weak ties 
(Granovetter, 1973, 1983). Agents are embedded in networks that determine access to 
information and knowledge and what they see as beneficial, desirable, possible, and practical 
(Granovetter, 1985; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991; Burt, 2004; Chesbrough, 2006; 
Christensen, 1997/2006). Giddens (1986) theorizes that agency and social structures, i.e., 
institutions, are codeterminant: individual actions are constrained by, but also shape, institutional 
arrangements. Actions have symbolic meaning that must be interpreted, as agents interact, 
according to Blumer (1969), which constructs the agents’ identity even as it guides their 
behavior.  
As they interact, agents also gain collective competence (Weick & Roberts, 1993/1996; 
Bandura, 2001), increase productivity (Arrow, 1962) and absorptive (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) 
capacities, and innovate (Morgan, 1997; Cooke, 2002; Cooke & Leysdesdorff, 2005). The 
fundamental issue is that technological advancement, incremental and radical changes in the 
ways assets are combined and used, is the bedrock of economic growth; it also creates new 
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information and knowledge, making others’ information and knowledge less complete and 
valuable, creating competitive advantage. 
Theories of individual learning initially attempted to explain acquisition of knowledge in 
isolation. More mature theories recognize that knowledge is intrinsically social. Essentially, 
learning is an increase in agency—ability to act in one’s own interests—that involves the 
construction and application of embodied models of the world (schemata) to one’s self, to others, 
and to things. As suggested by Bandura’s (1986) triadic reciprocity, one’s capabilities, or level of 
knowledge, depends on personal characteristics—identity and intentions, particularly—and 
social context, one’s communities, networks, organizations, and so forth. The former can be seen 
as the sum of one’s beliefs. The latter are the means to drive fulfillment, particularly for 
acquiring information related to drives. More than that, social structure constrains individual 
action even as it extends individual capabilities. The social and the personal shape each other 
even as they determine behavior. 
Organizational Learning 
Nevis, Dibella, and Gould (1995), among others, imply that all organizations are learning 
systems: 
We define organizational learning as the capacity or processes within an 
organization to maintain or improve performance based on experience. 
Learning is a systems-level phenomenon because it stays within the 
organization, even if individuals change. One of our assumptions is that 
organizations learn as they produce. Learning is as much a task as the 
production and delivery of goods and services. (p. 2) 
This position is built on basic economic theory. It extends from Arrow’s (1962) insights 
into learning by doing. It implicitly accepts Hayek’s (1945) points about the uses of knowledge, 
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and incorporates observations about the nature and role of institutions (Williamson, 1981, 2000; 
Ostrom, 1990). It also fits well with theories related to individual learning from psychology and 
sociology, discussed in relation to individual learning, above.  
Senge (2006) makes the distinction between adaptive learning, which allows an 
organization to operate, and generative learning, which “enhances our capacity to create” (p. 14) 
and enables innovation. Cook and Brown (1999) posit that this results from a “generative dance” 
between knowing and knowledge, between tacit and explicit knowledge. Christensen 
(1997/2006) notes that innovation can vary in scope—from internal processes to external 
marketplace—and from sustaining current market structure to disrupting it. Organizational 
effectiveness can be understood, according to Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983), in terms of focus 
and structure. They see focus as varying from internal to external, and structure ranging from 
control to flexibility. Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) present this as the basis for various 
organizational models, and for understanding core goals or values. Or, at least it is a basis for 
thinking about organizations’ people, productivity, acquisitions, and stability. 
There is something of a bifurcation between attempts to explain how organizations learn 
and attempts to improve organizational learning (Argyris, 1999; Easterby-Smith & Araujo, 
1999). Easterby-Smith and Araujo (1999) make a further distinction between the social and 
technical views of both organizational learning and learning organizations. The technical, which 
has dominated to date, focuses on organizational performance, particularly as measured in 
economic or financial terms. The social is more concerned with how meaning is constructed. 
Where the former eschews politics as a foil, the latter accepts it as an integral aspect of 
organizations.  
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Huber (1993/1996) argues that learning does not require a change in behavior: “An 
organization learns if, through its processing of information, the range of its potential behaviors 
is changed” (p. 126). Noting that this applies to any entity, including a society, that can acquire, 
distribute, interpret, and remember information, he maintains that an entity learns if even a single 
unit (member) acquires knowledge and recognizes it as potentially useful. The more units 
recognize this usefulness, the more varied interpretations of the knowledge, and the more 
uniform comprehensions of the interpretations are, the more learning occurs.  
Huber (1993/1996) reviews literature on acquisition of knowledge by various means: 
congenital, experiential, and vicarious, by grafting, by intentional searching, and by unintentional 
noticing. He concludes that only acquisition by experience and search have been thoroughly 
considered, but without synthesis or conceptual work. There are many diverse factors that 
contribute to change in the range of potential organizational behaviors, Huber concludes, but 
relatively few have been studied, and there has been little substantiation of theory. The research 
is highly fragmented with much specialization and little collaboration or integration, according to 
Huber’s analysis, and is not applied to improving organizational learning.  
The technical approach, exemplified by Huber (Easterby-Smith and Araujo, 1999) is 
behaviorist: If an organization is successful, if it maintains in the face of change or changes to 
overcome threats, it has learned. But the approach does not involve actually ascertaining the state 
of an organization’s knowledge, either prior to or after learning has apparently occurred; it offers 
no practical insights.  
A somewhat more “social” perspective on organizational learning is offered by Weick 
and Roberts (1993/1996). In collective mind—which they define as “heedful interrelating” —
there is careful coordination of action and knowledge. Multiple actors act jointly to contribute to 
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a social system, and subordinate their personal actions to the system and its outcomes. Actions of 
individuals are interdependent and integrated into a seamless system, the dynamics of which are 
“felt” or sensed rather than categorically and explicitly described or measured. Knowledge is 
acquired from the system via dialog and narrative, based on common artifacts and shared 
experience. Then, by dialog and narrative, it is fed back into the system by each individual 
participant. Organizational learning perpetuates and reinforces the system, even as it shapes and 
reinforces participants’ identities.  
From this perspective learning by rather than in organizations is primarily a cultural 
rather than cognitive phenomenon: It is about shared meanings rather than collective behaviors 
(Cook and Yanow, 1993/1996); behaviors are simply means to create meaning. The implication 
for assessment is that only those directly engaged in the action—at least in the “systems that 
cannot fail” like those discussed by Weick and Roberts (1993/1996)—can tacitly assess the 
situation. 
Weick and Roberts (1993/1996) somewhat resolve the social/technical divide by 
demonstrating the parallel between cognitive operations at the individual level and cultural 
operations at the organizational level: they operate via differential connections and patterns of 
nodal activation. Where these connective patterns result in habits of individuals, routines are 
manifest organizational behaviors. Routines are matched as appropriate to situations encountered 
by the organization, shaped more by past experience than future expectations, and judged in 
terms of the relation between actual and desired outcomes. All of this occurs within an ecology 
of learners within which patience is a virtue, because it allows learning effects to emerge (Levitt 
and March, 1988/1996).  
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The technical approach to learning organizations, most evident in work on intellectual 
capital, focuses on measuring and valuing knowledge. Stewart (1997) defines it as “intellectual 
material—knowledge, information, intellectual property, experience—that can be put to use to 
create wealth” (p. x), or “Intellectual capital is packaged useful knowledge” (p. 67). It is related 
to and made up of human, structural, customer, organizational, and other non-financial capital, 
including leadership and culture and values (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Stewart, 1997). 
Adherents to the intellectual capital approach provide complex sets of metrics that make up the 
seemingly simple calculation: Human Capital + Structural Capital + Relational Capital  = 
Intellectual Capital (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Roos, et al., 1998), but this includes such 
intangibles as “Customer IT literacy,” “Innovation,” and “Motivation.”  
The proliferation of variables and metrics for intellectual capital (Bontis, 2001) suggest 
conceptual fragmentation and a weak theoretical framework. After constructing and applying a 
knowledge-measurement methodology, King and Zeithaml (2003) conclude that the results of 
such methods have limited general value because knowledge resources vary greatly across 
industries and organizations. Lee, Lee, and Kang (2005) focus on the efficiency of knowledge-
circulation processes in an organization—creation, accumulation, sharing, utilization, and 
internalization of knowledge—and claim that organizations are able to become more knowledge-
intensive as the amount of resources required for these functions decreases. Knowledge 
circulation can be seen as collective cognition, or simply division of labor. While the concept of 
knowledge circulation is useful for analyzing organizational learning, it does not deal with the 
reality that what qualifies as knowledge is contingent on circumstances. Nor does the concept 
accommodate the possibility that knowledge can emerge spontaneously without a cause or 
source. 
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Krogh, Roos, and Slocum (1994) consider difficulties related to organizational 
knowledge—and, similarly, for regional knowledge: Knowledge is enacted by multiple knowers. 
It has context and scope that can be either very general or very specific. And knowledge is 
captured, communicated, and evaluated via language. Spender and Grant (1996) point out that 
knowledge is given meaning across various levels—industry, firm, department—and that 
quantitative methods may not be able to address this variability and richness. 
Senge (2006) exemplifies the social approach to learning organizations. Learning is 
“expanding the ability to produce the results we truly want in life” (p. 142). This occurs via 
generative rather than just adaptive learning, not just surviving but also enhancing our creative 
abilities. “The core learning dilemma that confronts organizations [is that] we learn best from 
experience,” notes Senge, “but we never directly experience the consequences of many of our 
most important decisions” (p. 23). More succinctly, “every organization is a product of how its 
members think and interact” (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, & Ross, 1994, p. 48). But organizations 
are complex dynamic systems in which “doing the obvious thing does not produce the obvious, 
desired results” (p. 71). Feedback can be reinforcing/amplifying or balancing/stabilizing; small 
amounts of the latter can lead to big changes, and small amounts of the former can hamper big 
changes. Both types of feedback consist of some source(s) of information, represented by one or 
more variables, which interact to inform behavior. The fundamental factors that can be derived 
from Senge (2000, 2006)—although he doesn’t put them so simply—are connections and vision. 
Connections and vision represent the interactions and thoughts that amplify—or attenuate—each 
other.  
Other notable social approaches to organizational learning include Choo (1998), and 
Davenport and Prusak (1998), who are somewhat more “technical” than Senge. Choo builds on 
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Senge’s ideas as well of those of others, but is more detailed and structured, and proffers a 
holistic model of learning organizations. His model includes modes of knowing—sense making, 
knowledge creating, and decision-making—which organizations (and individuals, groups, etc.) 
employ as appropriate to the circumstances, converting explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge, 
and back again. Choo identifies cognitive, affective, and situational dimensions that vary with 
mode and with knowledge conversion. In place of Senge’s shared vision, Choo looks for “shared 
mind”: ability to learn together, evident in the organization’s culture and the ways in which it’s 
members reach—or don’t reach—consensus.  
Davenport and Prusak (1998) begin with a working definition of knowledge—a 
taxonomy, really. Information is “data that makes a difference” (p. 3), Davenport and Prusak 
(1998) tell us, and “knowledge derives from minds at work” processing information (p. 5). 
Davenport and Prusak parallel Choo’s modes with a process that generates, codifies and 
coordinates, and transfers knowledge. In Davenport and Prusak’s model, each step in the process 
involves different roles and skills, which are rather more observable than Choo’s affective, 
cognitive, and situational variables. Davenport and Prusak repackage Senge’s disciplines as 
critical activities for organizational learning, each of which contributes to the efficacy of 
processing data into information into knowledge. 
Collins (2001) presents an empirically-derived model that also essentially extends 
Senge’s (2006) concepts of mastery and feedback into a process for organizational 
transformation. Unlike Choo’s (1998) knowing cycle, Davenport and Prusak’s knowledge 
process, or intellectual capital’s foci and timeframes of knowledge (Stewart, 1997; Edvinsson & 
Malone, 1997), Collins’ “Good to Great” model is developmental. Collins sees the process 
occurring over a relatively long time. Organizations gain capabilities by engaging the “right” 
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people, getting them to think together, and to act collectively. The Good-to-Great development 
process is driven by iterations of a “council” asking questions, dialoging and debating, making 
decisions, and analyzing the results of those decisions. This iterative process is practically a 
hybrid of Shewart’s plan-do-check-act cycle (Deming, 1986), Kolb’s (1984) experiential 
learning model, and van der Spek and Spijkervet’s (1997) knowledge activities, as well as 
Boisot’s (1995) information space, and Choo’s (1998) modes. It is notable that Deming and Kolb 
both also promoted active involvement of those closest to the work. 
A somewhat different approach, which focuses on organizations’ attractiveness to highly 
capable individuals, is Gratton’s (2007) Hot Spot model. She characterizes attractiveness as a 
function of cooperative mindset, boundary spanning, igniting purpose, and productive capacity 
within the organization, each of which is developed through iterative processes similar to Argryis 
and Schön’s (1978), Senge’s (2006), and Collin’s (2001). Her parallel to Boisot’s (1995) 
information space and Stewart’s knowledge forms/states is a matrix of a relationship’s depth 
(strength) to its boundary spanning. Different combinations of span and strength allow different 
strategies for creating hotspots. Novel combinations of people, exploitation of shared expertise, 
and exploration via synthesis are social, intellectual, and emotional drivers of human capital. 
This is a variation of March’s (1991) concept of exploiting versus exploring technologies, as 
well as Stewart’s (1997) model for dealing with various types of knowledge.  
Community in Organizational Learning 
The concept of community plays a central role in organizational learning, particularly 
highly social approaches, such as those of Gozdz (1995), Penuel and Roschelle (1999), Wenger, 
McDermott, and Snyder (200 2), Voosen and Conneely (2005), and Wenger, Trayner, and de 
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Laat (2011). In this literature, community is something that exists within organizations—“a 
group of individuals with some common interests and greater density of communication within 
than across its boundaries” (Markus, 1990, p. 194), rather than a geographically situated 
phenomenon (Hillery, 1955, 1958; Fischer, et al., 1977; Fischer 1982). And, the focus is 
practical, so theory is implicit rather than explicit; the theoretical essence is that community is 
the means of learning.  
The contributors to Gozdz (1995) offer a wide range of perspectives on community in 
organizations, but the overall message is, “Community in organizations is essential for optimal 
performance and learning capability. Without it we cannot create aligned organizations that 
coherently work toward shared goals and objectives” (p. 415). The need for community arises 
from the nature of knowledge, according to Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder (2002), “that it is 
not an object that can be stored, owned, and moved like a piece of equipment or a document. ... 
Companies must manage their knowledge in ways that do not merely reduce it to an object” (p. 
11).  
From cognitive science, Penuel and Roschelle (1999) conclude that practical knowledge 
develops in communities by solving a variety of problems, particularly in novel situations, based 
on prior learning, enabled by collaboration, and guided by reflection. Voosen and Conneely 
(2005) present learning communities as facilitated and supported teams of learners focused on 
creating new, tacit knowledge to solve ill-formed problems. Senge and Scharmer (2006) see 
learning community as “a diverse group of people working together to nurture and sustain a 
knowledge-creating system” (p. 197, emphasis in original) that involves three complementary 
domains of action: research, capacity-building, and practice. This requires guiding ideas, 
infrastructure, and common work. 
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Learning communities are especially prevalent in academic settings. Hord (1997) notes 
that the term was common in educational lexicon, although it had no clear definition—the 
community could be educators, administrators, students, parents, external stakeholders, or some 
combination of these. The concept was refined into community of inquiry, focusing on students 
and teachers learning together, especially in the context of online and blended learning 
environments. Garrison, Anderson, and Archer (2000) suggest that an educational experience is 
defined by cognitive, social, and teaching presence, so the question becomes how to maximize 
those things online. The authors see practical inquiry, which they see as a process of shared 
perception, deliberation, conception, and action, as the basis for building communities of inquiry. 
Friedman (2006) discusses how scholarship might be extended via communities of inquiry 
within communities of practice that include both researchers and practitioners. But Rourke and 
Kanuka (2009) find problems with construct validity, means for measuring learning, and, more 
fundamentally, learning outcomes from communities of inquiry. In particular, they question the 
concept of cognitive presence, finding that it does not emerge in online communities of inquiry. 
Interestingly, the model of practical inquiry suggested by Garrison, Anderson, and Archer (2000) 
is very similar to cyclic loops of learning, discussed below. But the extent of these activities and 
the extent to which they are shared do not seem to be important factors in the communities of 
inquiry research. 
Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat (2011) view “community and network as two aspects of 
social structures in which learning takes place” (p. 9). Networks are defined by connections and 
flows, according to Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat, communities are defined by shared identity 
and collective intentions. Connections, flows, shared identity, and collective are all learning 
resources. Noise, spontaneity, and unpredictability are inherent characteristics of communities 
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and networks, any, and, or all of which can feed or undermine learning. Too strong a collective 
identity means too little noise and variation, maintain Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat (2011), and 
too much noise impedes collective identity and interests from emerging: 
[C]ommunity creates a social space in which participants can discover and 
further a learning partnership related to a common domain ... [but 
community] can become hostage to its history, its established ways of 
doing things, and the attendant identification with the group. (p. 10) 
The learning value of network derives from access to a rich web of 
information sources offering multiple perspectives and dialogues, 
responses to queries, and help from others ... Expanding connectivity 
increases the chance of useful access, but it also increases the level of 
“noise.” (p. 11) 
Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat (2011) say knowledge is collected and sense-making 
occurs via narratives, collective and individual, as accounts of community/network activities, 
aspirational narratives that frame community/network success, and the tensions between 
accounts and aspirations. Value develops through cycles from immediate intrinsic value, through 
potential value as knowledge capital and applied value as changes in practice to realized value of 
performance improvement. This parallels the four levels of Kirkpatrick’s (Kirkpatrick & 
Kirkpatrick, 2006) model of learning, to which Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat (2011) add a fifth 
level of reframing value to redefine success. Each level has different quantitative indicators of 
increasing impacts through time and space, and different evaluative/reflective questions and 
value-creation stories.  
Cycles in Organizational Learning 
The defining metaphor of organizational learning theory is undoubtedly the loop. An 
early version of the loop is the Shewart cycle, the plan-do-check/study-act cycle promoted by 
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Deming (1986; Gabor, 1990) and widely used as the basis for continuous improvement. 
Deming’s guidance is to apply the cycle iteratively to critical issues, one after another, in a 
disciplined, data-driven manner. Argyris and Schön (1978) begin with a simple model of how 
outcomes are linked back to actions via beliefs and feelings, then they add ability to improve 
action, and finally they note how the linkages might be improved to better align enacted and 
espoused theories. Thus they add a second loop of learning to learn. Argyris and Schön (1978), 
the plan-do-check/study-act (Deming, 1986; Gabor,1990), and the Lean Startup (Ries, 2011) are 
similarly structured, but operate at different scales, allowing for loops to be embedded in each 
other. According to Lindsley, Brass, and Thomas (1995), spiraling loops of perceived efficacy 
and performance link individuals, groups, and organizations, but have different characteristics at 
different levels: higher level spirals of efficacy and performance seem to be harder to start and 
stop, downward spirals are more evident than upward spirals, and higher level spirals may 
interfere with or mask lower levels spirals. 
There are numerous larger-scale process models of organizational learning. Crossan, 
Lane, and White (1999) see intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing as 
comprising organizational learning, and connecting action and improvement at individual, group, 
and organizational levels. Choo’s (1998), Davenport and Prusak’s (1998), Collins’ (2001), and 
Gratton’s models all share features with Crossan, Lane, and White. At more general level are 
Simon’s (1976) model of decision-making, Weick’s (1995) sense-making, and Williamson’s 
(1981) transaction costs, and Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat’s (2011) value-creation cycles. 
Focused, smaller-scale processes, such as action learning (Revans, 1998; Kramer, 2008), 
appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005), and Peters’ (2009) DATA-DATA model, 
are also similar. The common features are a series of general actions each of which involves 
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information and feeds into the next action, culminating in increased capabilities and reduced 
uncertainty. Each action or phase in each cycle involves a different set of rules, roles, and 
resources—different knowledge bases—applied to the evolving issue. And, the process is 
applied iteratively.  
A central theoretical question is whether these models are positive statements about what 
is or normative statements about what should be. Are they suggestions about how organizations 
should be structured in order to learn? Or, are organizations that learn necessarily based on such 
cycles? A related issue is the structure of the “loops”: Does each loop consist of distinct phases? 
How do the phases interrelate; are they invariably linear and sequential? If the phases vary, how 
and why do they do so? The literature reviewed above tells us that there is at least a 
contemplative state and an experiential state—seeing and doing—that translate into active and 
reflective phases. It also tells us that such simplistic dualities are unrealistic. Action and 
reflection are generalities that are never realized in the extreme; we—collectively and 
individually—are always operating with both. Sometimes we are highly active, 
unselfconsciously attending to and through others. Other times we are deeply reflective, totally 
engrossed in self, not really doing anything. But, most of the time we are acting and reflecting, 
interacting and conversing, in a state between the two extremes of self- and other-orientation. 
This fusion is practically and simply captured in Toyota’s 14th quality principle: “Become a 
learning organization through relentless reflection (hansei) and continuous improvement 
(kaizen)” (Liker, 2004, 40). 
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Regional Learning 
The literature reviewed up to this point has not explicitly addressed a fundamental issue: 
location. People congregate in places, and places become associated with particular activities and 
products. The concept of geographic regions as containers of knowledge is as old as the social 
sciences, going back to classic economics’ attempt to explain why some locations are rich and 
others poor: Smith’s seminal Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1776/1904), and Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage (1817). Marshall advanced the 
concept with his consideration of industrial districts, emphasizing the importance of proximity 
and environmental factors (Asheim, 2003).  
The fundamental question became why some economic activities tend to agglomerate, or 
congregate in and around a particular location, rather than spread out in space. The general 
answer is that agglomeration somehow provides an advantage. “The original rationale for 
industrial districts rests on the creation of … economies that are external to the firm but internal 
to the area, for groups of small firms … [that] … provides a competitive alternative to the 
internal economies of scale of large firms” (Asheim, 2003, p. 415). Agglomeration allows for 
knowledge spillovers from firms and institutions to those around them, but it can also lead to 
technological lock-in and path dependency in which the economic fate of a region is tied to the 
lifecycle of its industry, from boom to bust (Audretsch, 1998). 
While Marshall is considered the father of neoclassical economics, the field largely 
ignored his interest in agglomeration (Asheim, 2003). Neoclassical economics did not account 
for how and why industrial districts blossomed, prospered, and declined. Regions were eclipsed 
during the mid-twentieth century as nations launched large-scale science programs, but economic 
restructuring and failure to produce market winners undermined this approach by the end of the 
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century (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Cooke, 2002). Schumpeter (1976/1942) provided the basis 
for a solution to the theoretical and programmatic shortcomings of neoclassical economics with 
insights into how entrepreneurs foster “creative destruction” by bringing innovative products into 
the marketplace (Cooke, 2002). Innovation requires resources beyond those readily available to 
the entrepreneur, thus they face transaction costs finding resources (including knowledge), 
executing contracts, and coordinating work (Williamson, 1981).  
Propinquity reduces transaction costs, allowing firms to be smaller and more specialized. 
Thus, “much of the competitive advantage lies outside a given company or even outside its 
industry, residing instead in the location of its business units” (Porter, 2003, p. 254, emphasis in 
original). The rise and fall of regions may be understood by replacing the term “competitive 
advantage” in this quote with the word “knowledge.” The unique availability of a full range of 
specialized knowledge makes regions economically important.  
Marshall emphasizes in particular the mutual knowledge and trust that 
reduces transaction costs in the local production system; the industrial 
atmosphere which facilitates the generation and transfer of skills and 
qualifications of workforce required by local industry; and the effect of 
both these aspects in promoting (incremental) innovations and innovation 
diffusion among small firms in industrial districts. (Asheim, 2003, pp. 
415-416)  
Many commentators maintain that improvements in communication should reduce the 
rationale for agglomeration (Cairncross, 2001). Others point out that this has not happened 
because collective assets and capabilities, transfer of tacit knowledge, and the very acts of 
creating knowledge and innovating require propinquity (Calhoun, 1998; Brown and Duguid, 
2002; Boschma, 2005; Cooke and Leysdesdorff, 2005). 
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Interest in agglomeration reemerged in the late twentieth-century. This interest was 
fueled by research documenting the role that the production of information and knowledge plays 
in our society (Machlup, 1962; Porat, 1977). Interest in agglomeration was informed by new 
appreciation of the roles of institutions and knowledge in economic theory (Williamson, 2000; 
Cortright, 2001). An emphasis on innovation by business thought leaders (Drucker, 1985, 
2002/1985) made agglomeration a practical matter. Those who resurrected agglomeration 
emphasize the integration of the social and economic. These scholars point to complementary 
public and private roles, and to balance between competition and cooperation, as important in 
agglomeration. There is division of labor (specialization) among numerous small firms, broad 
and rapid dissemination of information, and a highly skilled workforce. Agglomerating involves 
increasing importance of continual, radical innovations, and collective cognizance of a 
globalizing economy. It requires learning, most of all (Asheim, 2003). Piore and Sabel (1984) 
see the integration of community life with productive activities as the means by which networks 
of firms maintain collective assets and continually innovate. As Asheim (2003) puts it: 
In a learning economy, the competitive advantage of firms and regions is 
based on innovation, interactive learning processes. … [O]ne problematic 
aspect of the learning economy has been its focus on ‘catching up’ 
learning based on incremental innovations, and not radical innovations 
requiring the creation of new knowledge. (pp. 426-427)  
The concept of “learning regions” was proposed to explain how agglomeration fosters 
continual and radical innovations, and to illuminate modern issues related to globalization, 
knowledge-intensive enterprises, and technological change (Florida, 1995). Amin (2008) and 
other scholars (Tolliday & Zeitlin, 1992; Burrows, Gilbert & Pollert, 1992) contrast these 
socioeconomic phenomena with large-scale, standardized production that they refer to as 
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Fordism, in reference to industrial approaches popularized by automotive magnate Henry Ford. 
In a global, post-Fordist, innovation-oriented economy, regions matter more than ever because 
“regions themselves are becoming focal points of knowledge-creation and learning … [that] 
function as collectors and repositories of knowledge and ideas, providing an underlying 
environment or infrastructure that facilitates the flow of knowledge, ideas, and learning” 
(Florida, 1995, p. 528). Florida goes on to say: 
Learning regions provide the crucial inputs for knowledge-intensive 
economic organization to flourish: a manufacturing infrastructure of 
interconnected vendors and suppliers; a human infrastructure that can 
produce knowledge workers, facilitates the development of a team 
orientation, and which is organized around life-long learning; a physical 
and communication infrastructure which facilitates and supports constant 
sharing of information, electronic exchange of data and information, just-
in-time delivery of goods and services, and integration into the global 
economy; and capital allocation and industrial governance systems attend 
to the needs of knowledge-intensive organizations. (p. 534) 
The challenges for firms, Florida (1995) maintains, are to “adopt new organizational and 
management systems that harness knowledge and intelligence,” to maintain “a balance between 
cutting edge innovation and high-quality and efficient production,” “to spur individual genius 
and creativity … and the collective mobilization of knowledge,” and “to build integrated and 
dense global webs of innovation and production” (p. 534). All of which implies a shift away 
from “the increasingly dysfunctional Fordist model” to sustainable advantage based on 
“continuous improvement of technology, continuous development of human resources, the use of 
clean production technology, elimination of waste, and a commitment to continuous 
environmental improvement” (p. 535). The implication is that firms cannot do these things on 
their own but require an intellectual, physical, and social environment that enables them to do 
them collectively: a learning region. 
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The learning-region paradigm emphasizes the networks or associational characteristics of 
a region in which firms are embedded, subsuming individual entrepreneurs and workers to 
consider how they function together rather than operate independently (Granovetter, 1985; 
Saxenian, 1994; Morgan, 1997). Various forms of proximity—cognitive, organizational, social, 
institutional, and geographical—provide stability and enable interactive learning (Boschma, 
2005), but excessive stability and static interactions resulting from “institutional thickness” can 
impede innovation (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Hauser, Tappeiner & Walde, 2007). Dynamic social 
networks with abundant weak ties within regions allow for knowledge spillovers and new 
opportunities for interactive learning. Broader extra-local networks bring new capabilities, ideas, 
and technologies into regions (MacKinnon, Cumbers, and Chapman, 2002). Both types of ties 
reduce transaction costs for knowledge as well as other resources, contributing to innovation by 
making it easy to connect disparate chunks of information into usable and useful knowledge.  
Embeddedness must be balanced by autonomy. If it is not, regions can get locked into a 
particular technology, following it from boom to bust. “It is the type of network relationships 
between organizations (firms, institutions) rather than their spatial clustering alone that 
determines the ability of regions to adapt” (Boschma and Lambooy, 1999, p. 393). Dynamism in 
social networks—lots of weak ties and shifting relationships—allows clusters (or the 
communities or regions in which they operate) to diversify, reinvent and revitalize themselves, 
and avoid technologically-determined path-dependency. Stronger, more stable ties provide 
governance, particularly to and through institutions, and reduce uncertainty, making it more 
practical for actors to take risks (Morgan, 1997).  
Some regional-learning literature, particularly prior to Florida’s explication of the 
concept, extends resource-based theories of organizations to explain why firms cluster together 
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by industry (see, for example, Porter, 1990). Breznitz and Taylor (2010) contrast such factor-
oriented theoretical perspectives with others that focus on social structure of regions, such as the 
dynamics of the “triple helix” of academia, government, and industry (Etzkotwitz and 
Leydesdorff, 1997; Etzkowitz, 2008) and an interactive model of innovation (Morgan, 1997). 
Cooke (2002) suggests that regional learning is essentially collaborative economic action by a 
localized socioeconomic system in response to natural socioeconomic disequilibrium. This 
requires social connections that are dynamic yet resilient: “knowledge is in the network,” Cooke 
(2002) maintains, “because each move in the interactive innovation process requires learning 
from other than those involved in the preceding move” (pp. 2 – 3, emphasis in the original). 
Breznitz and Taylor (2010) conclude that social structure is as important for innovation as 
economic factors, and more important to growing and retaining producers of technological 
innovations. 
The triple-helix theory (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997; Etzkotwitz, 2008) posits that a 
general type of social-network structure must exist for regional learning, and evolves in a 
particular way to sustain innovation. Generally, Etzkotwitz (2008) maintains, triple-helix 
regional learning emerges as the distinction between business and science is blurred, and as 
government facilitates this blurring with resources and regulatory relief. Civil society and 
voluntary associations provide the space for the helices to connect and overlap. “A triple helix 
regime typically begins as university, industry, and government enter into a reciprocal 
relationship with each other in which each attempts to enhance the performance of the other” 
(Etzkotwitz, 2008, p. 8). As industries become more knowledge-intensive, government and 
university play more important roles as enablers.  The triple helix evolves as each strand—
academia, government, or industry—takes on new roles similar to the roles of the others in 
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support of the others’ core competencies, as each strives to make the others successful. 
Performance of each helix improves as individuals and information circulate through it, and 
individuals and information circulating between the helices fuels innovation. 
Innovation is an interactive learning process, says Morgan (1997), with powerful 
feedback loops incorporating common and tacit knowledge, “that is shaped by a variety of 
institutional routines and social conventions” (Morgan, 1997, p. 493). Agglomeration, or clusters 
of complementary specialized entities in proximity and cooperating with each other, is a 
hallmark of learning regions. But the clusters are byproducts of the innovation process, of social 
propagation of knowledge from individuals to community, and of mobility within the region 
between firms (Cooke, 2002). These are made possible in turn by norms of reciprocity and 
trust—social capital—that facilitate network development, support interactive learning and 
innovation, and thereby provide competitive advantage. Cook maintains that “[C]lustering 
[exists] for learning, knowledge transfer, collaboration, and the exploitation of spillovers” (p. 3). 
The “innovation as interactive learning” theory further explicates and supports the “evolving 
triple helix as source of sustained radical innovation” theory: The triple helix provides the 
institutional infrastructure for interactive learning, and interactive learning provides the means by 
which the triple helix evolves.  
Moulaert and Sekia (2003) examine various “territorial innovation models” of regional 
learning. They find that each includes agglomeration, endogenous development, and systems of 
innovation. Each model also includes evolution and learning, network organization, and 
governance. But Moulaert and Sekia feel that these models suffer from theoretical ambiguity as a 
consequence of excessive focus on business culture and technological innovation. They suggest 
an “integrated area development” model that includes non-market components of the economy 
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and community life “to broaden the discussion on territorial innovation in all its dimensions, as a 
lead theme for the progress of humanity at the local level” (p. 299).  
MacKinnon, Cumbers, and Chapman (2002) fault regional-learning scholars for not fully 
considering the importance of extra-local ties in fostering innovation. Doloreux and Parto (2005) 
… contend that the interactions between actors in regional innovation 
systems have not been sufficiently explored, while the institutional context 
of these interactions has been largely overlooked. As a result, the validity 
of recommendations for innovation policy making based on the current 
analyses of regional innovation systems is somewhat questionable. (p. 
134) 
But, by reviewing the literature we can see that Doloreux and Parto’s contentions are not 
justified, as I now show.  
Brown and Duguid (2002) maintain that the only means of constructing regional 
advantage is to capitalize on local knowledge that is simultaneously “leaky” and “sticky.” Such 
knowledge inevitably leaks out of particular organizations but sticks in a particular region 
because it inheres to an embedded boundary, spanning local social networks.  Also consider what 
may be called “optimal proximity,” presented by Boschma (2005): a loosely coupled system, 
balancing local “buzz” with extra-local linkages, combining community and market relations, 
and providing institutional checks and balances, to create a common knowledge base with 
diverse but complementary capabilities. This involves cognitive, organizational, social, and 
institutional capabilities across and within geographical limits. Brown and Duguid (2002) and 
Boschma (2005) make essentially the same point: Sustained innovation capacity comes from 
leveraging unique local human assets for acquiring relevant global human assets and constantly 
recombining them. These perspectives are essentially elaborations on Marshall (Asheim, 2003), 
Piore and Sabel (1984), and others. 
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In the same ways that interactive learning enables firms to generate marketable 
innovations, case studies have shown that interactive learning by policy makers (Hassink, 2005) 
and boundary spanning by civic organizations (Safford, 2009) can be important for regions to 
recover from path dependency and revitalize. Cooke and Leysdesdorff (2005) maintain that 
regions provide “constructed advantage”—as opposed to comparative and competitive 
advantages—by intentionally aligning and integrating the regional economy, governance, 
knowledge infrastructure, and community and culture. Constructed advantage involves 
combining symbolic/creative, synthetic/technical, and analytic/scientific forms, linking the 
subsystems for knowledge creation, exploration, and exploitation, enabled by the triple helix. 
Gertler and Wolfe (2004) look at regional foresight exercises as interactive learning by 
individuals, organizations, and regions that allow them to adapt and innovate. Such broad-based 
collective learning can overcome the barriers to learning intrinsic to capitalism. Cross-sector 
interactive learning allows for the creation of the entirely new organizations necessary for the 
creative forgetting and unlearning by organizations and social systems. It leads to deep regional 
economic restructuring (Johnson, 1992; Hudson, 1999; Boschma and Lambooy, 1999).  
A new kind of organisation is spearheading the phenomenon: knowledge-
based communities, i.e. networks of individuals striving, first and 
foremost, to produce and circulate new knowledge and working for 
different, even rival, organisations. One sign that a knowledge-based 
economy is developing can be seen when such individuals penetrate 
conventional organisations to which their continuing attachment to an 
“external” knowledge-based community represents a valuable asset. As 
these communities develop their activities, they become agents of change 
for the economy as a whole. (David & Foray, 2002, p. 9) 
A knowledge-intensive community is a community where a large 
proportion of members is involved in the production and reproduction of 
knowledge and, hence, the creation of a public (or semi-public) space 
where knowledge is circulated and where codification and dissemination 
44 
costs have been radically reduced through the use of new information and 
communication technologies. (David & Foray, 2002, p. 14) 
Core Concepts 
This section builds on and extends the concepts and definitions embedded in the literature 
review, above. My focus here is on terms that are central to theories of learning, particularly 
those that I anticipate using in my proposed theory, and especially those that I use somewhat 
differently than is typical. My goal here is to clarify and validate my definitions of the terms as a 
basis for the results section of my dissertation.  
Learning. The key term in this proposed dissertation is learning. Schunk (2008) begins 
his comprehensive survey of theories of individual learning by defining learning as “an enduring 
change in behavior, or in the capacity to behave in a given fashion, which results from practice 
or other forms of experience” (p. 2). Note that the essence of learning for Schunk is a change, 
where the standard definition of learning is simply “the act or process of acquiring knowledge or 
skill” (learning, n.d.). Theory is implicit in both. For Schunk the essential theory is that “practice 
or other forms of experience” results in “an enduring change in behavior, or in the capacity to 
behave in a given fashion” (p. 2). The standard definition theorizes that “knowledge or skill” is 
acquired via an “act or process.” Together these definitions make learning both an act—or series 
of activities (a process)—and the result of that act; it is both a change in behavioral capacity and 
acquisition of knowledge or skill, which are presumable demonstrable. 
Acting and behaving are both important to learning; what’s the difference? To act is “to 
do something, to exert energy or force” (act, n.d.), generally to benefit or perpetuate the actor, 
whereas behavior is a pattern of interactions in the social context of mores, norms, and values. 
As noted in the philosophy of action (Wilson & Shpall, 2012), action implies agency, 
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consciousness, intention, and mind. Action has meaning to the actor(s), others attribute meaning 
to the actions/actors, and actors shape their actions to affect meaning (Weber, 1922/1978); Thus, 
action becomes behavior. Action or behavior without agency is simply an effect of gravity, 
thermodynamics, or other laws of nature. These definitions do not venture to say that learning is 
an improvement, though—only a change. Next, I argue that learning is necessarily a beneficial 
change, or increase in capabilities. 
Capability and knowledge. Undergirding the definition of learning are two essential 
terms: capability and knowledge. The dictionary definition of capability refers to “ability or 
capacity” (capable, n.d.), but I use the term to mean the combination of the two: ability given 
capacity, where capacity is the quantity that can be accommodated or carried, and ability refers 
to the quality of accomplishments from using capacity. Capability is both the know-how and the 
resources to act (Sen, 1988, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000; Clark, 2005). Knowledge is informed true 
belief; something that one accepts as real or true, based on reasoning from sense data, that is 
actually real or true. This definition is derived from Plato (Meno, The Republic, and Theaetetus), 
who refers to knowledge as justified true belief. Using the term “informed” rather than 
“justified” avoids the problems of justification (Gettier, 1963; Chisholm, 1982), and provides 
practical criteria for knowing by substituting information for justification. Shannon and Weaver 
(1949) define information as a probabilistic measure of uncertainty, or simply something that 
reduces uncertainty. So, essentially, knowledge is content of the mind derived from the senses, 
even if indirectly via reason, that is coherent, consistent, and correspondent. One can increase the 
quantity or scope of one’s informed true beliefs, or one’s existing beliefs can become better 
informed and more true. Either way, an increase in knowledge improves one’s capabilities to act. 
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Belief. For the purpose of this dissertation, belief is simply defined as contents of mind, 
which is consonant with the standard definition (belief, n.d.). Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) say that, 
“beliefs refer to a person’s subjective probability judgments concerning some discriminable 
aspect of his world; they deal with a person’s understanding of himself and his environment” (p. 
131). For every belief there is an object that the belief is about, a relationship, a second object or 
characteristic or outcome, and a probability associated with that relationship. Belief that a thing 
exists—belief in—is simply a fundamental form of belief about. Beliefs can arise from direct 
observation, which Fisbein and Ajzen (1975) refer to as descriptive beliefs, or can be inferred 
from past experience, from logic, and socially promulgated associations. Experience creates a 
“residue” of beliefs according to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), which is critical to inference: 
It is thus possible to view beliefs as representing a continuum from 
descriptive to inferential. At the descriptive end of the continuum, a 
person’s beliefs are directly tied to the stimulus situation, and a the 
inferential end, beliefs are formed on the basis of these stimuli as well as 
residues of the person’s past experiences; the continuum may be seen as 
involving minimal to maximal use of such experiential residues. (p. 133) 
So, belief can be defined formally in terms of the relationship between to objects or qualities, the 
subjective probability assigned to the relationship, and the extent to which the belief draws on 
prior experience—it is new content of the mind or built upon existing content. 
Knowledge has verisimilitude (Popper, 1963/2003) when it is coherent, consistent, and 
correspondent. These are the criteria for true knowledge. Coherent knowledge is clear, sensible, 
and has well-integrated components (i.e., propositions) that do not contradict each other (Young, 
2008). Consistent knowledge—based on Habermas (1979, 1984) and the pragmatists, Dewey 
(1910/1991,1929/1984; Hickman & Alexander, 1999), James (1907/1975), and Peirce (Peirce, 
Hartshorne, & Weiss, 1935)—is invariably expressed and experienced, particularly via narrative 
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and practice. Correspondent knowledge accurately represents some aspect of reality (David, 
2009). While these definitions can be seen as competing philosophical views of truth, they can 
also be seen as complementary criteria for true knowledge, i.e., true knowledge must meet all 
three criteria to have maximum verisimilitude, to be considered “most true.”  
Ryle (1946, 1949) makes the distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how. There 
is a huge difference between “acknowledging principles in thought and intelligently applying 
them in action” (1946, p. 8). Principles may explain and guide action but one does not need to 
know the principles to act, and “Knowing a rule is not knowing how” (1946, p. 7). Knowing-that 
involves putative facts or truths, while knowing-how often occurs without conscious theorizing. 
In fact, action and experience precede and inform as well as validate fact and theory, Ryle 
insists. It is not the declaration that makes the action possible, rather the other way around. Of 
course, the action may be observed rather than experienced directly, particularly when actions 
are particularly dangerous, but that is a weaker form of knowing-how. Ryle built on previous 
philosophers, particularly Russell (1911), who argued that true knowledge involved firsthand 
experience (knowledge by acquaintance), and that knowledge by description (know-of) was a 
lesser form of knowing. 
Ryle’s ideas can be seen in Bandura’s social cognitive theory, particularly learning by 
observing versus learning by doing (Bandura, 1986), and in the distinction between moral 
competence and moral performance (Bandura, 2001). Ryle is also reflected in How People Learn 
(Bransford, Brown & Cocking, 2000), which reports that experts’ knowledge can’t be reduced to 
a set of facts or rules; they can retrieve specialized knowledge with little effort, but may be 
incapable of teaching others. Essentially, there is an ineffable, non-codifiable knowledge of 
procedures that comes with experience. This knowledge enables statements about what is real or 
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true, but those statements can only be tested, validated, and verified by application, which may 
require expertise from repeated application (i.e., just because something doesn’t work the first 
time you try it, doesn’t mean it’s wrong, it just means you’re doing it wrong and you have to try 
it again and do it right). 
Polanyi (1958, 1966) extends Ryle’s distinction to explicit and tacit knowledge, 
distinguishing between knowledge that can be codified and easily transferred and knowledge that 
can be shared only through interaction. All knowledge, Polanyi notes, is based on personal 
judgment and is consequently subjective. Both Polanyi and Ryle reject the Cartesian dualism 
between mind and body. Polanyi, particularly, explores how we can indwell an object, attend 
through it—rather than to it—to something else, essentially integrating mind and body. For 
Polanyi, knowing and doing are integrated into being (similar to, but distinct from Heidegger’s 
approach (Capobianco, 2010)). Interestingly, Polanyi’s work seems to have had more impact on 
organizational learning, where there is interest in generating and monetizing knowledge, than on 
education (as recent examples: Pfeffer and Sutton, 2000; Lam, 2000; Bennet and Bennet, 2008; 
Busch, 2008; Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009). 
Just as Ryles and Polanyi rejected Cartesian mind-body dualism, so did Heidegger 
(Capobianco, 2010) and Habermas (1979, 1984) reject the object-subject distinction. For 
Heidegger, this dualism disappears in being. Habermas (1979, 1984) made the point that each 
action or utterance is embedded in the intersubjective, the world of ideas, language, and values 
that has been constructed and is reconstructed by human interaction. Habermas maintains that 
statements can only be valid if they are consistent with the objective “it,” the subjective “I,” and 
the intersubjective “we.” Habermas suggests that the rational is established via communication, 
that language serves as the means for connecting doing to knowing, for translating implicit 
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know-how into explicit know-that and using know-that to inform know-how. To be considered 
fully rational, any action/thought/expression must be seen as normatively (intersubjective), 
objectively, and subjectively valid to all involved: It must be true (“it”), right (“we”), and sincere 
(“I”). Valid knowledge—and consequent actions and expressions—corresponds with what is 
objectively considered real, consists of intersubjectively defined social mores, and coheres with 
one’s subjective believes and experiences. 
All of this must be placed in the context of current understanding of reality. Most 
fundamentally, as already noted, human knowledge and understanding are limited (Plato, The 
Republic; Descartes, 1641/1998; Simon, 1976, 1991). In the last century we have come to 
understand that this is not just a limit of the human mind; it is a fundamental aspect of reality. 
Einstein’s theory of relativity (1920), Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (1930), Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem (1931/2000), and Arrow’s impossibility theorem (1970) show that 
reality is inherently contingent and uncertain. The result is described by Shannon’s theory of 
communication (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) in which information is inevitably reduced by 
entropy and noise. The fundamental uncertainty of nature is evident in chaotic and complex 
phenomena for which absolutely accurate prediction is impossible, there is self-similarity or 
recursion across scale, and small causes can have large effects (Waldrop, 1992; Kelly, 1995; 
Prigogine, 1997). Individual units can self-organize into unique wholes and new properties can 
emerge seemingly without cause (Goldstein, 1999; Corning, 2002), particularly among living, 
self-referential systems (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Luhmann, 1990). 
Taken to the social scale, fundamental realities mean that objectivity and rationality must 
be looked on with skepticism. Heidegger (1927/1996) rejects objectivity. Kuhn (1962/1996) lays 
bare the process by which scientific paradigms are constructed and supplanted. Lyotard 
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(1979/1984) points out the impossibility of generalization and the limits of universal 
“metanarratives.” Habermas (1984) and Giddens (1986) discuss how rationality and social 
structure are continually redefined as people communicate with each other. We may be certain 
that causality exists, but the exact levels of cause and effect, and the relations between them, are 
complex, contingent, and fundamentally uncertain. 
In summary, knowledge is informed, true belief, which is manifested as capabilities. 
Learning is both the outcome and process of gaining capabilities and knowledge. Knowledge can 
take several complementary forms—know how, know that, etc.—and can be explicit, implicit, or 
tacit. The criteria for knowledge are coherence, consistence, and correspondence, which 
comprise trueness or verisimilitude. Validity must be subjective, objective, and intersubjective. 
The processing of information into knowledge can vary in cognitive efficiency, efficacy, and 
equity. The outputs of learning can be understood in terms of cognitive metrics, knowledge 
criteria, forms of knowledge, and validity. All of these thinks are inherently limited and 
uncertain, and are arbitrarily defined by human interaction. The basic question for the 
dissertation is about the process and activities that result in learning, and how they relate to 
individual, organizational, regional, and broader social factors.   
Multilevel. Given that the purpose of this dissertation is to provide an explanation and 
model of learning that spans multiple levels of social aggregation, I really should provide a clear 
definition of multilevel, including what it means for a model or theory to be multilevel. The 
literature reviewed here makes it apparent that social theories don’t just accommodate multiple 
levels of social aggregation; the theories seek to identify the levels, explain why they are distinct 
from, and help us understand how they relate to, each other. A distinction must be made between 
classes-collectives-sets and elements-individuals-members, Dubin (1969) tells us, to avoid the 
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mistakes of assuming the individual mirrors the class or assuming that the collective is simply 
the sum of its members. “Multilevel models enable the analyst to view people in the context of 
their social and organizational hierarchies,” say Heck and Thomas (2009): 
Because of the presence of these successive grouping, people within 
particular organizations may share certain properties including work-
related beliefs, attitudes, and goals. Similarly, properties of groups may 
also be influenced by the people in them. (p. 1) 
Rousseau (1985) provides basic concepts and issues, beginning with the idea that 
multilevel implies hierarchical relationships in which higher-level entities are composed of, 
larger, and more complex than lower-level entities. Higher-level entities are “interdependent, 
goal directed” collectives, in Morgeson and Hofmann’s (1999) formulation, that emerge from 
and influence individual action. 
The implication is that variation occurs within subjects, at lower levels, as well as 
between subjects of a given level, and a fundamental question for multilevel theories is how 
variation within a unit relates to variation between units (Heck & Thomas, 2009). Thus, in 
multilevel models the focus is on correlation between variance of constructs as much as their 
values. Generally: 
Multilevel theories, thus, begin to bridge the micro-macro divide, 
integrating the micro domain’s focus on individuals and groups with the 
macro domain’s focus on individuals and group with the macro domain’s 
focus on organizations, environment, and strategy. The result is a deeper, 
richer portrait of organizational life—one that acknowledges the 
influences of the organizational context on individuals’ actions and 
perceptions and the influence of individuals’ action and perceptions on the 
organizational context (Klein, Tosi, & Cannella, 1999, pg. 243, emphasis 
in original).  
This dissertation seeks to take this understanding to another level—literally and 
figuratively—by considering how regional context influences organizations and individuals, and 
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vice-versa. In this dissertation, I will refer to individuals and their activities, characteristics, etc., 
as micro, to groups and organizations as meso, and to regions as macro. 
Community. The other term that will be important is community. The standard definition 
of the term (community, 2003) involves, “A group of people living in the same locality and 
under the same government” and “The district or locality in which such a group lives,” but also 
“A group of people having common interests” and “A group viewed as forming a distinct 
segment of society” (community, 2003). Tönnies’ (1887/2001) made the seminal distinction 
between community ties (Gemeinschaft), which cause individuals to place others above self, 
exemplified by family, from the ties of society (Gesellschaft), which are based on self-interest. In 
1955, Hillery noted ninety-four definitions of the term in sociological literature, and his 1958 
seminal consideration of the topic focused on “a social group inhabiting a common territory and 
having one or more additional common ties” (p. 237).  
Arensberg and Kimball (1965) see community as “a master institution or master social 
system; a key to society; and a model, indeed perhaps the most important model of culture… a 
main link, perhaps a major determinant, in the connections between culture and society” (p. ix). 
Sanders (1975) turns this linkage around, saying that community “is part of and acted upon by 
complex environmental factors” (p. 44). This “setting” includes a community’s ecology, 
demography, culture, personality, time, and society at large. For a community to prosper, 
Sanders (1975) suggests that it must: 
1. Recruit new members either through birth, in-migration, or 
annexation, and maintain existing members; 
2. Train the new members to play the appropriate roles as they take their 
places and achieve status in the community; 
3. Exert some form of control over individuals who deviate too far from 
the norm. (p. 192) 
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These processes are carried forward, Sanders suggests, by two general functions: 
allocation and communication. The allocation of resources, roles, power and prestige to members 
of the community provides incentives and disincentives for becoming, staying, or bringing in a 
member of the community, and for filling certain roles or behaving in certain ways. 
Communication is the means by which members or potential members of a community come to 
know how the community performs allocation—how much of what resources are assigned to 
which components of the community. Communication allows the community to carry out its 
processes—recruitment, socialization, and control—by bringing individuals within its 
boundaries, enhancing their ability to deal with diversity and to prosper, and inform members 
about those processes. 
Social psychologists such as McMillan and Chavez (1986) approach community from an 
individuals’ perspective. They define community phenomenologically, in terms of the 
individual’s sense of belonging, influence, needs fulfillment, and shared emotional commitment, 
which apply—like Arensberg & Kimball’s and Sander’s definitions—to interest-based 
communities as well as place-based ones. McMillan and Chavez (1986) provide detailed 
definitions of each aspect of community: 
[M]embership has five attributes: boundaries, emotional safety, a sense of 
belonging and identification, personal investment, and a common symbol 
system. These attributes work together and contribute to a sense of who is 
a part of the community and who is not. (p. 11) 
Influence is a bidirectional concept. In one direction, there is the notion 
that for a member to be attracted to a group, he or she must have some 
influence over what the group does. … On the other hand, cohesiveness is 
contingent on a group’s ability to influence its members. (p. 11) 
[F]or any group to maintain a positive sense of togetherness, the 
individual-group association must be rewarding for its members. … The 
extent to which individual values are shared among community members 
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will determine the ability of a community to organize and prioritize its 
needs-fulfillment activities. … ¶ … A strong community is able to fit 
people together so that people meet others’ needs while they meet their 
own. (p. 12-13) 
A shared emotional connection is based, in part, on a shared history. It is 
not necessary that group members have participated in the history in order 
to share it, but they must identify with it. The interactions of members in 
shared events and specific attributes of the events may facilitate or inhibit 
the strength of the community. (p. 13) 
In summary, strong communities are those that offer members positive 
ways to interact, important events to share and ways to resolve them 
positively, opportunities to honor members, opportunities to invest in the 
community, and opportunities to experience spiritual bond among 
members. (p. 14) 
So, community as a concept is strongly associated with, but does not necessarily involve, 
place. It does, however, link individuals and groups together, and to broader society. Place, as 
well as interests, is basically means for making that linkage. Community is phenomenon—not a 
thing—that is evident in interactions between humans (and other living things). The phenomenon 
is sensed so strongly that it is perceived as a thing. Indeed, this can be seen as a central element 
of the definition: Community is perceived affective ties among actors.  
Conceptually, community is a nexus of human needs-fulfillment activities that is clearly 
identified and valued as such by participants. Community is evident in the extent to which 
participants would forego personal benefits in order to establish or sustain this nexus. Morse 
(2005) introduces the concept of community learning, but implies that community is a thing 
when he says that, “[c]ommunity learning is collaborative learning that occurs at the community 
level about community level concerns” (p. 4, emphasis in the original). Morse (2005) provides 
six postulates about learning as a community-level process: 
Postulate I: The community process creates new, collective knowledge in the form of 
shared meanings or collective ideas. (p. 13) 
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Postulate II: Structured processes of dialogue and deliberation facilitate the community 
process. (p. 15) 
Postulate III: The community process creates, maintains, or strengthens the relationships 
which constitute the social structure of community. (p. 19)	  
Postulate IV: A model of community as the structure of interinstitutional relations 
focuses the attention of researchers and community participants on the linkages across 
community institutions and social fields. (p. 20) 
Postulate V: Community learning occurs as knowledge created through the community 
process is fed-forward to the level of the community structure or field. A community has 
learned when this collective knowledge is institutionalized across the community 
structure, or rather, is embedded across the web of community institutions. (p. 23-24) 
Postulate VI: A “learning community” has a well-developed community structure that 
has institutionalized the practice of community learning, thus facilitating a sustained 
community process. Such communities are said to be taking advantage of the “collective 
intelligence.” They have created ongoing “forums for interaction”, or space for the 
community process at the level of the community structure or field. (p. 27) 
Morse (2005), like other scholars who focus on community, implies that the term 
community refers to a thing. As things, 
Communities are collections of actors whose membership in the collective 
provides social and cultural resources that shape their actions. 
Membership can result from a number of factors, including propinquity, 
interest in a common goal, or common identity. (Marquis, Lounsbury, & 
Greenwood, 2011, p. xvi) 
According to Marquis, Lounsbury, and Greenwood (2011), community is a form of organization 
for social production of goods and, “a key source of institutional logics that provide meaning and 
shape behaviour of actors in an institutional field” (p. xvi). For practical purposes, community is 
“a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common 
perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings” (MacQueen, et al., 
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2001, para. 3), recognizing that people emphasize and experience elements of this differently, 
based on their backgrounds.  
An important implication of these definitions is that community exists at and varies 
across all levels: Individuals each have unique, personal communities. Organizations are not 
communities, but do have communities embedded within them, and have communities that span 
their boundaries. And, organizations are members of communities when all members of the 
organizations involved share a sense of their organizations’ belonging. Regions are not 
communities but do have communities of individuals and organizations within and across them.  
For the purposes of my dissertation, community is not a thing; it is a set of actors that is 
defined by their interactions, manifesting at all levels in similar but different manners. That said, 
community manifests as a thing, as a group given substance by members’ behavior, based on 
shared sense of belonging and commitment. In this dissertation, I use the term community to 
mean both the phenomenon of shared sense of community and the grouping described by 
MacQueen, et al. (2001), and make an explicit distinction when I use the term to mean one or the 
other. 
These concepts and definitions provide the footers upon which I hope to lay the 
foundations for a multilevel theory of learning. These concepts are considered in more detail in 
chapters four and five. The question is how to explain, to model, and to predict learning, and 
how we can critique and improve learning. The literature regarding learning reviewed in this 
dissertation shows commonalities between theories of learning at various levels, but also critical 
differences. What is conspicuous in its absence is a conceptual framework for linking the levels; 
a theory that explains how they relate that is consistent with established theory at each level.  
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How might a theory that applies to multiple levels and to relationships between levels be 
constructed? In the next chapter I review literature on methods for analyzing concepts presented 
in texts, which I use to identify commonalities and differences in learning across/between levels, 
literature on methods for generating scientific theory, and literature on multilevel models. Then, 
in chapter four, I present the results of my application of these methods to the question of how 
learning occurs at various levels of socioeconomic aggregation. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
As discussed at the outset, my goal for this dissertation is to synthesize a theory of 
learning at all levels of socioeconomic aggregation. The theory should help us understand 
interactions across, between, and within levels in order to predict and improve learning at all 
levels. There are three general tasks that I propose to carry out in order to suggest such a theory. 
The first task is to identify a theoretical gap: a discrepancy in explanations of how learning—the 
process of increasing capabilities or knowledge—occurs. Essentially, for this task, I must 
analyze ideas related to learning. My concern is not with particular theories, or even academic 
disciplines, but with the space between them, and with connecting them together. For this task I 
employ textual analysis (Fairclough, 2003; Flick, 2009). The “data,” so to speak, for this analysis 
are the ideas and theories from various academic disciplines, included in the review of literature 
in chapter 2. 
The second task for this dissertation is to suggest an explanation of learning that is 
consonant with the ideas from various academic disciplines. This will be an exercise in theory 
and model building. Such an exercise can only be considered productive if it results in a 
conceptual framework that includes constructs and variables for description, measurement, and 
testing. Therefore, I provide a conceptual framework that accommodates both qualitative and 
quantitative inquiry into the nature of learning, and that can be used by various academic 
disciplines. In order to accomplish this, my conceptual framework must be different enough to 
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extend existing concepts without being so different that it conflicts with existing ideas. 
Essentially, my challenge is to establish a “Switzerland” that is not within any one discipline or 
paradigm, but is a place for the academics (and practitioners) to meet and work together. The 
“Results” section of this dissertation will accomplish this second task. 
The third and final task, which is essentially an extension of the second, is to describe 
how the models I suggest might be used, how they might be applied in practice, how they might 
be tested, and, generally, the means by which they might help us understand, predict, improve, 
and explain learning across levels of social aggregation. To accomplish this I provide a mental 
simulation or thought experiment of the use of my conceptual framework, models, and putative 
theory. I use narrative form for this purpose, telling a story about practitioners and scientists 
working together to address learning across levels. This will be done in the final chapter of this 
dissertation. 
Textual Analysis, Narrative Inquiry, and Critical Discourse Analysis 
The initial method of this inquiry is a form of objective hermeneutics akin to narrative 
inquiry (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). It takes theories of learning as parts and products of the 
process of mimesis—the representation of reality—and considers what unifies and differentiates 
them. My method is to act as a medium for a dialogue within and between these bodies of 
literature, extending the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer (1960/2004) as discussed by 
McDowell (1994; Ramberg & Gjesdal, 2009). This dissertation is part and product of my 
Bildung, which McDowell (1994) defines as the development of one’s second nature, as well as 
an interpretation of the mimetic processes implicit in bodies of theoretical literature regarding 
how individuals, organizations, and regions learn.  
60 
Building on Schütz (1962), as discussed in Flick (2009), my task is third-degree 
construction: constructs from the theoretical ideas that are derived from actual experience and 
everyday life. Flick (2009) presents mimesis as the process of constructing versions of the world 
from experience, and interpreting those versions to guide action. This is second-degree 
construction, where social construction of reality (Berger & Luckman, 1966) is first-degree. My 
task here is to look across academic disciplines to understand commonalities and differences in 
their constructions of learning. In pursuing this task I borrow from, build on, and respond to 
Fairclough’s (2003) point that: 
There is a need to develop approaches to text analysis through a 
transdisciplinary dialogue with perspectives on language and discourse 
within social theory and research in order to develop our capacity to 
analyse texts as elements in social processes. A ‘transdisciplinary’ 
approach to theory or analytical method is a matter of working with 
categories and ‘logic’. (p. 6, emphasis in the original) 
Critical discourse analysis is a form of social research, which Fairclough (2003) tells us: 
… begins from questions such as these: how do existing societies provide 
people with possibilities and resources for rich and fulfilling lives, how on 
the other hand do they deny people these possibilities and resources? What 
is it about existing societies that produces poverty, privation, misery, and 
insecurity in people’s lives? What possibilities are there for social change 
which would reduce these problems and enhance the quality of the lives of 
human beings? The aim of critical social research is better understanding 
of how societies work and produce both beneficial and detrimental effects, 
and how the detrimental effects can be mitigated if not eliminated. (pp. 
202-203) 
A somewhat unique feature of this dissertation is that I am interested in how the 
behavioral and social sciences answer these questions and achieve the aims of understanding and 
improvement. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 tells us that learning is essential to 
individuals, organizations, and regions. Learning appears to be a topic for the full range of 
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behavioral sciences—indeed, for all science, if advancing knowledge is considered to be 
learning. Given the breadth of this endeavor, I focus on the central ideas from theoretical 
literature related to learning at the individual, organizational, and regional levels, rather than on 
the particular language of specific texts.  
The initial portion of the results of this dissertation will be an analysis—my 
interpretation—of the fundamental concepts from each of these bodies of literature. I then apply 
the methods of theory and model building, discussed below, to suggest an explanation of 
learning that applies at all levels of social aggregation, and of how learning at various levels is 
related. The purpose of this form of discussion is to instantiate (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010) my 
proposed theory, to validate it, and to further the reader’s understanding of what I am suggesting. 
Theory and model building are the methods I use to suggest a theory to fill the gaps in the 
literature reviewed above. 
Theory Building 
The goal of my dissertation is to propose “a set of statements about the relationship(s) 
between two or more concepts or constructs” (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, p. 28), which is how 
Jaccard and Jacoby define the term “theory.” In particular, I attempt to advance our 
understanding of how concepts and constructs at different levels of social aggregation (which is, 
itself, a construct) relate to each other. I begin with the supposition that a multilevel learning 
theory must conform to and draw on accepted theory from multiple fields. Indeed, by its very 
nature such a theory transcends disciplinary boundaries. So, this is a transdisciplinary endeavor.  
A multilevel learning theory should also have implications for practice at various 
levels—individual teaching, organizational development, regional planning, etc. Therefore, this 
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dissertation is rightfully an applied, practical endeavor, as well as a theoretical one. Because this 
is bound to be an applied, transdisciplinary theory, it is important to make the theory’s logic 
abundantly clear and to place it in context meaningful to practitioners (Lynham, 2002; Swanson, 
2007).  An applied approach, as discussed by Swanson (2007), is methodologically useful 
because it inevitably draws on and synthesizes from various theories. Ouliaris (2011) maintains 
that the process of theory building causes critical thinking about phenomena, which guides 
practice.  
With a flexible approach that integrates practice into theory, “Knowledge generation is 
often best construed as a rhetorical process wherein the nature of knowledge is inextricably tied 
to assumptions and vocabularies used to communicate ideas and approaches to study” (Gioia & 
Pitre, 1990, 587). In other words, epistemology matters in practice. Different practices have 
different paradigms. Gioia and Pitre maintain that paradigms behind theories aren’t totally 
incommensurable; there are fuzzy boundaries between them. Applied theory building is a 
“search for comprehensiveness,” for “more complete view or organizational phenomena” (Gioia 
& Pitre, 1990, 587-588) rather than for truth. But the assumptions, purposes/goals, and 
rhetoric/vocabulary of paradigms are different, precluding true synthesis (Gioia & Pitre, 1990). 
Paradigms exist within naturalistic, interpretivist, and critical approaches to social science, and 
there is similar fuzziness—and even interdependence—between these approaches (Braybrooke, 
1987; Lynham, 2002). Effective practice, if not sound science, requires one to rise above 
paradigmatic dogma. 
Science has two separate but not incompatible purposes for theory, according to Dubin 
(1969): predicting outcomes and understanding interactions—both of which are essential for 
practice. Others would add emancipation, or at least improvement (Braybrooke, 1987; Gioia & 
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Pitre, 1990; Lynham, 2002; Swanson, 2007), further tying theory to practice. Regardless of how 
science is applied, its fundamental objective, Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) maintain, is to achieve 
consensus regarding methods and results—to achieve intersubjectivity, in Habermas’s (1979, 
1984) terms. Weick (1989), quoting Sutherland (1975), defines theory as “an ordered set of 
assertions about a generic behavior or structure assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad 
range of specific instances” (p. 517). Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) define theory as “a set of 
statements about the relationship(s) between two or more concepts or constructs” (p. 28). Gioia 
and Pitre’s (1990) definition is even simpler: “any coherent description or explanation of 
observed or experienced phenomenon” (p. 587).  
Generally, theories may be constructed deductively, reasoning from general rules to make 
predictions, or inductively, by generalizing from observations to explain them (Babbie, 2010). 
The two approaches are also characterized as theory-to-research and research-to-theory 
(Lynham, 2002). Traditional positivistic scientific method is based on deduction, but Babbie 
(2010) describes science as a cycle that includes induction, too. The combination drives the cycle 
from theory to hypotheses to observation to generalizations and back to theory. Dubin (1969) 
refers to this as the Theory-Research Cycle, in which he identifies four steps of theory building 
prior to stating and testing propositions: specify units, identify laws of interaction, defining 
boundaries, and positing possible system states. Ouliaris (2011) maintains that the process of 
theory building causes critical thinking about phenomena, which guides practice. Applied 
theorizing requires the addition of practice to the cycle of research and development (Lynham, 
2002), which is held together by theory (Swanson, 2007). Lynham argues that the theory-to-
research approach is better suited to behavioral and social theory than research-to-theory. 
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“Good theory” requires considering different phenomena at different scales, drawing on 
the diversity of human experience, and always putting questions into historical perspective 
(Mills, 1959). “These temporal and contextual factors set the boundaries of generalizability, and 
as such constitute the range of theory,” according to Whetten (1989, p. 492), putting the 
questions of how and what into the context of what, when, where, and, most importantly, why. A 
substantial theoretical contribution, Whetten (1989) says, should provide theoretical 
improvements—not just critiques—for multiple aspects of a theory, based on compelling 
evidence.  
To economically answer questions that clarify facts, Mills (1959) maintains, do as much 
as possible by reasoning, repeating the following four steps: identify relevant information, 
determine relationships between pieces of information, eliminate the irrelevant, and restate the 
questions. This is, in Weick’s (1989) terms, “imagination disciplined by the processes of 
artificial selection” (p. 528), and demands “a more informed and deliberate use of a simulated 
evolutionary system” (p. 529). An evolutionary approach helps theorists deal with the reality that 
“most theory construction depends on conjectures, preserved in well-crafted sentences, that are 
tested in substitute environments by people who have a stake in the outcome of the test and may 
be tempted to bias that outcome” (p. 529).  
The critical ability for theorizing, Mills (1959) says, is “to shift from one perspective to 
another, and in the process to build up an adequate view of a total society and its components” 
(p. 232) and “by considering extremes – by thinking of the opposite of that with which you are 
directly concerned” (p. 235). Weick (1989) maintains that, “A theorizing process characterized 
by a greater number of diverse conjectures produces better theory than a process characterized by 
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a smaller number of homogeneous conjectures” and “heterogeneous thought trials are more 
likely than homogeneous thought trials to solve theoretical problems” (p. 522).  
The greater the number of diverse criteria applied to a conjecture, the 
higher the probability that those conjectures which are selected will result 
in good theory. Furthermore, selection criteria must be applied 
consistently or theorists will be left with an assortment of conjectures that 
are just as fragmentary as those they started with. (p. 523) 
The three steps of theory building, identified by Weick (1989), are problem statements, 
thought trials, and selection criteria. Weick sees this as an intellectual parallel to biological 
evolution, as sense making rather than problem solving, that does not have discrete well-defined 
structure: “theory building involves simultaneous parallel processing, not sequential thinking” 
(Weick, 1989, p. 519). Varian (2009) describes theory building in similar but more practical 
terms: Look for problems in ordinary experiences that are scientifically interesting, and create 
the simplest models of agents making choices to explain them. Someone has already done it, 
Varian warns, and has done it better. Regardless, he promotes simplifying and generalizing by 
repeated trial-and-error approach. “This back-and-forth iteration in building a model is like 
sculpting: you are chipping away a little bit here, and a little bit there, hoping to find what's 
really inside that stubborn block of marble” (Varian, 2009, p. 6).  
Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) refer to this process as instantiation, “specifying concrete 
instances of abstract concepts in order to help clarify their meaning” (p. 76). They note that 
instantiation bridges the conceptual to the empirical, increasing validity, including 
intersubjective aspects of empirical methods and results. Researchers maximize shared meaning 
and reduce surplus (non-shared) meaning as, “each investigator makes his or her conceptual 
definition explicit … [so] … specific points of agreement and disagreement can be identified” 
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(Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, p. 78), which they call consensual validation (as well as 
intersubjectivity). They place instantiation between generating ideas for theorizing and 
conducting thought experiments, and suggest numerous heuristics and practical strategies for 
generating ideas and specifying concepts. “But the meaning and worth of a construct ultimately 
depends on the broader nomological network in which it is embedded” (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, 
p. 79). 
“When theorists apply selection criteria to their conjectures,” Weick (1989) maintains, 
“they ask whether the conjecture is interesting, obvious, connected, believable, beautiful, or real, 
in the context of the problems they are trying to solve” (p. 524). Varian (2009) agrees, 
particularly, that concepts should be interesting. But, as Fiorina (1975) points out, “interesting” 
depends on current knowledge. The theorist’s judgment of plausibility, based on selection 
criteria, is parallel to and can substitute for empirical testing, according to Weick (1989). 
Varian’s (2009) advice is to simplify and generalize, and get to the fundamental idea of the 
model. This requires additional knowledge: “The more we know, the more restrictions we can 
place on our models, and the less likely will our models be serious misrepresentations of the 
empirical world” (Fiorina, 1975, p. 146). 
Babbie (2010) says theory building involves establishing a purpose and unit of analysis, 
identifying variables, including time, and operationalizing them, and conjecturing about the 
relationship between those variables. And, Lynham (2002) maintains that the process consists of 
verifying and refining, as well as generating, theory. All four of the research paradigms 
identified by Gioia and Pitre (1990) seem to have a similar process for theory building, and the 
cyclic-loop structure: The techniques vary by paradigm, but theory building invariably follows 
from opening work, data collection, and analysis. And, theory building—particularly for 
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traditional science—is embedded in a process along with operationalization and observation 
(Babbie, 2010). 
In Dubin’s (1969) view, theories are built of theoretical units (as distinct from, and as 
determinants of, units of analysis or units of measure)—from most specific to most general: 
enumerative, associative, relational, statistical, and summative units. The units are either 
qualitative attributes or quantitative variables that persist over time and are linked by laws of 
interaction. The general interactions are, from weakest to strongest, categoric (simple 
association), sequential (related in time), or determinant (one depends on the other) interactions. 
Causality involves all of these interactions. Research is “used to measure the values associated 
with ‘things’” (Dubin, 1969, p. 6) for testing hypotheses about interactions between units, 
allowing predictions and understanding. 
“Concepts are the building blocks for all thinking,” according to Jaccard and Jacoby 
(2010, p. 11), “It is our concepts that enable us to achieve some basic understanding of the 
world.” As “generalized abstractions” that “encompass universes of possibilities” (p. 11), 
constructs are hypothetical yet functional, learned and socially shared, and selectively 
constructed. Constructs are concepts that encompass clusters of other concepts, note Jaccard and 
Jacoby, and variables are particularly measurable constructs that represent abstract concepts. 
Their general process is to systematically refine concepts, first to constructs, then to variables. 
Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) suggest identifying outcome variables first, then direct causes, then 
indirect causes including mediating and moderating variables, and finally reciprocal and spurious 
relationships, temporal dynamics, and unanalyzed relationships. 
Theory building can be seen as a learning process (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 2006), by its 
structure as well as results (e.g., new knowledge). Just as learning resolves seemingly conflicting 
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and contradictory sensation, so theories are built via a “generative dance” (Cook & Brown, 1999) 
between conflicting approaches and incommensurable paradigms. Gioia and Pitre’s (1990) 
caution about differing assumptions, purposes/goals, and rhetoric/vocabulary is well taken. But 
the concepts of this dissertation are intrinsically transdisciplinary, and this dissertation must be 
applied if it is to be sensible. So it is necessary to synthesize from very different concepts if I am 
to develop a cohesive and comprehensive theory.  
The solution is to use paradigmatic differences as a driving force for theory building, as 
advocated by Mills (1959), Weick (1989), and others. Juxtaposing and jumping between 
paradigms can be an effective way to generate and select theoretical conjectures, as long as this 
is done methodically. Another solution is to embrace the fuzziness between 
approaches/paradigm, and build on their interdependencies by grounding theory in real world 
context. Such grounding is more than possible, it is essential to applied disciplines because 
theory connects research, practice, and development in a dynamic cycle that is, again, essentially 
the same as the loops that are central to organizational learning theory (Swanson, 2007). And, it 
may be best to start with assumptions, purposes/goals, and rhetoric/vocabulary that are common 
to all. 
While Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) emphasize the importance of theory having consensual 
validity and relating to other theories, they also promote use of both process- and variable-
oriented approaches. “In our experience, science in practice rarely fits neatly into simple 
dichotomies,” say Jaccard and Jacoby, “Rather, scientists blend approaches in different ways and 
to different degrees for different problems” (2010, p. 259). They continue: 
[W]e believe that one should strive to create a diverse set of tools for one’s 
theoretical toolbox and then use them in ways that help get the job done. 
… In the end, the ultimate goal is to describe, predict, understand, and 
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explain behavior in ways that help us make sense of our world and that 
allow us to derive benefits. Both confirmatory and emergent approaches 
are complementary, not conflicting means to these ends. (p. 259) 
Fiorina (1975) makes the point that theories, particularly formal models, are inherently 
limited by simplifying assumptions and could never totally capture reality; there are assumptions 
built into any theoretical approach. Therefore, Fiorina says, the ultimate criteria for theories have 
to be the logical rigor of the theorizing and the usefulness theory. The challenge with complex 
behavioral and social systems, according to Ashby (1970), is to eliminate information: “when 
faced with the excessively large quantities so readily offered by complex systems, we have to 
learn how to be skillful in shedding it” (p. 100). Lave and March (1993), say: 
A model is a simplified representation of the real world. A model is 
created by speculating about processes that could have produced observed 
facts. Models are evaluated in terms of their ability to predict correctly 
other new facts. (p. 19) 
Jaccard and Jacoby (2010), who use “model” and “theory” interchangeably, classify 
models variously as process-oriented or variable-oriented, as causal or mathematical, and as 
confirmatory or grounded/emergent. Grounded/emergent theories and process-oriented 
approaches are similar, although—according to Jaccard and Jacoby’s (2010) description—
grounded theories don’t use models. Causal and mathematical models are both variable-oriented 
approaches. Causal models address mediating, moderating, reciprocal, and other effects. 
Mathematical models define variables as functions of other variables. Jaccard and Jacoby say 
these approaches are mostly used in isolation, but argue that causal and mathematical models—
confirmatory approaches—could be used together, and even with emergent approaches, to good 
effect. The authors in Blalock (1985) show how mathematical approaches can be applied to 
causal models. Others provide philosophical (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2008) and practical 
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(Onwuegbuzie, Johnson, & Collins, 2009) guidance and reviews of studies (Small, 2011) that 
combine process-oriented and variable-oriented approaches to model building. 
Fiorina (1975) sees models as expressions of theories, consisting of “primitives” 
assembled into defined concepts under certain assumptions. Ouliaris (2011) says a model is, “a 
simplified description of reality, designed to yield hypotheses about economic behavior that can 
be tested. An important feature of an economic model is that it is necessarily subjective in design 
because there are no objective measures of economic outcomes” (p. 46). Ouliaris (2011) 
continues: 
Theoretical models seek to derive verifiable implications about economic 
behavior under the assumption that agents maximize specific objectives 
subject to constraints that are well defined in the model (for example, an 
agent’s budget). They provide qualitative answers to specific questions—
such as the implications of asymmetric information (when one side to a 
transaction knows more than the other) or how best to handle market 
failures. (p. 47) 
Formal models are equally useful in political science, Firorina (1975) tells us: They force the 
theorist to be more precise, they make assumptions clear (and reasonable), they are easy to 
validate, and models allow the theorist to dive deep into a theoretical construct. Fiorina admits to 
the limits of formal models but argues that such models should be judged on their predictive 
power.  
Models can be deductive theoretical models or inductive empirical models that test the 
theoretical models with data gathered via research (Ouliaris, 2011). Lave and March (1993) 
identify four general types of social science models—models of adaptation (learning), choice, 
diffusion, and exchange—and all are built in four steps: (1) observe some facts, (2) look at the 
facts as the result of some process, (3) deduce other results, and (4) ask whether these results 
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obtain. Their rule of thumb for model building derives directly from these steps: (1) think 
“process,” (2) develop interesting implications, and (3) look for generality. Fiorina (1975) 
suggests “retroduction”—which is similar to Ashby’s (1970) eliminating information, Weick’s 
(1989) artificial selection, Varian’s (2009) chipping away, and Jaccard and Jacoby’s (2010) 
instantiation—as a basic approach to model building: 
Given some empirical finding(s), X, one poses the question, “How might 
the world be structured such that X holds, occurs, or is true?” The answers 
to this question are models, all of which have in common that they assume 
or imply X. To be worthy of consideration a model must have at least this 
one tie (X) to the empirical world. (Fiorina, 1975, p. 145) 
Generally, models consist of inputs (independent variables), intervening factors, outputs 
(dependent variables), coefficients that specify the relationship between factors, and an error 
term for the portion of the relationship that cannot be explained (specified) (Ouliaris, 2011). 
And, the models must be tested or validated empirically to identify and correct systematic errors. 
Predictive power and ability to isolate the effects of specific factors tend to be mutually 
exclusive, Ouliaris tells us, and “the model’s predictions must be tempered by the randomness of 
the underlying data it seeks to explain and by the validity of the theories used to derive its 
equations” (2011, p. 49).  
Multilevel Models 
“Multilevel models enable the analyst to view people in the context of their social and 
organizational hierarchies,” say Heck and Thomas (2009, p. 1), who provide a thorough 
consideration of the topic. Multilevel models include a representation of each level and describe 
relations between and within levels. This allows researchers to consider how variation within a 
level relates to variation between levels. For this dissertation multilevel modeling means 
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representing how persons, organizations, and regions learn, and describing how learning at one 
level affects learning at another level.  
A major issue for multilevel modeling is the aggregation and disaggregation of data, and 
how those data are interpreted: 
[I]t is important to develop a scheme to place the explanatory variables 
hypothesized to affect individual and other types of organizational process 
in their proper hierarchical locations … This helps to clarify the 
organizational, or contextual, level to which they rightly belong. (Heck & 
Thomas, 2009, p. 20) 
For this dissertation, I provide a conceptual framework that clearly delineates levels. There are a 
variety of methods for drawing samples, aggregating data, and analyzing results, the 
appropriateness of which depends on the type of multilevel model one is using (Klein & 
Kozlowski, 2000). Researchers must make decisions about constructs and measurements, 
models, sampling, and analysis, Klein and Kozlowski (2000) note. Multilevel models contain 
hierarchical data structures, which benefit from techniques that can “represent a number of 
different statistical concepts including random coefficients, sources of variation in multilevel 
analyses, missing data, growth trajectories, finite mixtures, and latent classes” (Heck & Thomas, 
2009, p. 99). These points are well taken, but such details are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. My models will be more general, but I note these admonitions because any 
multilevel theory should accommodate them to make empirical analysis practical. 
Rousseau (1985) notes that the level on which the model focuses is distinct from the 
levels of measurement and analysis, and it is necessary to avoid attributing what’s measured to 
another level. Such “misspecification arises from failure to establish specific-level construct 
validity, which is the extent to which the operationalization the research employs is a valid 
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measure of a construct at the focal level” (Rousseau, 1985, p. 5, emphasis in original). While 
aggregation can minimize random error at the level of measurement, according to Rousseau, it 
cannot help systematic error, and aggregation methods may create spurious relationships in the 
data. Generally, Rousseau suggests, it is best if the focal unit is consistent with the level of 
measurement and the level of analysis, and indivisible data for the focal unit is preferable to data 
aggregated from subunits.  
Rousseau (1985) also reminds us to avoid the ecological fallacy of attributing 
characteristics of one level to its constituents, and the cross-level fallacy of assigning traits at one 
level to aggregate entities at the next level. Isomorphism, in which a single construct is evident at 
multiple levels, is an important topic for social science, Rousseau says, “Isomorphism implies 
that constructs mean the same thing at different levels” (p. 8). It can be difficult for isomorphism 
to provide non-obvious explanations, Klein, Tosi, and Cannella (1999) note, and clearly define 
constructs at different levels: constructs’ functionality is the same even though their structure 
may vary across levels. It is necessary to have a cross-level theory of composition that “specifies 
functional relationships underlying constructs from different levels” (Klein, Tosi & Cannella, 
1999, p. 9, emphasis in original). For example, some researchers have defined constructs at the 
intrasubjective, intersubjective, and collective levels, while others have examined how constructs 
change levels (Klein, Tosi & Cannella, 1999).  
Rousseau (1985) also tells us to avoid contextual fallacies by considering the effects of 
environment and setting. Specifically, researchers should mind effects that “act as unit-level 
moderators of relationships at the individual level” (p. 9) and those that “result from appraisal or 
evaluation of one’s relative standing in a group” (p. 10). In other word, peoples’ behaviors can 
be impacted by their situations and their feelings about those situations. Individuals, especially 
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executives and other leaders, or groups can also affect context and unit constructs (Klein, Tosi & 
Cannella, 1999).  
Rousseau (1985) boils all of this down to three types of models: composition models 
address how nondependent variables on different levels relate to each other; cross-level models 
deal with dependent and independent variables at different levels; and, multilevel models are of 
dependent and independent variables at one level generalized to other levels. Models of 
composition help ensure that aggregated data represent variables, there is no bias from methods 
or raters, and the data’s form is valid for a construct’s attributes. Cross-level models can deal 
with how context impacts variables, relations between multiple variables at the same level, and 
deviance from in-level norms. Klein and Kozlowski (2000) add that a direct effects cross-level 
model can only explain between-unit variation. Direct effects can be moderated cross-level by a 
third variable note Klein and Kozlowski, and within-unit variation can affect variation between 
subunits (one’s position relative to others may have greater impact than absolute characteristics). 
Fully multilevel theories require composition theories to specify how a particular 
construct exists separately at multiple levels. Klein and Kozlowski (2000) suggest distinguishing 
between the global, objective characteristics of a group, the characteristics or experiences that 
are common to all members of the group, and the characteristics that “capture the array, pattern, 
or variability of individual characteristics within a team” (p. 217). Model builders “must specify 
the levels or types of organizational units meaningful to us from the perspective of theory 
development and empirical generalization” (Rousseau, 1985, p. 25). In doing so, it is necessary 
to be cognizant of assumptions that functions of sub-units depend on their role in higher-level 
units, and/or that units are derived solely and totally from subunits. There must be between-unit 
variation just to operationalize the model’s constructs (Klein & Kozwolski, 2000). 
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Rousseau (1985) provides the following guidelines for multilevel theorizing. Specify the 
appropriate level(s) for theories, at which levels constructs obtain. Establish construct validity at 
all appropriate levels. Make sure the number of higher-level units is as large as possible relative 
to subunits, and make sure subunits are accurately assigned to the correct units. When evaluating 
independent and dependent variables on the same level, gather data from different subjects. Use 
global variables whenever possible rather than or along with aggregate data. Evaluate the extent 
of subjects’ agreement on aggregated measures, but remember that within-unit disagreement may 
be worth studying (Klein, Tosi & Cannella, 1999) as well as an important consideration in 
aggregating data (Klein & Kozwolski, 2000). “Maintain all data at the lowest measurement level 
possible” (Rousseau, 1985, p. 31). Conduct analysis at the level of the focal unit. When relating 
subunit variables to global unit variables, assign the global value to each subunit and conduct 
correlations at the subunit level, which “allows effects of unit characteristics on lower level 
responses to be assessed at the levels where those effects are hypothesized to occur” (Rousseau, 
1985, p. 31). 
Logic Models. Multilevel models as discussed above are fundamentally variable-oriented, 
causal and mathematical approaches. In contrast, process-oriented approaches are less inclined to 
modeling (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010). Case-study logic models are a clear exception. Case-studies 
examine how and why a particular set of events and outcomes, or program, occurred (Yin, 2008). 
The case study method described by Yin is deceptively simple: First, define and design the case; 
second, prepare then collect and analyze data; and, third, analyze results and draw conclusions. 
Generally, Yin is a proponent of using case studies to “test” rival explanations. Once the subject 
and research question(s) are established, the researcher identifies various explanation, or 
program theories, for the events/outcomes. Yin (2008) discusses embedded case studies, with 
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multiple units of analysis, as a way to document projects—or other “process units” such as 
locations, meetings, or roles—within a program.  
Yin (2008) suggests logic models as means for analyzing case study data. Logic models 
are widely used in practice, for designing and evaluating programs for business, education, 
healthcare, etc. (Conrad, et al., 1999: Cooksy, Gill & Kelly, 2000; W. K. Kellogg Foundation, 
2004; Yang, Shen, Cao & Warfield, 2004; Renger & Hurly, 2006; Yin, 2008). “A logic model is 
a graphic representation of a program that describes the program’s essential components and 
expected accomplishments and conveys a logical relationship between these components and 
their outcomes” (Conrad, et al., 1999, p. 18).  
Logic models represent the program theory against which empirical results can be 
compared for evaluation and research purposes (Yin, 2008). They provide a framework for 
multi-method pattern matching and triangulation (Cooksy, Gill, and Kelly, 2000). The W. K. 
Kellogg Foundation (2003) focuses on logic models’ use for design and implementation of 
programs. How logic models are used depends on whether the model focuses on theory, 
outcomes, or activities, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation (2003) tells us, because each has a 
different underlying rationale. Theory is about why a program will work. Outcomes are the 
expected results. Activities are what the program will do. It is important to make planned 
activities, expected outcomes, and theories clear during planning in order to maximize the value 
of evaluations. 
The W. K. Kellogg Foundation (2004) breaks the logic model into two parts, planned 
work and intended results, and subdivides those into (1) resources/inputs, (2) activities, which 
are components of planned work, (3) outputs, (4) outcomes, and (5) impact, which are 
components of intended results, based on clearly stated assumptions. Conrad, et al. (1999) see a 
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program as consisting of “(1) the context; (2) the theory and assumptions that underlie the 
program’s intervention, (3) the intervention, and (4) the outcomes” (p. 18). Yang, Shen, Cao & 
Warfield (2004) present a model that, “has four major components: (a) issues and opportunities; 
(b) strategies; (c) outcomes; and (d) impacts” (p. 497), for each of three strategy clusters. Yin 
(2008) sticks with Wholey’s (1979) logic model structure of intervention, immediate outcome, 
intermediate outcome, and ultimate outcomes. Renger and Hurley (2006) are more vague about 
the components, but emphasize the importance of fully identifying all antecedent conditions (as 
opposed to more simplistic descriptions of context). 
As Yin (2008) describes them, logic models have much in common with causal models: 
The logic model deliberately stipulates a complex chain of events over an 
extended period of time. The events are staged in repeated cause-effect-
cause-effect patterns, whereby a dependent variable (event) at an earlier 
stage becomes an independent variable (causal event) for the next stage. 
(p. 149) 
Note the fundamentally different nature of “variables” in logic models: They are events 
rather than measurable constructs. Yin suggests using quantitative as well as qualitative data for 
these variables. The ATM (antecedent, targeting, and measurement) approach discussed by 
Renger and Hurley (2006) is very much a causal model, but incorporates a wide range of 
qualitative factors and scant mathematics. An outcome could be a profound change in the 
program. 
Logic models can be used to analyze individual, organization, and program level 
activities/events, Yin (2008) says, and can capture transformations in units of analysis at each 
level. Cooksy, Gill, and Kelly (2000) demonstrate how logic models can capture multiple levels 
simply by combining multiple cases. The logic model, which is built of micro units, provides a 
78 
basis for comparing meso units. Taken together the logic models for multiple organizations—
assuming they are in the same geographic area—also imply something about the macro level.  
Yang, Shen, Cao, and Warfield (2004) look at a comprehensive program for increasing 
philanthropy and volunteerism on three levels. The top level is the overall initiative. The second 
level consists of three clusters: “(a) supporting emerging leaders and donors, (b) creating and 
sharing knowledge around philanthropy and volunteerism, and (c) building tools for sector 
sustainability and effectiveness” (Yang, Shen, Cao & Warfield, 2004, p. 495). Under each cluster 
at the lowest, are multiple projects. Their logic model incorporates each cluster’s objectives for 
all projects related to issues and opportunities, strategies, outcomes, and impacts. “No multilevel 
evaluation alignment would be feasible unless there are common principles to tie together the 
evaluations at different levels,” note Yang, Shen, Cao, and Warfield (2004, p. 497). 
The Colorado Trust’s framework for its Change Through Advocacy program (Beer & 
Reed, 2009) exemplifies the application of a logic model and is a causal multilevel advocacy 
evaluation model. It begins with increasing in organizations’ capacities, goes through alliance 
building, to shared agendas and political will, and culminates with substantive impacts. This 
hypothetical model is used to guide change as an evaluation that, “ensures continuous learning 
within the advocates’ organizations—incorporating informed, evidence-based decision making 
into grantees’ day-to-day operations” (Beer & Reed, 2009, p. 152). 
W. K. Kellogg (2004) is a detailed guide to creating a logic model as tool for planning 
and implementation. Its process begins with theory building, then specifying outcomes, and, 
finally, detailing activities. Yang (2004) presents this process as an evaluation tool by embedding 
it in a larger process: establish a logic model, then pose evaluation questions and subquestions, 
and then collect and analyze data, which lead to program improvements. The ATM approach’s 
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(Renger & Hurley, 2006) first step is identifying antecedent conditions. These will be so 
numerous that it will be necessary to target those on which to focus, which is the second step. 
Measurement is the third step. Yin’s (2008) process for developing an analytic strategy applies to 
logic models, and to time series, explanation building, and pattern matching. He suggests the 
strategy start with theoretical propositions, develop a case description, use qualitative and 
quantitative data, and examine rival explanations. The model must have construct, internal, and 
external validity, and be reliable, and Yin maintains that each strategy variously addresses each 
of these issues. 
Of course, the above discussion is about developing logic models of specific cases. My 
goal is to provide a different general model because learning provides a different logic, which 
can be applied to particular cases. I propose to provide a theory that can be the basis for a 
learning logic model. Many of the concepts reviewed above, especially those regarding model 
building and multiple levels, may apply to building a general model. But my general model will 
necessarily have different components and a different structure.  
Building a Multilevel Theory and Models of Learning 
The purpose of model building is to identify the critical parts of a thing, and specify how 
those parts interact, in order to explain and predict how the thing works. Multilevel models are 
based on the realization that a thing might be affected by external context and environment, as 
well as internal characteristics. Based on the literature reviewed above, any theory requires a 
clear definition of the thing to be explained, and a multilevel theory requires similar clarity 
regarding levels. The conceptual framework should plainly impute factors thought to influence 
the thing to one and only one level. This not only makes research easier, it reduces the risk of 
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false and trivial conclusion. A conceptual framework that makes levels distinct makes for 
theoretical models that can be practically tested against reality. 
I use the theory- and model-building methods reviewed above to suggest a simple yet 
powerful explanation of learning that applies to various levels of social aggregation. I also 
provide a conceptual framework to support it, for practical and scholarly purposes. The 
objectives are to produce causal, mathematical, and logic models, discuss and illustrate the 
putative theory, and indicate how the models might be tested and used. I specify underlying 
assumptions—building on the definitions in the introduction—and provide precise language for 
the theory.  
In order to provide a comprehensive view, I focus on the areas between paradigms and 
approaches as I develop my explanation of learning. I deduce theoretical propositions by 
identifying gaps and overlaps between previously validated theories from different academic 
disciplines. These theories are the data I analyze in order to generate conjectures and problem 
statements that fit with but not within various academic perspectives. From these conjectures and 
problem statements I deduce primitives and units, along with the assumptions and laws of 
interaction (Dubin, 1969). Then, based on the assumptions and laws, I assemble primitives into 
concepts and construct a transdisciplinary conceptual framework from those concepts.  
To put this in the terms of the literature on theory- and model-building, I conduct 
instantiation (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010) and retroduction (Fiorina, 1975). I use Weick’s (1989) 
problem statements, thought trials, and selection criteria. In the process, I define unit(s) of 
analysis, identify variables (input, intervening, and outputs) including time, and operationalize 
them, and conjecture about the relationships (i.e., coefficients) between those variables (Babbie, 
2010).  
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Generally, I work in the area between naturalistic, interpretivist, and critical paradigms, 
addressing all but hewing to none. To establish consensual validity I show how the proposed 
theory applies to practice. Ultimately, I hope to provide a theory that is simple yet useful. 
I offer three general models for practitioners and researchers. A mathematical model will 
be provided as a means for describing the relationship between levels, how variation at one level 
explains variation at other levels. A causal model will illustrate how the characteristics of 
independent variables precede and determine the characteristics of the dependent variables. A 
logic model will present this as a process via which factors are transformed into outcomes 
through a series of functions. These models should prove useful for designing and implementing 
learning programs, as well as for inquiry that advances our understanding of learning. The causal 
and mathematical models will be variable-oriented, intended primarily for hypothesis testing. 
The process-oriented logic model will be primarily for program design and evaluation. My 
conceptual framework will act as a theory of composition to deal with data-aggregation issues 
and avoid misspecification, and to isolate mediating or moderating effects of context.  
As a theoretical dissertation, these models will only go so far as to establish construct 
validity. I provide guidelines and suggestions for operationalizing variables and provide 
examples of how the theory might be applied, but will not actually collect or analyze any original 
data. The process-oriented model will translate learning into a general structure for a logic 
model, and a general model of the learning process. The model will be applicable to multiple 
levels, and will allow for transformation in subjects. It will emphasize the importance of 
antecedents to learning and the general activities or events that generate learning. As with the 
variable-oriented models, I provide some guidelines and suggestions on how to use the model for 
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designing and evaluating learning, based on the model but I do not gather or analyze original 
data.  
The data for this dissertation are the theories from which I synthesize my proposed 
theory. The results will be a qualitative analysis of this data, and a conceptual framework for 
describing, integrating, and measuring these elements. So, I intend to make assertions about 
learning that hold across levels of social aggregation, from individuals through organizations to 
regions, and apply to various circumstances. I attempt to provide a coherent description and 
explanation to predict outcomes and understand the interaction of learning that occurs across, as 
well as within, levels. And, I provide means for documenting and testing those interactions and 
their effects. As underpinnings for the theory and models, I provide an innovative conceptual 
framework synthesized from the literature reviewed above.  
Finally, in the discussion portion of this dissertation I illustrate use of my proposed 
conceptual framework, models, and theory with a thought experiment. Thought experiments 
have a long history and have been notably used by luminaries such as Galileo, Descartes, 
Newton, and, more recently, by Albert Einstein and John Searle (Brown & Fehige, 2011). I use 
thought experiment to illustrate my theory, which is a long-accepted use of thought experiment 
(Brown & Fehige, 2011), especially given practical limitations of empirical investigation. The 
thought experiment will allow me to discuss how my proposed theory might be applied and 
tested. 
83 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
Analysis of Literature 
Learning theory for each level of social aggregation has different metaphors—“tools to 
create compact descriptions of complex phenomena” (Weick, 1989, p. 529)—for framing the 
process of increasing capabilities. The metaphors discussed here—the cognitive constructor, 
loops of learning, and triple helix—come directly from literature reviewed in Chapter 2. At the 
micro level, the overarching metaphor might be called “the cognitive constructor.” A person 
makes the most of her or his innate, physical characteristics (including those that determine 
mental capacity) by acquiring information through experience, by observing others, and from 
texts—informational artifacts created by others. He or she constructs information into useful 
knowledge, building schemata, generating connections between concepts and experience, and 
producing behavior. Behavior invariably involves interaction with others, which constructs a 
shared reality. All of this in response to diverse yet complementary innate human drives. As a 
person, an individual’s general purpose is fulfillment of drives and needs. It should be noted that 
all levels are defined by the actions of individuals, so it is redundant to refer to the micro level as 
“individual.” Rather, this is the level at which individuals behave as persons rather than members 
of organizations or residents of regions. 
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The metaphor at the meso level is “loops of learning.” These are cyclic, iterated efforts to 
clarify and strengthen the relations between individuals in order to form (or reform) the 
organization. These loops occur at various scales, and are nested within each other. There are 
various theoretical views of the phases, stages, or steps in this cyclic process. The specific steps 
are not as important as is the common framework and shared experience for individuals that the 
steps provide. Organizations exist for specific, well-defined purposes, to which everyone in an 
organization relates. Individuals converge on purpose via the steps in loops of learning. The 
general concept that is prominent in theories of organizational learning is that of feedback and 
reflection. The organization provides a context for individuals to garner feedback from and 
provide it to each other, to guide behavior toward purpose.  
The “triple helix” is a metaphor for learning at the macro level. It is academia, 
government, and industry learning interactively with diverse global and local agents, sharing 
ordinary and special knowledge. Place not only matters at this level, it is a defining characteristic 
of learning. Knowledge inheres to people in place. For regions, even more than organizations 
level, learning is relatively independent of particular individuals. Theorists are interested in how 
the structure of and interactions between economic-political-social institutions explain 
differences between regions, and differences in what those regions produce. Theory at this level 
emphasizes that learning is social. 
Theories at each level attempt to explain a general output, or dependent variables. At the 
micro level the output is capability (as defined by Sen (1988, 1999), Nussbaum (2000), and 
Clark (2005)): ability to fulfill needs, how one acts in response to innate drives, and what 
decisions one makes in particular situations, given one’s capacity. This is what individuals 
construct, their capabilities. Of course, individuals can have many goals, purposes, and play 
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many roles—some conflicting—that change over time. But, drives remain. This provides the 
basis for judging capabilities. More subjectively, individuals, as persons, seek fulfillment; 
personal fulfillment provides the basis for innate drives and the rationale for capabilities.  
For organizations, at the meso level, the output is performance—essentially producing 
goods and/or services via combination of capital and labor—in an economically or politically 
viable manner. In contrast with individuals, organizations judge performance on a limited 
number of relatively stable goals.  
At the macro level the general regional output is advantage: some novel, unique, and 
valuable characteristic of a place. While regions have a set of general goals—infrastructure, jobs, 
quality of life, etc.—they are characterized by diverse, sometimes conflicting, sometimes 
complementary, often unrelated, purposes, connected by place. Organizational performance and 
regional advantage are undoubtedly dependent on individual capabilities, but the relationship 
obviously goes the other direction as well. Personal fulfillment is dependent on organizational 
performance and regional advantage, as well and individual capability. But because fulfillment is 
subjective, the fundamental dependent variable is individual capability. There are moral as well 
as practical reasons for making individual capability the fundamental unit of analysis, which I 
discuss below. 
There are common factors, or independent variables, for theories at each level, too. 
Individual capabilities require information, models, stimuli, practice, feedback, etc., as well as 
prior knowledge—attitudes, beliefs, etc. The function of the cognitive constructor is to construct 
capabilities from these factors. Organizational performance depends on division of labor, means 
of production, and technology (which is essentially instantiated knowledge). The loops of 
learning are cognitive constructors operating on these organizational factors. Regional advantage 
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results from different organizations interacting to align their capital, labor, and technology, 
creating knowledge spillovers and network externalities in the process. The triple helix arises 
from connecting loops of learning to reinforce each other. These metaphors come directly from 
the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The relationship between levels is implied by the metaphors 
but rarely if ever addressed in the literature. 
Each of the factors and outputs are important at other levels, but each level seems to 
focus on and situate particular variables. Individuals, with their drives and capabilities, are 
situated in organizations via division of labor. Place-based advantages situate organizations in 
regions, making them more competitive, productive, and profitable. Each level provides 
synergies from lower-level aggregation. Indeed, synergy is what defines each level: Lower level 
entities are not just aggregated; they are combined in such a way that the whole is greater than 
the sum of its parts. How are these synergies realized and increased? What explains variation in 
the synergies? What explains differences in combining cognitive constructors via division of 
labor, and in connecting loops of learning to capture knowledge spillovers? How does the triple 
helix improve division of labor for multiple organizations? And, how do loops of learning boost 
capabilities of multiple individuals? 
Theories at each level share certain fundamental realities. Agents tend to act in their own 
interests, at times collectively. But agents’ understanding of their own and others’ interests is 
limited; and circumstances can countervail. Each agent has a unique set of resources, particularly 
information, at her or his disposal. To create meaning and maximize value, agents exchange 
those resources as goods and symbols. Agents construct institutions with roles and rules, and 
narratives about them, to provide additional certainty to those exchanges. Through interaction 
agents develop a shared understanding of interests and resources. Undergirding all of this is the 
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concept of development; that one can methodically improve one’s state, especially by acting 
collectively. 
Recursion and reflexivity are important in all learning theories at all levels: self-action, 
self-awareness, and self-regulation. Whether individual, organizational, or regional, the learner 
identifies herself, himself, or itself as an entity, and it acts upon itself, applying its output to its 
factors. So, individuals behave to acquire better information. Organizational performance 
includes restructuring capital and labor. Innovations generated by regions fuel interactions within 
them. Self-action can be seen as the means by which the metaphors at each level are integrated: 
Multiple individual cognitive constructors acting upon themselves in coordination generate 
organizational loops of learning, and many of those loops acting upon themselves in concert 
accrete into regional triple helixes.  
The other concept or construct that is common to all theoretical areas is the information 
network. The simplest version of this is nodes that sense and signal each other. These nodes 
could be nerve endings, individuals, or enterprises. They sense reality and produce signals based 
on the sense data, as determined by simple rules. The rules employed depend on signals from 
other sensors. And, the sensing can never be passive; reality must somehow change the node, 
activating or interfering with it. Conceptually, such a network depends on how sensors are 
attuned to each other, how they sense signals from other sensors as distinct from other parts of 
the world. The metaphors, outputs, factors, and common concepts related to learning at the 
micro, meso, and macro levels are summarized in table 1.  
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Table 1 Summary of Metaphors, Outputs, Factors, and Common Concepts for Learning at 
Individual, Organizational, and Regional Levels 
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The general theoretical picture is one of micro-level knowledge processes, applied 
recursively and reflexively to allocation of capital and division of labor at the meso-level, 
enabled by macro-level institutions and infrastructure. The socio-cognitive constructor is enabled 
by being embedded in loops of learning and triple helices, by engaging in action and reflection 
with others based on shared places and purposes. In this dissertation I conjecture that there is 
phenomenon or process that occurs across levels whenever learning—particularly generative 
learning and innovation—occurs: Community. The independent variables and shared realities 
become factors of functions that determine learning across levels. 
Proposed Theory 
The theory of learning I propose to explain learning at all levels and the relationship 
between learning at various levels is essentially quite simple: community yields learning. 
Community results in learning, the stronger community is the greater the learning, and 
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substantive learning does not occur without community. Community makes people smarter. 
Community also makes organizations and regions smarter. This theory requires much 
explication. Before doing so I provide a conceptual framework for use in applying and testing the 
theory, and I clearly state some fundamental aspects of this theory. First, though, I should 
provide some background on the theory and how it was developed. 
This theory builds on existing validated theories and shows how those theories are 
consistent across levels. This theory is transdisciplinary. It draws indiscriminately—so to speak, 
because it is carefully considered—from numerous academic fields. My goal is a theory that is 
comprehensive yet focused, that is both practically and scholastically useful. This theory has 
been developed over the course of my doctoral work in a manner similar to those discussed by 
Mill (1959), Weick (1989), Gioia and Pitre (1990), Lyndham (2002), Swanson (2007), Varian 
(2009), Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) and Ouliaris (2011). Prior to my doctoral studies I was 
concerned with the relationship between individual learning about technology, particularly 
among traditional leaders, and how the organizations those individuals led adopted and used 
technology, and how technology-use spilled over from those organizations into the surrounding 
region. It is this conundrum that motivated me to pursue scholarly knowledge about leading and 
learning.  
My theory building process has been embedded in my studies, doing exactly as Mills 
(1959) recommends: identifying relevant information, determining relationships between pieces 
of information, eliminating the irrelevant, and restating my questions. I have found relevant 
information in most all the behavioral and social sciences. The relationships became clear 
through innumerable hours of discussion and study. My practical work in economic development 
and education helped me understand what was relevant. And, the writing I’ve done has 
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essentially been a continual restatement of my questions, artificially selecting ideas via 
instantiation and thought experiments (as discussed by Weick (1989) and Jaccard & Jacoby 
(2010)). My approach has not been as rigorous as Weick might like but it has been more 
methodical than Varian’s (2009) approach.  
The following text presents the results of this process. Ultimately, I illustrate the results 
via a thought experiment regarding the impact of high-speed internet access (i.e., broadband) and 
how that impact might be increased via innovative intervention by higher education. This will 
replicate the theoretical instantiation (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010) I’ve done over the last four years. 
The core results are structured around Dubin’s (1969) Theory-Research Cycle. So, before 
illustrating the theory, I specify units, identify laws of interaction, define boundaries, and posit 
possible system states. As I work through these steps I provide three models for explaining, 
predicting, and understanding multilevel learning, a causal model, a mathematical model, and a 
logic model. Each of these models, and the theory itself, will be constructed within a conceptual 
framework, which provides a basis for addressing each portion of the Theory-Research Cycle. 
The methodology literature reviewed in chapter 2 of this dissertation makes it clear that a 
good theory is falsifiable, if not verifiable. Theoretical constructs and measures must be valid 
and reliable to use. A conceptual framework should make it clear how to validate and verify 
theory. As discussed above, the three general criteria of truth (veracity) are coherence, 
consistence, and correspondence, and the three forms of validity are subjective, objective, and 
intersubjective. These characteristics also provide the diverse criteria promoted by Weick (1989) 
for selecting theoretical propositions. 
My conceptual framework establishes objective validity by building on existing, 
validated theory. It seeks subjective validity via practical applicability. Intersubjective validity 
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comes from finding commonalities between practice, theory, and various paradigms. This is a bit 
of a challenge because scientists and professionals tend to focus at one level. Not only are there 
paradigmatic conflicts within levels, there are also paradigmatic disconnects between levels. I 
address this first by identifying how fundamental aspects at each level relate to each other, based 
on literature reviewed above, and second by offering a way of thinking about structure that 
applies at all levels. Each level functions differently, but in complementary manners. I feel these 
conflicts and disconnects actually benefits my theorizing by providing the diverse perspectives 
that Mills (1959) calls for. So, my conceptual framework integrates diverse academic 
perspectives to provide diverse theoretical criteria in a manner that is reasonably simple yet 
provides descriptive power and measurable constructs. 
Before detailing my conceptual framework, allow me to briefly summarize it so the 
reader does not get lost along the way. In this framework: (1) the fundamental unit of analysis is 
the individual human being. Individuals act agentically at the micro level as persons, at the meso 
level as members of organizations, and at the macro level residents of regions. Individuals’ 
behaviors can be observed to measure the information and materials they use, and to infer their 
attitudes and beliefs. Their connections to others determine what information and materials 
individuals have, and their attitudes and beliefs define individuals’ visions of what is desirable 
and possible. (2) Individuals’ behaviors, connections, and visions can be described and 
measured. Individuals’ connections and visions can be observed as behavior. Those behaviors 
can be ascribed to micro, meso, or macro levels, analyzed to identify variation, and that variation 
can correlated between and within levels. (3) The dependent variable is individual real freedoms, 
or capabilities, which can be described in terms of knowledge and measured in terms of liberty, 
prosperity, and wellness. An individual’s freedoms can be negatively or positively correlated, 
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between and within levels, with the personal fulfillment of others, and with organizational 
performance and regional advantage. (4) The independent variable is community, or rather the 
socio-cognitive functions that result in a shared sense of community. These functions are the 
input factors that cause individuals—personally, as organizations, and as regions—to gain 
capabilities. Hypothetically, the level of community increases with each function, leading to 
increased capabilities.  
The next section discusses the conceptual framework and its elements in detail. Then I 
explicate the multilevel theory of learning using the conceptual framework, including a causal 
model, a logic model, and a mathematical model. Finally, I illustrate the theory by applying it to 
higher education and information and communication technologies. 
Conceptual Framework 
A multilevel theory of learning should fill critical gaps in theories of learning. It should 
enable educators, policymakers, and researchers to better understand the role of context in 
learning and how learning aggregates. Here I seek to provide a set of concepts and propositions 
that addresses how collective capabilities impact individuals, and how individual knowledge 
impacts development of collectives. A conceptual framework for a multilevel theory can be built 
on the individual as agent—drawing on the work of Bandura (2001)—acting in her or his own 
interests, which emerge from innate drives (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Lawrence & Nohria, 2002) as 
intentions (Ajzen, 1991) and motivations (Deci & Ryan, 1985). My fundamental unit of analysis 
is the individual human being, who acts agentically as a (1) person, (2) member of organizations, 
and (3) citizen of a region, and who sees, has, and does in different ways as each. This 
conceptual framework affords three levels of analysis by distinguishing forms of agentic 
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behavior each of which has a defining function. Those functions, and the levels, can be 
distinguished by cognition, collectivity, place, and purpose.  
Unit of Analysis 
Individual human beings have inherent capacity to carry, handle, process, use, etc., some 
quantity of information and materials, which I refer to as assets. Capacity is determined by 
physical attributes, including cognitive capacity. Capacity is limited but can be allocated to 
various purposes—generally, personal, organizational, or regional—and used in different ways. 
It can be supplemented by other individuals or with implements, but is essentially fixed (at least 
in the short-run). Individuals also have ability to affect or transform the quality of the 
information and materials they handle. Ability can be enhanced and improved, but this requires 
capacity. All of this is done via activities. (This is something of a restatement of Miller’s (1956) 
theory that humans’ cognitive capacity is limited to seven plus or minus two bits of information, 
but we are able to handle greater amounts of information by “chunking” these bits together.) 
Psychologically, individuals use embodied mental models, or schemata, to guide action 
(Piaget, 1973, 1983; Hirsch, 1987; Rumelhart, 1980; Isanski & West, 2010), for interpreting 
information and manipulating materials. For example, humans only have two hands so can only 
carry two relatively light things. This is our unaided carrying capacity. We have developed 
numerous means with associated schemata to enhance our abilities: bags, baskets, carts, juggling, 
trucks, etc. It takes time, as well as information and materials, to create, and even to use, these 
things. So, consider a person carrying water. Unaided, he or she can carry little, if any, water. 
Water-carrying capacity is greatly increased with a bucket, and that capacity is doubled with two 
buckets. But, where do the buckets come from? First, there has to be the idea of a bucket, 
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possibly from seeing rainwater trapped in a broken gourd. Then, the bucket must be constructed 
from a gourd or animal hide or coopered wood. Then, the buckets must be filled and carried, 
which can be physically difficult if the water is inaccessible. This is because our human arms can 
only reach so far, and our hands can only grasp for a limited time. So, the person might create a 
lever for drawing up water and a yoke for carrying two buckets. All of this takes time. The more 
skilled the person is at constructing things, the more quickly he or she can make the buckets, 
lever, and yoke. Also, some buckets, levers, and yokes are more functional—less likely to break, 
require less physical effort or pain, don’t leak or spill water, etc.—than others. The individual 
must have both the mental content about functional elements (buckets, lever, and yoke, but also 
not to mention components like lumber and rope) and how those elements work together, and the 
ability to realize that functionality by transforming natural materials into a water-carrying 
system. While the individual is creating the components and putting them together in a system, 
he or she is not carrying water. But, once constructed, the system greatly increases the 
individual’s water-carrying capacity, so he or she can carry the needed water quicker. 
So, what are we analyzing here, how much water an individual can carry? No, what we 
are really interested in is what the individual does with the water when he or she doesn’t have to 
carry it. People must have water. Prior to the water-carrying system the individual (and those 
who rely on her or him) had to spend a lot of time carrying water. With the water-carrying 
system, the individual can spends much less time on that task and has time to spend as he or she 
sees fit. The individual does not exist to carry water. Rather, water is means to the individual’s 
survival. The individual can use it personally, or he or she can use it as part of an organization, or 
he or she can contribute to a system that is used by other individuals—as persons or 
organizations—in a region. 
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There are certain realities—from humans’ need for water to the fact that built systems 
deteriorate—that create imperatives for individuals; things they must do. What I am focused on 
here is how those imperatives arise and how they are addressed. These are really issues of what 
determines individual capabilities, and of how individuals utilize their capacity and develop their 
abilities. I am concerned with means and reasons, and how those arise. 
As agents, individuals have common, complementary, and conflicting interests, they have 
differing, but always limited, amounts of information (and materials), and they interact based on 
these interests and information (Thibault & Kelley, 1952; Homans, 1958; Coase, 1960; Simon, 
1976, 1991). There aren’t just complementary and conflicting interests between agents; different 
interests exist within individuals as they act agentically at the micro level as a person, for an 
organization at the meso level, or at the macro level in a region. Relationships between and 
within levels can be positive or negative: the micro can enhance or undermine the meso, and vice 
versa, and the same is true for the macro.  
How to balance for personal, organizational, and regional agency is a fundamental issue 
for individuals. Intentionally and methodically increasing abilities—learning—is one means for 
achieving this balance, which allows individuals to accommodate competing demands or to 
restructure those demands to be complementary. Another means for balancing differing interests 
from various levels is to organize and to create infrastructure and institutions, or to restructure 
existing organizations and institutions. These activities are also forms of learning—collective 
learning. 
For moral and practical reasons, this conceptual framework focuses on individuals as 
ends rather than means. Practically, it can be difficult to define and determine ends in the context 
of organizations and regions. For an organization, for example, is the end profitability or 
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customer delight? Elsewhere I identify (from literature) organizational performance and regional 
advantage as general goals or metrics. But who says exactly what these things are? Practically 
(although, admittedly this is not unproblematic), individuals are the ultimate arbiters of what is 
meaningful to them. While we can say organizations and regions—and persons, for that matter—
are social constructions, we cannot say that of individuals. It is individuals who create social 
constructions. For research and theoretical purposes, we can reduce the risk of the cross-level 
fallacies and ecological fallacies that are endemic to multilevel analysis (Rousseau, 1985; Klein, 
Tosi & Cannella, 1999; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000) by consistently analyzing learning and its 
effects at the individual level. 
As notably pointed out by Kant (1785/1993), moral logic dictates that one should not 
treat others as means. Researchers (and educators) who see knowledge as an end can too easily 
objectify subjects in the process. Focusing on individuals as the ultimate unit of analysis helps to 
avoid this moral pitfall. Even when considering regional and organizational learning, the 
fundamental question is, “how do individuals benefit?” Of course, none of this is to say that 
individuals cannot be considered in context. We can we analyze individuals in groups and places 
by considering their activities and assets. We can analyze individuals’ context in terms of what 
they do, have, and say, their behavior, connections, and visions.  
In the end, though, the question must be what these things mean for the individuals 
involved. The quality of a quantity—whether it is positive or negative—is determined by 
whether it reduces or increases drives and needs of individual human beings. Ultimately, 
fulfillment—reduced drives and needs—emerges as liberty, prosperity, and wellness. So, these 
are what we ultimately must analyze about (and as) individuals to determine their learning. 
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Levels of Analysis 
Individuals act first and foremost to construct and maintain themselves as persons. Such 
action defines and delimits the micro level of analysis. People have a general purpose—which I 
shall refer to as fulfillment—that includes creating or finding specific purpose(s). Personal 
purpose is based on innate drives and human needs. Personhood is the ultimate end, the most 
compelling and general purpose: To be an autonomous, competent, and related person, who can 
acquire, bond, and defend to satiate physiological and psychological needs. Persons function as 
socio-cognitive constructors of capabilities and knowledge for fulfillment of drives and needs. 
As discussed in more details below, capabilities are comprised of capacity and ability. 
Capabilities are what others observe of one’s knowledge, which can be described as knowledge 
elements or knoels (discussed below). Capabilities are evident in personal fulfillment (micro 
level), organizational performance (meso level), and regional advantage (macro level). Ability is 
enabled and capacity is limited by regional advantage and organizational performance. 
Ultimately, capabilities can be described and measured in terms of liberty, prosperity, and 
wellness, which are the ultimate goods, the dependent variables, and what is analyzed about 
individuals. 
People are cognitive constructors. Individuals achieve personhood, in part, by processing 
perceived information (which is accessed via connections) for actions via rules (which are 
integrated into vision). People continuously improve rules based on results of actions. 
Individuals instantiate rules and schemata into artifacts and practices, which can then be 
replicated and shared. Socially, these phenomena manifest as organizations that enable persons 
to gather information and to act more effectively and efficiently (Smith, 1776/1904; Olson, 1965; 
Williamson, 1981, 2000; Senge, 2006). Bandura (2001) points out that:  
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[T]here is no emergent entity that operates independently of the beliefs 
and actions of the individuals who make up a social system. It is people 
acting conjointly on a shared belief, not a disembodied group mind that is 
doing the cognizing, aspiring, motivating, and regulating. (p. 14) 
Such action defines and delimits the meso level of analysis. 
Metaphorically, organizations are not just aggregated agentic socio-cognitive 
constructors. They function as groups engaged in loops of learning regarding collective 
performance of some purpose, evaluated in terms of fulfillment (of customers, employees, 
partners, etc.). Organizational performance is determined by the amount of capital and labor 
(“means of production,” and aggregated individual capabilities allocated to organizational 
purposes), and by division of labor and technological quality. These are the organizational 
equivalents of capacity and ability, which can be described and measured. 
Organizations emerge from general, innate human drives, but they do not have such 
drives. Instead, organizations have particular purposes, e.g., their missions. Individuals divide up 
their actions and pursue their drives via organizations. Organizations don’t have capabilities, 
either, per se. An organization’s capacity is determined by the capital—buildings, equipment, 
stock, and cash money—and employees/labor available for its purpose. The arrangement of 
capital and labor, including technology, determine an organization’s ability to apply available 
capacity to purpose. In this conceptual framework we are not so concerned with whether 
capacity comes from capital or labor; the primary focus is how they contribute to organizational 
performance. Conceptually, organization is a means to increase the collective ability of a group 
with given capacity. So, two groups with similar physical characteristics and resources may 
perform at very different levels simply because of how they are organized. For example, an 
organization might have many resources—physical, human, financial, etc.—but still perform 
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poorly, whereas an organization with few resources may be highly effective. This is a difference 
in ability and use of capacity. 
Organizations impact individuals in two general ways. First, individuals use the products 
of organizations for personal fulfillment, either directly as customers or indirectly via proximity 
and society. For example, a company may produce laborsaving devices for their customers while 
producing pollution that sickens the company’s neighbors. Second, organizations aggregate 
individuals’ capabilities as employees. Individuals, in return, allocate some of their capabilities 
to organizational purposes, either directly as an employee or indirectly as a customer/neighbor. 
Such an allocation results can increase capabilities, but can also have a negative impact. Time 
spent working can positively impact prosperity while negatively affecting wellness. 
Organizations have a general purpose—to perform—that is tied to their specific purposes, 
their missions. To maintain viability, members of an organization continually strive to improve 
performance vis-à-vis its mission. Members collectively reiterate improvement processes, and 
reflect critically on the mission and improvement processes (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Deming, 
1986; Argyris, 1999; Liker, 2004; Senge, 2006). Collective cognition involves members of the 
organization thinking together, in coordination, with a share base of knowledge and means of 
communicating. How organizations combine people and resources may be more important than 
what people and resources are combined. This how is technology: formalized, replicable means 
of arranging things to achieve ends and solve problems. In many ways, technology is the social 
equivalent of schema: Technologies are means for making sense of and manipulating the 
environment that are common to a group or society.  
Regions function as multiple loops of learning engaged in geography-based triple helix of 
interactive learning for constructed advantage, evaluated in terms of performance and 
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fulfillment. The environment, infrastructure, and location determine regional capacity; the 
quality of institutions determines regional ability. Together these things determine regional 
advantage. How regional advantage contributes to personal fulfillment is mediated by 
organizational performance. 
Place is the general context of agentic action, including organizations. Groups of people 
organized for particular purposes interact and overlap with other such groups in place. This is 
essentially the axiom of regions (Arensberg & Kimball, 1965; Sanders, 1975; Fischer, et al., 
1977; Fischer, 1982; Saxenian, 1994; Florida, 1995; Audretsch, 1998; Cooke & Morgan, 1998; 
Asheim, 2003; Safford, 2009). Where the basic metric for persons is capability, and performance 
for organizations, regions are evaluated in terms of the advantages they provide to those who 
reside in them.  
Regions have natural and built environments that individuals use for personal and 
organized agentic action, and which are tied to location. The regional environment determines 
the region’s capacity. Regions also have institutions (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Boschma and 
Lambooy, 1999; Hauser, Tappeiner & Walde, 2007)—“complex social forms that reproduce 
themselves such as governments, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, business 
corporations, and legal systems” (Miller, 2012, para. 1). Institutions are regions’ equivalent to 
ability. Regional institutions in conjunction with infrastructure and other resources comprise the 
regions’ capabilities: regional advantage. 
Effective utilization of regional resources depends not just on individual and 
organizational abilities, but also on interactions between organizations within and outside the 
region (Granovetter, 1985; Saxenian, 1994; Amin and Thrift, 1995; Morgan, 1997; MacKinnon, 
Cumbers, and Chapman, 2002; Boschma, 2005; Hauser, Tappeiner & Walde, 2007). Practically, 
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there is coherent regional action that is distinct from that of particular organization and 
individuals. They act differently together in place. Metaphorically, knowledge spills over from 
organizations as they interact, and this knowledge becomes a place-based, regional resource for 
organizations and individuals (Audretsch, 1998; Asheim, 2003). 
Conceptually, persons, organizations, and regions have formal and functional differences. 
Formally, people are socio-cogntive constructors that function to fulfill diverse drives—
physiological and psychological (Maslow, 1970), autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Ryan 
& Deci, 2000), to acquire, to bond, and to defend (Lawrence & Nohria, 2002). Again, the basic 
metric for persons is individual capabilities.  
Organizations take the form of people interacting through loops of learning to combine 
capital and labor. Organizations involve multiple individuals, and individuals can be involved in 
multiple organizations. The general function of organizations is to produce a set of goods, and to 
exchange those goods so as to benefit those within the organization and those involved in the 
exchange. Performance is the essential metric.  
Regions take the form geographic concentrations of people organized in groups 
interacting and overlapping in a shared built and natural environment. Regions don’t have 
explicit purposes, but they do function to capitalize on—to exploit, improve, and maintain—the 
built and natural environment. All of this emerges as various sectors’ loops of learning interact. 
Advantage is the essential metric for regions. 
These levels are formally and functionally embedded in (or encompass) each other. A 
simple way to say this is that people plus materials and technology comprise organizations, and 
organizations plus infrastructure and institutions comprise regions. But this is not just an over 
simplification, it is backward and treats individuals as means. Fundamentally, regions and 
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organizations exist as collective agents for individual benefit. Regional capacity plus regional 
ability determine regional advantage, which contributes to organizational capabilities. 
Organizational capacity and organizational abilities determines organizational performance, 
enhancing individual capabilities. Individuals allocate their capabilities to personal, 
organizational, and regional purposes based on expected fulfillment. This is the simplest possible 
way of describing the relationships between the levels of analysis without losing validity and 
veracity.  
There are a few salient characteristics of the personal-organizational-regional continuum 
that should be noted. For one thing, to state the obvious, it varies in number from one to many 
(millions, even). Although it could be argued that individuals might be decomposed into roles or 
traits, the fundamental, indivisible unit is the individual. With the number of individuals there is 
an increasing number and diversity of purposes; each individual has multiple (possibly 
conflicting) drives and concomitant purposes, and each organization layers purposes on those. 
While regions don’t have particular purposes, they are characterized by shared agendas (better 
schools, less congestion, more jobs, etc.) and the general purpose of providing advantages to 
residents. As scale increases so does the number of activities and assets; there is an increasing 
number and diversity of resources. There is also less coherence and more diffuse ownership of 
these resources. As resources aggregate, so do the roles and rules for acquiring, holding, and 
using resources. The interplay of roles and rules increases exponentially. And, with all of this, 
there are longer and longer time horizons. More people and more things mean more conflicts and 
increased transaction costs (to find, reach agreements, and coordinate actions). The more people, 
the longer things take. 
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Description and Measurement 
There are important structurally similarities between individuals, organizations, and 
regions that provide a common basis for describing, measuring, and relating them. 
Fundamentally each of these units can be seen as complex, adaptive, self-regulating, socially 
constructed systems (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Bertalanffy, 1968; Maturana & Varela, 1980; 
Luhmann, 1990; Holland, 2006). Systems at each level are of different scales, function 
differently, and take different forms. But their structures—components and their interactions—
and synergistic natures are generally similar. As complex adaptive systems individuals, 
organizations, and regions are contain and are embedded within each other and self-similar 
across scale (Holland, 2006).  
Self-similarity could be theoretically problematic because it translates into isomorphism. 
This is a different type of isomorphism than that which worries Klein, Tosi, and Cannella (1999). 
Where they were concerned about constructs having the same function with different structures 
at different scales, what we have here is structural isomorphism: Similar structures with different 
functions at various levels. Structural isomorphism allows for simple conceptual framework that 
enables simplification, as recommended by Ashby (1970), Fiorina (1975), Weick (1989), Varian 
(2009), Jaccard and Jacoby (2010), and helps to avoid problems with misspecification, 
ecological fallacy, and cross-level fallacy discussed by Rousseau (1985). So what is it that 
systems at all levels have in common? 
All of these systems behave: they operate in a purposive, agentic manner, albeit with 
different general purposes at each level. And, of course, beyond the individual level it is 
collective agency. Second, each level has distinct systems of beliefs about what they are and 
what they hope to become, why they exist, what they can and cannot do, and how they do and 
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should operate; they have vision. More accurately, individuals see things differently as they act 
as persons, organization members, and region residents, and operate under different sets of 
beliefs. These beliefs exist in individuals’ minds but are instantiated in organizations’ roles and 
rules and in regions’ infrastructure and institutions. Third, all of these systems have connections 
with other, similar systems via which they exchange information and materials.  
These are not independent characteristics; behavior, connections, and vision are different 
aspects of a system. Visions are the internal subjective aspects of individuals, organizations, and 
regions, which are qualitatively expressed via behavior. Connections are the external objective 
aspects of these systems, which are quantitatively enacted via behavior. Behavior is the common 
intersubjective aspect of these systems that is the means of enactment and expression.  
There is an important conceptual and practical implication of structural isomorphism: 
Conceptually, each aspect of a system at any level has the same information content. This is what 
it means to different aspects of one system; a system has a unitary set of information, and 
different systems have different information. Yet all systems are embedded in an environment, 
so have a great deal of shared information.  
Scientists, professionals, and others who might employ this proposed theory, and the 
organizations and regions in which they are embedded, behave, too. While they can observe 
enactment and expression of others, they can never be separate from them. The objective and 
subjective are indefinite ideals that are transformed by observation. I delve into the implications 
of this in more detail when I illustrate my theory. For now, let it suffice to say we must all learn 
together, along with our subjects. 
More immediately, as I discuss connections and vision in more detail remember that 
behavior is implicit in them (and vice-versa). It impossible to fully separate and independently 
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define the objective and subjective. We are all in this together so we cannot be either totally 
independent of or totally integrated with any other. Complete knowledge may be asymptotically 
approached but never achieved, which makes theory building all the more—not less—important 
and interesting! 
Vision 
Vision is generally defined as “intelligent foresight … the manner in which one sees or 
conceives of something … a mental image produced by the imagination,” as well as the faculty 
of sight (vision, 2003). My definition of this construct is more detailed and specific, but the 
standard definition includes the basic elements: belief about what is and what could and should 
be. Vision encompasses two central elements of sociocognitive theory: perceived self-efficacy, 
or belief regarding one’s ability, and outcomes expectations, or belief outcomes of action 
(Bandura, 1986, 1997, 2001, 2006). It is a particular component of mental model (Senge, 2006) 
and type of schema (Piaget, 1973, 1983; Hirsch, 1987).  
Visions are beliefs about what is, what could be, and what should be—current and future 
states, including self, others, and environment—often construed as mental images. Behind these 
beliefs are practical theories regarding factors that drive or enable action, and about factors that 
limit or disable action, including what is in the minds of others (e.g., their purposes, rationales, 
and visions). Objective information and subjective feelings undergird vision, giving us a sense of 
what is beneficial and what is desirable, which can be two very different things. Future and 
present; drivers and limiters; information and feelings; these comprise the “sides” of vision, 
which define a three-dimensional conceptual space, illustrated in figure 1. The intersubjective 
resides in the middle of this space. 
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Senge (2006) provides an extensive consideration of mental models and shared vision but 
does not discuss personal vision in any detail, and treats the two as separate constructs. He 
basically equates vision with purpose. My approach is more similar to Bandura’s (1997, 2001) 
concept of collective efficacy. He characterizes it as “an emergent group-level property, not 
simply the sum of the efficacy beliefs of individual members” (p. 14), that operates via 
individuals in addition to their personal perceived self-efficacy. Thus personal vision and 
collective vision are separate but co-determinant aspects of vision that are manifest by 
individuals via their intentions and actions, which depend upon individuals situation and their 
roles in those situations.  
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Figure 1 The “Sides” of Vision 
 
Let’s consider some examples or iterations of vision. A police officer chasing a suspect 
sees that it is possible to speed after the suspect at 100 miles per hour. But, recognizing that it is 
impractical because it puts others at risk, she calls for backup instead. A student taking a test 
feels the desire to cheat but knows it is not acceptable. While a higher grade would be beneficial, 
he will not benefit from increased knowledge needed for the test, and he definitely won’t benefit 
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if he’s caught. A corporate executive considering an acquisition that is desirable for its assets 
might feel that it as a bad cultural fit so her company would not benefit.  
Each of these examples illustrates a different vision space—a different combination of 
beneficial, desirable, possible, and practical. Each demonstrates visions of different intensity. 
The police officer’s vision is low-intensity, overshadowed by the experience, as she is acting 
almost automatically in response to intensive training. The student is contemplating his future 
and his grade in a medium-intensity vision. The executive has a strong, if not clear, high-
intensity vision of what her company is and where it is going. It is easy to imagine others in the 
same situation viewing it differently, or the same people having hindsight different from their 
foresight. Each person is informed by backside experience and frontside expectation, as well as 
topside drivers and bottomside constraints. 
Three general points about vision: First, it is highly complex and dynamic, yet often 
comes down to something quite simple that can be effectively communicated to others. Second, 
vision is inherently subjective and qualitative. Even the “outside” of vision—viewing something 
from a factual and objective perspective—is a subjective phenomenon that cannot be directly 
measured. Third, although they are inherently qualitative, vision can vary greatly. When we 
speak of a “visionary,” we usually mean someone who has a clear and compelling idea for some 
ambitious goal. Sometimes we mean an artist or eccentric who has an odd perspective or unusual 
goal. We do not refer to ordinary people with mundane visions. Regular folks have visions—
beliefs about what is, what could and should be—they just aren’t notable. 
All visions, extraordinary or mundane, are nominally knowledge—informed true 
beliefs—that can be described by knoels (knowledge elements, discussed below in the section on 
“Knowledge”). This knowledge is expressed in texts, and can be verified in terms of coherence, 
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consistence, and correspondence. So, for practical purposes, a text can be analyzed to ascertain 
what it means, how sensible its meaning is, how its meaning varies, and how it relates to what 
others see as meaningful. I provide more detail about how to describe vision in the discussion 
section, below. 
Connections 
Connections are seemingly more straightforward than visions: A connection is a means of 
transferring information or materials. They are discrete and clear cut, even when they are 
qualitative: She is a police officer. He is a student. She is a corporate executive. Each of these 
connections can be unpacked to reveal the information and materials that go along with them. 
Many connections are simple, stable tethers of constancy that anchor identity and determine what 
one has. Some connections happen very rapidly and are totally unique. And, such connections 
can have huge implications.  
Connections may be most commonly understood in economic terms, as exchange and 
production. The concept of persons having roles, operating under rules, and working with 
resources was well established by Smith (1776/1904), Ricardo (1817), and other classical 
economists if not before. Trade, a primary concern of Smith, Ricardo, and many other 
economists, is part and parcel of connections. The production function, an essential element of 
neo-classical economics that states that production is a function of capital and labor (Mishra, 
2007), is essentially a highly abstracted and simplified description of connections, at least their 
results.  
Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981, 2000), social exchange theory (Blau, 
1964; Befu, 1977), and resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) are essentially 
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formal descriptions of how connections operate. Social capital and social networks (Granovetter, 
1973, 1983; Fischer, et al., 1977; Putnam, 1993; Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2002; Burt, 2004) are 
purely sociological descriptions of connections, as is social identity theory (Turner & Reynolds, 
2010) and actor-network theory (Latour, 2005). Much of this depends on theory of mind, the 
belief that others have a mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Baron-Cohen, 1991), because it 
enables connection and identification. A fundamental element of these theories is that individuals 
interact and share resources based on socially constructed roles and rules, which links the 
concept of connections to social construction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Latour, 2003). 
Connections manifest as quantities of information or materials with certain qualities, 
associated with other persons, organizations, and regions: The police officer arrests a number of 
criminals for various offenses; the student takes a number of tests at a university, making 
different grades; the executive acquires another company for an amount of money. Economists 
would note that each of these combines assets (capital) during activities (of labor) to achieve an 
outcome (production). Assets, activities, and outcomes all have value associated with them, 
determined by demand for, supply of, and uses for those things. Psychologists would put the 
values in more subjective terms, based on drive reduction or needs fulfillment. Sociologists look 
at roles, rules, and resources in a broader perspective, but basically these boil down to number 
and types of connections. 
Connections can be counted, subdivided by type, and measured by the amount or value of 
information and materials conveyed. Generally, connections can be strong or weak, based on 
their frequency and intensity (the amount of attention and/or resources involved). Drawing on 
economics, strength can be measured in terms of activities (labor intensity) and assets (capital 
intensity). As Granovetter (1973, 1983) notes in his seminal works, strong and weak ties both 
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have particular value. Connections can serve to bond individuals into groups or to bridge 
between the groups (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Lin, 2002). As Burt (2004) gaps can be as 
important as bonds and bridge. Social network analysts measure nodes in terms of centrality: 
betweenness, closeness, degree, and eigenvector (Lin, 2002; Knoke & Yang, 2008). In this 
conceptual framework, focusing on connections, valence is the effect a connection has on 
centrality. Connections can have positive or negative valence. The practical implication of 
valence is that positive valence involves opportunities while negative valence is associated with 
problems. These elements create a three-dimensional conceptual space, illustrated in figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Connection Characteristics 
 
Two general points about connections: First, they are basically simple—two parties, 
exchanging one thing for another—yet they can easily become highly complex and dynamic. 
Second, connections are intrinsically objective and quantitative; they are highly amenable to 
valuation. Even in their most subjective form, connections come down to what I get, what I give, 
and the relative value of these items. Connections have physical capacity to carry certain 
amounts of information and materials, and have ability to accommodate certain qualities or types 
of information and materials. 
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Behaviors 
Behaviors are patterns of action in determined by beliefs in context. Acts occur in a 
shared, socially constructed reality, which makes them behaviors. While we can objectively 
observe an act, we can never fully separate it from our own acts. While we can presume there is 
subjective meaning for an act, we can never be truly sure that the meaning is the actors’ and not 
our own. I reference a great deal of literature from across the behavioral sciences in this 
dissertation, and summarize key concepts elsewhere in this section. Therefore, I do not rehash 
the concepts regarding behavior, except to make four general points about it. 
First, in order to understand behavior it helps to understand beliefs and context, the 
internal and external aspects of behavior. This is where this conceptual framework helps: 
Connections are all about context, visions composed of beliefs. Connections are amenable to 
objective, quantitative measurement, and visions are amenable to subjective, qualitative 
description. Measures of connections can be validated subjectively, objectively, and 
intersubjectively. But propositions about connections cannot be verified, only falsified. 
Descriptions of vision can be verified in terms of coherence, consistence, and correspondence. 
But, as subjective beliefs, they cannot be validated; they must simply be accepted. In a sense the 
behavior-connection-vision (BCV) framework is a means for triangulating to understanding 
actors. 
Second, unfortunately, it is impossible to directly measure connections or describe 
visions because we are immersed in the intersubjective. Instead, we can only measure and 
describe behaviors as indicators of connections and visions. The implication is that the BCV 
framework turns behavioral science on its head. We are not really interested in behaviors; we are 
interested in connections and visions. Rather than understanding behavior by considering 
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connections and visions, we are validating connections and verifying visions by observing 
behaviors. What we’re really interested in are capabilities—the interplay between ability and 
capacity, what is not chosen as well as what is. The BCV framework allows us to understand 
capabilities, what they are, and how they change. To do this, we observe the behavior—doing—
and infer connections and visions. 
Third, the distinction between personal, organizational, and regional capabilities—the 
connections and visions for each level—can be discerned via behavior in context. Visions are the 
internal aspect of an individual, organizational, or regional agent. When fully internalized, vision 
becomes embodied in the agent, part of its form that is transparent to its functioning. No effort is 
required to invoke the vision. Indeed, one can’t help but call it to mind. Behavior occurs without 
thought. It is the “fast” element of thought (Kahneman, 2011), the “inferential” type of belief 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), and is implicit in the agent. It effectively becomes infrastructure—
“It is by definition invisible, part of the background for other kinds of work. It is ready-to-hand” 
(Star, 1999, p. 380). Beliefs about what is and what should be become intrinsic to how one sees 
the world via internalization. I refer to the general process of incorporating new information into 
vision and internalizing it as seeing.  
Connections are an agent’s external aspect. Highly externalized connections require a 
huge amount of effort, or sense-making (Weick, 1995) and transaction costs (Williamson, 1981) 
for decision-making (Simon, 1976). This is both what Kahneman (2011) calls “slow” thinking 
and what Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) refer to as “descriptive” belief. At some indistinct point in 
these processes, through experience and practice, slow thinking becomes fast, descriptive beliefs 
become inferential, and connections are internalized into vision. Conversely, sometimes visions 
must be externalized to create connections, particularly when there are major changes in the 
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environment. Vision becomes enacted in connections to acquire information and materials, 
which I refer to as having.  
Externalization of vision occurs via learning. Rather, having is learning, or at least part of 
it. Having is both a demonstration of and means to increase capabilities. The other side of 
learning is reflection, or seeing. Both having and seeing can results from as well as feed into 
learning. Having and seeing are, in this conceptual framework, practical aspects of being, along 
with doing. Doing is the intersubjective aspect of being, having is the objective aspect, and 
seeing is the subjective aspect. Doing is not just about action; it is about states-of-being. This is 
illustrated in figure 3, which shows how connections and visions are conceptually integrated in 
behavior. Externalized information requires inference and behavior happens slowly as one must 
attend to assets to understand what they are and how they work. Internalized information allows 
description and behavior happens rapidly as one is able to attend through assets to act in/on the 
world. 
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Figure 3 The Behavioral Space 
 
Behavior changes with externalization and internalization, as connections and visions 
change. All of this manifests as behavior; indeed, behavior can be seen as an on-going interplay 
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between externalization and internalization. It also describes how interpersonal relations arise. 
Vision is manifest in behavior, and persons with complementary behavior connect. Behavior of 
others with whom one is connected functions as a model, impacting that person’s behavior and 
influencing her or his visions. These concepts align with philosophical perspectives such as those 
of Ryle (1946, 2002), Polanyi (1958, 1983), and Habermas (1984), as well as with the views of 
cognitive scientists such as Baldwin, et al. (1996) and Bargh and Ferguson (2000). 
An individual who is highly capable in a particular context does not need to make 
connections because those connections have already been made, internalized, and incorporated 
into vision. Therefore he or she is engages in activities and utilizes assets effortlessly—literally, 
unconsciously recognizing them. An incapable person literally cannot envision how things work 
or what to do. He or she ends up attending to assets rather than attending through them to do the 
activities. Or, if the person is marginally capable, he or she attends through the asset to the 
activity but not to the purpose. For example, someone who is new to a company has a difficult 
time getting a conference room, getting the projector to work, and getting on the conference call. 
A more experienced worker can do all of those things but can’t keep attendees on topic or get a 
decision. A highly capable worker skillfully facilitates the discussion and uses the facilities to get 
through the meeting. A similar analysis could be conducted of persons in their individual and 
regional contexts.  
This brings me to a final point about behavior: The person is the fundamental object. This 
dissertation and theory are really all about individual people. An individual manifests personal 
behaviors-connections-visions (B-C-V), organizational B-C-V, and regional B-C-V that are 
distinct from each other. Individuals behave collectively as organizations and regions differently 
than they do individually as persons. Differences in B-C-V between levels emerge as differences 
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in form and function between levels. Persons have form and function different from 
organizations. And, organizations have form and function different from regions. Conceptually, 
individual, organizational, and regional capabilities can change independently (even if, in reality, 
they never do). The behavior-connection-vision (B-C-V) framework provides a means for 
assessing changes in capabilities at each level, for correlating those changes to each other, and 
for ascertaining what causes capabilities to change. 
To simplify and summarize, capabilities and knowledge—the dependent variables in this 
theory and the outcomes of learning are evident in behavior—which is the manifestation of 
internal visions and external connections. Behaviors, connections, and visions can also be used to 
describe and measure the independent variables, or inputs, of this theory, which I discuss below. 
If people learn, they will invariably exhibit particular types of behaviors-connections-visions (B-
C-V): liberty, prosperity, and wellness. These result from another particular type of B-C-V, 
which is commonly referred to as community. Generally, applying and testing this theory 
involves analysis of what individuals are at the micro, meso, and macro levels. To be valid and 
verifiable, such an analysis must consider what individuals do (behavior, activities, purposeful 
actions, etc.), have (connections, assets, information, materials resources, etc.), and say (vision, 
attention, attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, thoughts). 
It is important to note that the precision, reliability, and validity of a measure (or 
descriptor) depend on specificity. Bandura (2006) makes this point in reference to self-efficacy, 
but it applies to behaviors and connections, as well as vision (which, in this conceptual 
framework, encompasses self-efficacy): 
There is no all-purpose measure of perceived self-efficacy. The “one 
measure fits all” approach usually has limited explanatory and predictive 
value because most of the items in an all-purpose test may have little or no 
116 
relevance to the domain of functioning. Moreover, in an effort to serve all 
purposes, items in such a measure are usually cast in general terms 
divorced from the situational demands and circumstances. This leaves 
much ambiguity about exactly what is being measured or the level of task 
and situational demands that must be managed. (p. 307, emphasis in the 
original) 
Similar can be said of capabilities, freedom, and knowledge, and of community. The more 
specific one can be about the aspect and context of the individual that is being described or 
measured, the clearer and more useful that descriptor or measure will be. This conceptual 
framework is intended to facilitate consistent specification of concepts and operationalization of 
variables across instances and levels. 
Capabilities, Freedom, and Knowledge 
Capabilities and knowledge are covered in some detail in the literature review. I also 
discussed capabilities in relation to levels of analysis. Here I focus on how they fit into and the 
forms they take my conceptual framework. The capabilities approach (Sen, 1988, 1999; 
Nussbaum, 2000; Clark, 2005) focuses on functionings, relative to the possible ways one could 
choose to function, and the factors that enable and constrain those choices and functions. 
Capabilities are what allow us to respond to innate drives, and capabilities can be constrained or 
enhanced.  
It is questionable whether drives can be definitively defined and differentiated as Ryan 
and Deci (2000) or Lawrence and Nohria (2002) have done. For one thing, these definitions of 
drives are different—competing or complementary—from each other and from Maslow’s (1970) 
taxonomy of needs. Another issue, as discussed by Clark (2005), is that such expert-formulated 
definitions can undermine capabilities by foreclosing on people’s opportunity to define their 
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drives for themselves. It is reasonable and useful to propose general areas or aspects of capability 
(freedom) based on the literature reviewed above (see table 2). This is just a framework. 
Conceptually, one or more of the forms of freedom allow individuals to fulfill their drives and 
live their values. But, individuals are fully able to name their own drives, responses, and guiding 
values. 
My definition of capabilities has two aspects. First is the inherent capacity to process 
information and materials. Second is acquired ability to utilize capacity for valued outcomes. 
Capacity is what the individual can accomplish unaided and without tools. It is what we have in 
Hobbes’s (1651/1994) “state of nature,” or what has been commonly referred to as “nature” in 
the behavioral sciences. For the sake of simplicity I assume, like Hobbes, that all persons have 
essentially the same capacity. Ability, in contrast, is similar to “nurture.” It is what we acquire 
through experience and from others.  
Table 2 The Forms and Aspects of Freedom  
Forms of Freedom Positive Aspect Negative aspect 
Liberty Freedom to associate and 
speak as one sees fit 
Freedom from coercion and 
oppression 
Prosperity Freedom to benefit from one’s 
effort and property  
Freedom from exploitation and 
privation 
Wellness Freedom to life and health Freedom from disease, injury, 
and infirmity 
 
In this framework, capability is simply ability given capacity. Capacity is the quantity of 
information or materials that can be acquired, handled, managed, processed, etc., over time. 
Ability is the quality over time. Capacity can be measured in units, whereas as ability must be 
valued to be measured. For example, an unaided person can carry five regular bricks at one time, 
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or that person can carry one gold brick; the former is a larger quantity but the latter is more 
qualitatively valuable. 
Freedom, in this conceptual framework, is simply the exercise of choice or preferences, 
including absence of that which impedes such exercise or presence of that which promotes it. 
Freedom relates directly to individual persons. It has a wholly physical form (wellness), a 
physical form in social context (prosperity), and a wholly social form (liberty). Liberty involves 
freedom of association and expression, or freedom from coercion and oppression. Prosperity 
involves freedom of ownership and work, or freedom from exploitation and privation. And, 
wellness involves freedom of health and life, or freedom from disease and injury. Socioeconomic 
circumstances can enable or constrain freedoms, and can be such that one persons freedoms are 
enhanced via constraint of another’s. For example, slave owners’ freedoms are increased by 
reducing their slaves’ freedoms. These are what I call the positive and negative aspects of 
freedom. 
Generally, a capability allows one to achieve some form of freedom. Indeed, capabilities 
can be defined as that which increases freedom (which is complementary to, not contradictory of 
my definition of capability as ability given capacity). There is a multiplicity of capabilities, but 
we can think of them in terms of drives: as autonomy, competency, and relatedness, as evidenced 
by acquiring, belonging, and defending. These can be described and measured in terms of 
behaviors, connections, and visions, and the extent that these aspects of the agent have a positive 
or negative impact (either by absence or presence) upon areas of freedom. Freedoms are 
evidence of capabilities in context, described as visions and measured as connections both via 
behaviors. 
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An individual’s capacity is assumed to be fixed, given, and practically the same as others’ 
capacities. Organizations and regions cannot increase an individual’s capacity but they can affect 
how that capacity is allocated. Higher level social structures can directly meet human needs—
can carry out important tasks for individuals—allowing them to do other less critical but higher 
valued tasks. For example, farms and markets can produce food for individuals so that those 
individuals can build houses, teach children, write poetry, etc. Organizations and regions can 
constrain individuals’ capacities by limiting access to nourishment, barring them from the 
marketplace, enslaving them, etc. Ability is the opposite: Organizations and regions can enhance 
ability but cannot limit it. 
External factors can reduce one’s capacity, resulting in negative freedom, or impede 
gains in ability. It is more difficult for negative freedoms to reduce ability because ability is, as 
Frankl (1984) notes, the contents of mind that only the individual can affect. Once you know 
something it is practically impossible for others to make you unlearn it. On the other hand, 
external forces can easily enhance ability, but they cannot easily enhance capacity. Note that 
organizations and regions consist largely of “external factors.” So, conceptually, capabilities and 
freedoms are closely related but not the same things. One way to look at this is that capacity is 
objective, ability is subjective, and freedom is intersubjective. The forms of freedom are the 
outputs of capabilities, the ways in which capabilities are evident. 
At least as important as the amount or level of freedom is the extent to which one 
freedom fosters or must be sacrificed for another—their correlation—may be more important. 
One might have to sacrifice prosperity for liberty if he or she does not want to be constrained by 
schedules and tasks dictated by work. Or, one may have to sacrifice health for prosperity in a job 
that is dangerous, or simply involves sedentary activities. There are three general relationships: 
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First, each form of freedom could be independent of—rising or falling without impacting—the 
others. Second, increases or decreases in one form of freedom could have a similar impact on—
be positively correlated with—one or both of the other forms. Third, one form freedom could be 
a trade-off for, negatively correlated with, the others. If it goes up the others go down and vice 
versa. The subjectively desirable situation is for each form of freedom to complement and 
promote the others, but this is often not the case. As much as we want to understand what 
contributes to a particular form, we are even more interested in what causes them to be 
complementary and to increase. 
Knowledge is informed true belief. Or, to be more specific, it is probabilistic judgment 
about the world—self and environment—that coheres together, is expressed consistently, and 
corresponds to reality based on signals from the world. The validity of knowledge can be judged 
by how it encompasses multiple divergent perspectives and by the amount of excess (unshared) 
information associated with it.  
Declarative knowledge is relatively easy to encode, make explicit, and share via 
documents. Procedural knowledge is relatively difficult to encode, remains largely tacit, and 
must be shared in person. Between these two forms is implicit knowledge that is built into 
artifacts and infrastructure. Knowledge can be naturally divided into nine types, which relate to 
explicit, implicit, and tacit forms. Generally, I refer to this typology as W7TH: Which and 
whether are types decisive knowledge regarding choices. Why is causal or rational type of 
knowledge. Who is agentic knowledge, and closely related to spatiotemporal knowledge when 
and where, because these are all contextual types of knowledge. Indicative, objective knowledge 
that and manipulative, subjective knowledge how are integrated in the most flexible type of 
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knowledge, the intersubjective what. Figure 4 illustrates how the types of knowledge are 
interconnected and how they formally manifest in the world.  
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Figure 4 The W7TH Typology of Knowledge 
 
Each instance of know-how, know-that, know-what, etc., is what I refer to as a 
knowledge element, or a knoel. A knoel such as “how to jump” or “because it’s far” have no 
meaning. Meaning comes from connecting knoels, for example, “jump because it’s too far to 
step” and “don’t jump because it’s too far” are different ways of connecting these knoels. They 
imply other connections, such as what is being done—crossing a chasm or a stream—and 
whether to act.  
Knoels are evident in expressions and artifacts regarding what we do (actions, roles), 
have (possessions, states-of-being), and say (perceptions, thoughts). Know-that in particular, is 
expressed in these terms. I do that: busy work, the polka, etc. I see that: a cat in a tree, you are 
right, etc. I have that: a broken heart, a ’57 Chevy, an organization, etc. State of being is not 
some ethereal, philosophical issue. It is very practical and real. And, it is important to assessing 
knowledge. States-of-being begin with know-that and become more specific as they are 
connected to other knoels. 
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Particular knoels are linked in a complex, dynamic web of associations with other knoels. 
For example, know-that it is Christmas is linked to know-who about Santa Claus as well as 
know-what and know-when of Christmas, which depend on know-where (at a holiday party, the 
mall, or the North Pole?). “Be nice” is know-whether based on Christmas know-why (because 
you won’t get any presents!). This knowledge links back know-what it means to “be nice”: 
know-that eating your vegetables, going to bed on time, etc., is nice, and know-how to behave 
when Santa is watching. Schemata are patterns or general ways of connecting knoels. 
Explicitness, implicitness, and tacitness are characteristics of knoels. Some knoels can be 
expressed—“That is a reindeer”—and verified and evaluated. Other knoels, such as how to wrap 
a present, can be enacted and validated (“He is really good at wrapping presents”). The knoels 
and their connections are explicit in Christmas songs and stories, tacitly communicated by the 
actions of others, and implicit in rituals associated with Christmas. They are possibly most 
evident in states of being: doing, having, and seeing. As noted above, this is a practical issue, 
which I revisit in the section on application and operationalization. 
You have know-which about a toy or a lump of coal. Of course you’ll be nice! Figure 4 
represents thinking from the abstract and general of know-how and know-that to the concrete and 
specific of know-whether and know-which (which can be so well embedded in our environment 
that we don’t have to consciously think and decide, we simply act). Kids have conceptual know-
how and know-that about being good, but it’s the other knoels of Christmas—the know-what, -
when, -where, -who, -why, -whether, and –which—that drive them to actually be good. 
This portion of my conceptual framework—capabilities and knowledge—provides a 
basis for description and measurement necessary to explore the theory. Capabilities and 
knowledge are the latent dependent variables in my theory, which are evident as liberty, 
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prosperity, and wellness. Capabilities and knowledge are means for individuals to achieve their 
ends; liberty, prosperity, and wellness are those ends. This portion of the theoretical framework 
allows for more detailed, in-depth analysis that addresses the issues raised in the methodology 
section. The behavior-connection-vision portion of the framework provides means for valid 
measures and verified descriptions of capabilities, knowledge, and their outcomes, liberty, 
prosperity, and wellness. Figure 5 shows how these components fit together.  
 
Capabilities and knowledge 
Capacity Ability 
Quantity of information, 
materials, and sources 
Quality - Validity (positive 
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Figure 5 Integration of Constructs and Measures 
 
Competence 
Competence is an aspect of capabilities and knowledge that is particularly important in 
context and in practice, basically, “The state or quality of being adequately or well qualified … 
A specific range of skill, knowledge, or ability” (competence, 2000). Competence is primarily 
procedural know-how, ability to carry out some task and to operate in some setting. There is, of 
course, declarative knowledge involved in competence. But, the incompetent person who has 
know-that but no know-how is practically a cliché and stereotype in many settings.  
It has been noted that the first step to knowledge is to realize one does not know. Adams 
(2011) maintains that competence develops through four stages, beginning with not knowing that 
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one does not know. Once a person becomes aware that he or she does not know it is possible to 
pursue competence and to become consciously competent. The ultimate stage is to be 
unconsciously competent. Unconscious competence is essentially what Bransford, Brown, and 
Cocking (2000) call expertise, and what I discuss as internalization. It is the integration of seeing 
and doing into being. Bloom’s (Bloom, et al., 1956; Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001) taxonomy is 
a more comprehensive framework for considering competence, learning activities and artifacts. 
Bloom’s taxonomy includes cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains. Increasing 
competence in each domain is characterized by increasing sophistication, from simply attending 
to a model or some stimuli, to effective response, to generation of new knowledge.  
The primary shortcoming of these approaches to knowledge is that they are inherent to 
the micro-level. Bloom’s taxonomy is quite practical and well suited to assessment, but it less 
applicable at the organizational and regional levels, although, Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder 
(2002) do suggest how this might work. More importantly for present purposes, Bloom’s 
taxonomy does little to help us understand how the learning at various levels is interrelated. In 
my framework, competence is essentially an intermediate element between community and 
capabilities. Competence does not just develop in the context of communities; competence is 
created by and defined in communities. Competence operates in tandem with roles, rules, and 
resources that emerge via community, are formalized into organizations, and are reified in 
regions’ infrastructure and institutions. And, competence contributes to capabilities and 
freedoms. 
125 
Learning 
I summarized the literature on learning, above, including definitions of the term and of 
related terms. Let it suffice to say that learning is the process of gaining capabilities and 
increasing knowledge. During learning, the mind gains informed true beliefs in the form of 
interconnected knoels, and liberty, prosperity, and wellness increase. My primary objective here 
is to highlight qualitatively different forms, or levels, of learning. 
Senge (2006) makes the distinction between adaptive (or survival) learning and 
generative learning. Increasing capabilities for adaptation and survival is important, of course. 
But, “‘adaptive learning’ must be joined by ‘generative learning,’ learning that enhances our 
capacity to create” (Senge, 2006, p. 14). “While adaptive learning is possible without vision, 
generative learning occurs only when people are striving to accomplish something that matters 
deeply to them” (p. 192). Senge argues that generative learning as a concept is meaningless 
without clear, strong vision.  He also maintains generative learning is a social activity.  
When you ask people about what it is like being part of a great team, what 
is most striking is the meaningfulness of the experience. People talk about 
being part of something larger than themselves, of being connected, of 
being generative. (Senge, 2006, p. 13) 
Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder (2002) maintain that learning occurs in communities 
and networks via interplay between accounts of activities and aspirations. The value of learning 
increases in cycles from the immediate, through what’s possible, to actual application, to 
impacts, and to changing values. The everyday accounts and aspirational narrative described by 
Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder equate to the sides vision—aspects of what is and what could 
be—in this conceptual framework. They see value creation in the tension between accounts and 
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aspirations. I see gains in capabilities coming from cycles of externalizing vision and 
internalizing connections; or, in more common terms, cycles of doing and seeing.  
Wittrock (1992) presents a different, sub-individual type of generative learning. He 
would likely agree with Senge’s (2006) take on generative learning, but Wittrock focuses on 
generating new connections among concepts and between prior knowledge and new information 
in the mind. He identifies behavior implications for teaching: generally, actively creating 
materials, rather than passively absorbing information, results in greater retention and 
understanding. Not to oversimplify, but active learning results in a higher level of learning—in 
all senses—than does passive learning. It makes new knowledge more meaningful. 
To put this in terms of my conceptual framework, creative behavior expands vision, 
particularly when it is collective behavior. This collective behavior requires connections among 
the actors, and those connections depend on common or complementary visions. Actors become 
aware of others’ visions via behavior, generally whether that behavior is active and generative or 
passive and adaptive. From Senge’s (2006) perspective, generative learning involves 
externalization of visions into teamwork. From Wittrock’s (1992) perspective, generative 
learning involves internalization of connections via creative acts. From my perspective, adaptive 
learning is little more than redeployment of capacity, whereas generative learning substantially 
increases ability. 
In either case, from either perspective, generative learning has greater impact on 
capabilities than adaptive learning. Thus, it is a higher level of learning. But, it requires capacity 
to be reallocated. Generative learning also links the levels of social aggregation. Individuals gain 
more capabilities by actively creating with others than by passively absorbing information. 
Teams form as individuals create together, giving the group greater capabilities than the 
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members have individually. The results are akin to March’s (1991) exploring technology versus 
exploiting it, and to Christensen’s (2006) concepts of continuous, discontinuous, and disruptive 
innovations. So generative learning appears, in the short-term, to a loss of capabilities, whereas 
adaptive learning appears as a small increase in capabilities. Long term, though, generative 
learning results in a large increase in capabilities, whereas adaptive learning can lead to a steep, 
sudden decrease in capabilities. 
Continuous innovation is an incremental improvement in a process that makes a firm 
more efficient. Such improvements are important, but become irrelevant when there a major 
socioeconomic shifts. It no longer matters how capable buggy whip makers or cassette tape 
manufacturers were. Disruptive innovations are entirely new products that fundamentally 
reshape markets and create new value networks. These are different levels of impacts and 
responses to change, which obtain at the personal and regional, as well as organizational, levels. 
Indeed, innovation at the organizational level is generative learning that requires generative 
learning at the individual level, and benefits from generative learning at the regional level (from 
organizations creating together). 
The fundamental challenge for practitioners and theoreticians is to determine whether a 
reduction in capabilities is the short-term effect of generative learning—meaning it will lead to a 
substantial increase in capabilities—or of adaptive learning. Capabilities lost due to adaptive 
learning are lost forever and must be replaced by other capabilities to avoid an increase in unmet 
human drives and needs. For this reason, I shall refer to generative learning as substantial and 
adaptive learning as superficial. A key objective of this dissertation is to help us see the 
differences between these forms of learning in practice, and to understand how build on 
superficial learning in order to achieve substantial learning. 
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Community Functions 
Community is the independent variable in my proposed theory. More than that, 
community is the phenomenon that hypothetically invariably precedes increases in capabilities 
(i.e., learning). There are communities between and within—so to speak—individuals, 
organizations, and regions. The fundamental proposition of this theory is that the more robust 
and stronger the community, the more robust and faster the learning. And this effect multiplies 
when community exists across levels. Capabilities increase faster and stronger when persons, 
organizations, and region all contain the same community. 
As discussed above, MacQueen, et al. (2001) define community as, “a group of people 
with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and 
engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings” (para. 3). In the context of the 
behaviors-connections-visions (B-C-V) conceptual framework social ties are shared connections, 
common perspectives are shared visions, joint action is shared behavior. Geographic locations or 
settings is shared contexts and imply shared behaviors, connections, and visions. People in the 
same place tend to do, say, and use similar things simply because they share a context.  
The “diverse characteristics” portion of MacQueen, et al.’s definition implies that 
community members are connected because they are different, not in spite of their differences. 
Such connections provide access to different resources, different sources of information and 
different pools of resources; they have high positive valence. Diversity is essentially what 
Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat (2011) refer to as noise, and is the source of the spontaneity and 
unpredictability that allows for generation of new ideas and resources. Diversity and all that 
comes with it must be optimized: Too little and the community becomes calcified and stops 
operating; too much and the community becomes incoherent and stops operating effectively. 
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This is essentially institutional thickness or thinness (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Hauser, Tappeiner 
& Walde, 2007), is similar to the leakiness and stickiness of local knowledge (Brown and 
Duguid, 2002), and is comparable to balance bonding and bridging social capital (Putnam, 
1993). 
The fundamental proposition of this dissertation—that community yields learning—isn’t 
so much about what community is, as its functions, how community operates. McMillan and 
Chavez (1986) maintain that for people to have a sense of community they must experience 
membership in, influence on, needs fulfillment by, and shared emotional commitment to… 
what? They go on to say communities “offer members positive ways to interact, important events 
to share and ways to resolve them positively, opportunities to honor members, opportunities to 
invest in the community, and opportunities to experience spiritual bond among members” (p. 
14). These are the output functions of community; what community offers to members. The 
implication is that communities function to optimize noise, institutional thickness, leakiness and 
stickiness of local knowledge, and bonding and bridging social capital.  
Peck (1987) presents a similar, simplified version of the characteristics of community, 
consisting of commitment, consensus, and inclusivity. In contrast to McMillan and Chavez 
(1986), Peck sees these as characteristics of how the community operates, rather than members’ 
perceptions (as McMillan & Chavez (1986) do). Peck suggests that communities develop in four 
stages from pseudo-community, through the chaos of member conflict, into “emptiness’” as 
members relinquish egoistic expectations, and finally to “true” community. These can be seen as 
paralleling the phases or stages of many of the cyclic loops of learning models of organizational 
learning. It also parallels other sequential models of development at other levels, particularly 
Piaget’s (Piaget & Inhelder, 1958/1999) micro-level model of cognitive development and 
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Kirkpatrick’s meso-level model of training impacts. Development, though, is much more 
complex than such models suggest, and rarely occurs in an across-the-board, clear sequence 
(Papalia, Olds & Feldman, 1998). 
Block (2008) suggests that community emerges or is transformed via a series of 
conversations based on powerful questions. He maintains that the first conversation must be one 
of invitation, and that this must be followed by conversations about possibility, ownership, 
dissent, commitment, and gifts in the community. (By “gifts” Block means what each member 
brings to the community, including what might be typically thought of as a disability.) The 
conversations must answer questions, “that engage people in an intimate way, confront them 
with their freedom, and invite them to cocreate a future possibility” (Block, 2008, p. 105). Other 
than the invitation conversation occurring first, Block says the sequence of conversations is not 
critical, as long as all the concomitant questions are addressed.  
What Peck (1987) and Block (2008) are essentially discussing are the functions via which 
a group is transformed into a community and generates new possibilities. These are what I term 
the input functions of community. It may be useful to apply the W7TH model of knowledge to 
community in order to better understand what these input functions are.  
In the W7TH model, know-what is a synthesis of know-how and know-that, ability to 
affect and identify. So when we ask, “what is community?” we are effectively asking about the 
facts and functions of community. By looking the other side of what in the W7TH model, we can 
say community requires know-when activities community occur, know-where community assets 
reside, and know-who is part of the community. The means for sharing information and materials 
defines community and those engaged in the sharing. Community is defined by sharing. 
Community is shared connections, but also shared behaviors and visions. 
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As a synthesis know-how and know-that, know-what is greater than the sum of its parts. 
Similarly, community is more than knowing that you share something with certain others and 
knowing how to share certain things with them, which I would term affiliation, the basis of a 
network. We affiliate with others out of personal self-interest, as self-agents, creating what 
Tönnies’ (1887/2001) termed Gesellschaft. In this framework networks are implicit in 
communities, but a community is more than a network. Communities are not things, but we refer 
to them as such—“my community” or “the business community.” There is shared identity and 
people act as agents for that identity, even if it’s not clearly their self-interest, based on mutual 
respect and common beliefs, giving rise to something like Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft.  
Putnam (1993) maintains that prosperity arises from networks of civic engagement, “rich 
networks of organized reciprocity and civic solidarity” (p 3). Such networks support prosperity 
in three ways, he says. First, they promote norms of caring and sharing, or “generalized 
reciprocity: I’ll do this for you now, in the expectation that down the road you or someone else 
will return the favor” (p. 3). Members of communities help each other without expecting direct 
compensation. But, members of community expect that if they need help other community 
members will come to their aid. Second, such networks transmit and respond to information 
about reputation and trustworthiness, such that “incentives for opportunism and malfeasance are 
reduced” (p. 4). So, if you take advantage of the communal resources without giving back you 
will be ostracized. Third, “networks of civic engagement embody past successes of 
collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration” (p. 4). Putnam 
makes the important point that the social capital in these networks is a “resource whose supply 
increases rather than decreases through use and which (unlike physical capital) becomes depleted 
if not used” (p. 4). 
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But where do these networks come from, how do they arise? As discussed in chapter 2, 
Sanders (1975) maintains that a community must: 
1. Recruit new members either through birth, in-migration, or 
annexation, and maintain existing members; 
2. Train the new members to play the appropriate roles as they take their 
places and achieve status in the community; 
3. Exert some form of control over individuals who deviate too far from 
the norm. (p. 192) 
These activities involve allocation of resources, roles, power and prestige to members of the 
community and communication regarding how the community performs allocation. Both 
functions are essential to recruitment, socialization, and control, and are carried out by 
connections. 
In my conceptual framework, connections transmit information and materials. The 
amount and usefulness of these resources determine the valence of connections. This is not to say 
that information and materials necessarily have positive value. Connections can have negative 
valence, transmitting misinformation and junk—i.e., noise—causing negative freedom. Some of 
this is inevitable, even useful (as discussed in Wenger, Trayner, & de Laat, 2011), in processes 
of creating and producing; junk and noise can spur substantive learning. But, too much junk and 
noise can force individuals to act adaptively, limiting opportunity to act generatively (and too 
little can lull individuals into acting adaptively, limiting intention and motivation to act 
generatively).  
An individual must evaluate connections and their content, balancing certainty and 
uncertainty, but such evaluation can be costly and risky. A group that can filter the noise and 
balance it with meaningful content is greatly helpful. It is even better if that group is actively 
helpful, like Putnam’s (1993) networks of civic engagement. This is what community does, and 
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how I distinguish a community from a network. In a network, each node (person) must evaluate 
connection in terms of direct benefits. In a community, the nodes validate and verify connections 
for each other in terms of benefits—actual and potential, direct and indirect—for all. 
Vision can only be externalized into connections with positive valence if it is true—
coherent, consistence, and correspondent. Community verifies visions. Similarly, connections 
can only be internalized if they are subjectively, objectively, and intersubjectively valid. 
Community validates connections. Validation and verification occur via behavior. Community is 
the context of behavioral changes that accompany internalization-externalization. As community 
members becomes more liberated, prosperous, and well—as they learn—they are hypothetically 
better able to contribute to the community and its functions. So, a community’s outputs—what it 
offers—should improve as the outcomes of behavior improve. 
It is also important to note how community does not do what it does: There are few if any 
formal roles and rules, fully private resources, governance, or hierarchy. People construct and 
find themselves within communities. Organizations develop from interpersonal interactions 
within communities. Regions are defined by inter-organizational interactions within 
communities. It is the flexibility and lack of formality of communities that allow the generative 
functions that create persons, organizations, and regions. Hypothetically, if and when formal 
hierarchy, roles, and rules are created for a community, it will cease to be a community and 
become something else and/or cease to be. Conceptually, hierarchy, roles, and rules enable 
production of previously defined goods and services (which is akin to adaptive learning or 
sustaining innovation), but can get in the way of learning, too. They facilitate stability and 
impede change. 
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So, in the terms of this conceptual framework, communities enable members to translate 
vision into connections and capitalize on connections to improve visions. In doing so, people not 
only gain capabilities and knowledge, they create socioeconomic structures. Community is the 
primordial soup from which organizations and regions emerge. Community allows us to deal 
with bounded rationality (Simon, 1991), provides members with economical access to activities 
and assets, and validates and verifies information and materials for members. This leads to the 
behavior changes—improvements—that evidence learning. To relate this to key concepts and 
literature regarding learning at each level, community provides: 
• A means of self-reflection, scaffolding for self-regulation, and source of models for 
persons (Bandura, 1997, 2001, 2006), informing and shaping drives, intentions, and 
motivations (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000; 
Lawrence & Nohria, 2002) 
• A decision-making aid (Simon, 1976), means for improving sense-making (Weick, 
1995), and a way to reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1981) for organizations 
• A medium for interactive learning (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Cooke, 2002), 
knowledge spillovers (Audretsch, 1998) for regions, optimizing institutional thickness 
(Amin and Thrift, 1995; Hauser, Tappeiner & Walde, 2007) and the leakiness and 
stickiness of local knowledge (Brown and Duguid, 2002) 
Now that I have defined community and what it does, the question becomes how does 
community do these things? What creates community? First, note that this is a process—“A 
series of actions, changes, or functions bringing about a result … performed in the making or 
treatment of a product” (process, 2003, para. 2-3)—of community building. Second, note that, 
since community is not a thing, community does not carry out these functions. People do. Lastly, 
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before considering what the series of community input functions might be, let us recall that 
people act agentically. We act in our own interests. While we might work in the community’s 
interest once it’s established, there must be means and motivations for proto-community to arise. 
These means and motivations must arise from innate human drives. 
So, drive theory is a starting point for thinking about how community operates. Ryan and 
Deci (2000) identify the basic human drives as resulting from needs for autonomy, competence, 
and relatedness; Lawrence and Nohria (2002) see the drives to acquire, bond, and defend (and to 
learn, or improvement in responses to other drives). Ryan and Deci’s drives are states of being 
(or feelings and perception about one’s state of being), which are internal, passive, and 
subjective. Lawrence and Nohria’s drives are active, external, and objective. The former maps to 
my concept of vision and the latter to connection. Ryan and Deci’s drives are based in one’s 
beliefs about what is and what could be. Lawrence and Nohria’s are about one’s acquisition of 
information and resources.  
If these are the innate drives of human behavior, and community represents a set of 
behaviors, then community must arise from these drives and, once in operation, must continue to 
reduce these drives if it is to be sustained. Going back to Ryle (1946, 2002) and Senge (2006), 
once individuals experience generative connections they know such connections are possible and 
desirable. “I was part of something, and I want to be part of something.” Thus “being part of 
something” becomes part of their identities—or at least their vision regarding identity—and they 
seek to identify others who have similar identities.  
I suggest that community has three general input functions that not only build community 
but also generate capabilities. As shown in table 3, these functions draw on and relate to a range 
of economic, psychological, and sociological constructs. These three functions describe how 
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input factors are transformed to create and sustain community. Generally, these functions create 
and sustain community by increasing their members’ capabilities. Indeed, capabilities, 
knowledge, and freedom are the result of this process of community building. Liberty, 
prosperity, and wellness are the output functions. 
 
Table 3 Concepts Related to Community Functions from Various Disciplines 
Literature Topic Identification Integration Differentiation 
Civic engagement 
(Putnam, 1993) 
Reputational 
information 
Generalized reciprocity Templates for 
collaboration 
Community     
(Sanders, 1975) Recruit new members Have members play 
the appropriate roles 
Control members’ 
behavior  
(McMillan & Chavez, 
1986) 
Belonging  Shared emotional 
commitment  
Influence and needs 
fulfillment 
Decision-making (Simon, 
1976) 
Analysis Design Execution 
Drives    
(Lawrence & Nohria, 
2002) 
Acquire Bond Defend 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000) Competence  Relatedness Autonomy 
Learning communities 
(Senge & Scharmer, 
2006) 
Research 
Guiding ideas 
Capacity-building 
Infrastructure 
Practice 
Common work 
Sense-making (Weick, 
1995) 
Environmental 
scanning 
Interpretation Guides for action 
Transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1981) 
Searching Contracting Coordinating 
 
My concepts of identification, integration, and differentiation are similar to but different 
from theoretical constructs in social psychology. (They are also similar to the mathematical 
meaning of these terms.) In this conceptual framework, identification, integration, and 
differentiation are functions. They things that people do naturally—part of human nature—but 
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also a relationship between a set of inputs and another set of outputs. Each function describes 
how the inputs are transformed into the outputs. Identification, integration, and differentiation 
are behaviors and changes in behavior, which means they also have associated connections and 
visions. In the following sections I’ll discuss these aspects of each function, and relate the 
concepts and constructs as I define them to existing theory. 
In social philosophy and science, identification, integration, and differentiation are 
subsumed under role theory. Role theory, based on the seminal works of Mead (1934), Merton 
(1949), and Parsons (1951/1991), seeks to explain how people are expected to and do actually 
behave in social situations. My conceptual framework implies a taxonomy of roles: Individuals 
act in personal, organizational, and regional roles. Building on Merton (1949), problems arise 
when these roles conflict. Such conflict hypothetically reduces functional capabilities because 
capacity must be allocated to balancing, making a trade-off, or switching between roles. An 
important implication of my proposed theory is that such conflicts are minimized—and even 
become synergies—via community, through a process of identification, integration, and 
differentiation. 
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Identification 
Identification is a fundamental cognitive operation that involves noting a thing’s 
separateness from everything else and its distinguishing characteristics, and giving it a name. 
Identification enables categorization and relation as well as discrimination; it allows us to say 
what things go together either because they are the same, complementary, or conflicting. For 
example, we identify retail employees as a group. The employees who stock the shelves are 
complementary to those who run the register. The employees of one grocery store compete with 
those of another.  
Identification becomes an input function to community when it becomes social. When we 
self-identify and other-identify, we have nascent community. Thus community depends on prior 
knowledge of personal characteristics—our own and others—including the extent to which we 
value relatedness. Identification also depends on our interests and motivations because these 
determine how and whether we seek others who identify themselves similarly. People connect 
over specific identity commonalities—liking football, working on a project, living in a certain 
place. Then they identify themselves collectively, as a group to which others might belong.  
So, there are multiple aspects to identification: identification as, identification by, 
identification of, identification with, etc. Identification involves multiple forms of knowledge: 
Know-how, know-that, etc., as well as know-who. Identification is derived from prior knowledge 
and from intentions and motivations. It is evident in connections and visions via behaviors: 
One’s identity determines what one does, has, and sees, and vice-versa. 
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Identification is a minimal response to internal and external drives. Depending on 
circumstances, it might be adequate, or identification may suggest other possibilities, generate 
new opportunities, and drive more group-oriented behavior. The key is that an individual cannot 
identify alone, others also have to identify, too. Individuals can only identify together if they 
share vision, and when they identify together they begin to share connections; they exchange 
information and materials with each other, but also share means of acquiring information and 
materials. In the process, the individuals involved will express knoels about their selves, about 
others, and about perceived commonalities. 
Social psychology has developed two theories of identity (Stets & Burke, 2000), one that 
focuses self-knowledge regarding membership in a group and another that is concerned with how 
roles are integrated into self-concept. Both involve theory of mind—which is not a theory, per se, 
but the phenomenon of sense that others have minds and act agentically (Baron-Chohen, 1991). 
So, identity theories are meta-theories about how we use ordinary, practical theories about 
others’ minds to connect with others. Stets and Burke (2000) note that in both theories identities 
are based on social categories, groups, and roles within groups; identification or self-
categorization is, according to these theories, how identities are formed. These theories focus on 
affiliation to an in-group, in contrast to the out-group: 
The consequence of self-categorization is an accentuation of the perceived 
similarities between the self and other in-group members, and an 
accentuation of perceived differences between the self and out-group 
members. The accentuation occurs for all the attitudes, beliefs and values, 
affective reactions, behavioral norms, styles of speech, and other 
properties that are believed to be correlated with the relevant intergroup 
categorization. (Stets & Berke, 2000, p. 225) 
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This is part of what I refer to as integration in my conceptual framework. Beyond the 
individual integrating into the group, there is the broader phenomenon of the group becoming 
more coherent and better integrated. Such integration is not easy or simple. It requires models 
and stimuli to guide individual, and lots of practice. 
Integration 
Once persons have identified themselves as part of a community (or at least as similar), 
the question becomes how coherent and formalized the group should be; whether they should 
integrate as a community. If members envision that they can acquire or defend better via the 
group, they will tend to integrate (i.e., bond) faster and stronger. Their behavior will manifest as 
a change in vision, evident in the community-related knoels they express: know-that and know-
how derived from know-what based on know-when, -where, and –who, all flowing from know-
why, the rationale for the community. In particular, the community must establish rules for 
behavior. This leads members exhibit more and stronger connections, which should manifest as 
increased capabilities. Here we see the potential conflict between autonomy (Ryan and Deci, 
2000) and bonding (Lawrence and Nohria, 2002). Integration intrinsically reduces one’s drive to 
bond, and can undermine one’s autonomy. The consequence is that it can be difficult for 
communities for fully integrate, or they can become over integrated so members have no 
personal identities, and then they can’t move to the next level. 
Integration creates networks, and is evident in new connections, new patterns of 
transacting information and materials. Integration also involves developing and sharing beliefs 
and ideas, i.e., visions. Durkheim’s (1897/1997) seminal sociological theory holds that persons 
who are well integrated into society are less prone to antisocial and destructive (and self-
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destructive) behaviors. In my conceptual framework integration provides only weak social 
controls because networks based on self-interest (as discussed by Wenger, Trayner, & de Laat, 
2011) rather than collective agency (prior to integration there is only weak collective identity or 
sense of community. What Stets and Burke (2000) refers to as having a social identity is 
integration in my conceptual framework: 
Having a particular social identity means being at one with a certain 
group, being like others in the group, and seeing things from the group’s 
perspective. (p. 226) 
Stets and Burke a distinction between from having a social identity and a role identity, which is 
more like what I refer as differentiation: 
[H]aving a particular role identity means acting to fulfill the expectations 
of the role, coordinating and negotiating interaction with role partners, and 
manipulating the environment to control the resources for which the role 
has responsibility. (p. 226) 
Feedback and reflection are essential factors for differentiation. These factors are the 
interpersonal and intrapersonal communications that make individuals aware that their drives 
have been met—that they are acquiring, bonding, and defending effectively—and builds their 
sense of community. Feedback and reflection tell an individual if they setting expectations, 
coordinating and negotiating, and manipulating assets in a meaningful and somewhat unique 
manner. 
Differentiation 
If members of a community want to be especially effective at acquiring or defending, 
they must act collectively. Acting collectively does not mean that everyone does the same thing. 
It means that individuals perform complementary, mutually supportive roles. These roles need to 
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be established, along with criteria and a means of accounting for performance. Thus the 
community—the persons who comprise it—must differentiate. Social psychologists see this 
occurring, at least in part, from social comparison: 
The consequence of the social comparison process is the selective 
application of the accentuation effect [of similarities with the in-group and 
differences with the out-group], primarily to those dimensions that will 
result in self-enhancing outcomes for the self. Specifically, one’s self-
esteem is enhancing by evaluating the in-group and the out-group on 
dimensions that lead the in-group to be judged positively and the out-
group to be judged negatively. (Stets & Berke, 2000, p. 225) 
Differentiation is especially powerful for addressing members’ drives for autonomy and 
competence in context, while also enhancing bonds and relatedness. It is something that 
individuals could not do without community. Differentiation makes community members feel 
simultaneously outstanding and part of something. Community doesn’t just require individuals to 
fit in; it enables them to stand out. Drive conflict can arise with differentiation if members feel 
diminished, pigeonholed, or threatened by differentiation. 
Differentiation will be evident in behavior-vision-connections. Individuals will continue 
to identify the community as such—as a valued thing—but will also identify themselves in new 
terms relative to the group, for example “I’m the leader,” or “I’m the bookkeeper,” or “I take out 
the trash,” for the group. Similarly, individuals will continue to share information and materials 
via and with the group, but they will also develop new connections and begin exchanging new 
types of information and materials. These new connections will be related to their new, different 
role, but the information and materials will also be evaluated in terms of the community: 
purchased 100 roles of toilet paper for, found a new office for, created a logo for, etc., the group. 
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With differentiation individuals value the group—which has become a community—in terms of 
what they contribute rather than what they derive from it. 
On a much broader scope, differentiation was seen in the seminal sociological definition 
of a system as means of dealing with complexity (Parsons, 1951/1991; Luhmann, 2006). A 
system has to be as complex as the phenomena with which it must deal with. Luhmann (2006) 
builds on the work of Maturana and Varela (1980) to suggest that reflexivity, which is integral to 
theories of identity (Stets & Burke, 2000), is the means by which social systems differentiate 
themselves.  
The implication is that differentiation enables organizations and regions to operate— 
differentiation is central to the division of labor and nature of institutions—even as it gives 
individuals subjectively meaningful roles and tasks. These roles and tasks fulfill the individuals’ 
drives by meeting the needs of the group—now a full-fledged community. Differentiation 
changes the ways that other must interact with the individual. And, differentiation disrupts the 
environment around the community and impacts others in that environment to the extent that 
differentiation fosters organization performance and regional advantage, as well as personal 
capabilities for other members of the community. 
Cooking the Potato 
So, in order to generate outputs—positive ways to interact, etc.—and allow individuals to 
reduce their drives, members of a community must (1) identify themselves and their community, 
(2) integrate into a cohesive and coherent group, and (3) differentiate themselves within the 
community in ways that generate value, particularly by enabling the community to differentiate 
itself from the environment. These functions can be seen as integrated into a community building 
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process, as illustrated in figure 6. My colleague Eleanor Cooper termed this process “cooking the 
potato” when I first sketched out this process, before even giving each step a name. (The 
metaphor is apt because there is so much more that can be done with potatoes as they are 
cooked.)  
Each step—identification, integration, and differentiation, as discussed above—in this 
process—community-building—brings changes in behaviors-connections-visions that represent 
gains in capabilities and knowledge. As Smelser (1965) pointed out about collective action, each 
step builds up in a cascading analytical process until together they become sufficient for 
community. And, we can see these gains go from adaptive and increment gains in the 
identification process, to generative and disruptive gains in the differentiation process. 
 
 
Figure 6 The Input Functions of Community as Steps in the Community-Building Process 
 
One community input function does not necessarily follow the other. Communities lose 
their identity as a result of too little (or too much) integration, and disintegrate from too little (or 
too much) differentiation. Identification, integration, and differentiation are levels of community 
behavior. Each function represents an increase in extent and strength of community. Ultimately, 
the greatest value in terms of capabilities is realized as each level is flexibly but fully established. 
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These levels of behavior emerge differently at various levels of socioeconomic 
aggregation. At the individual level a person experiences various levels of identification, 
integration, and differentiation with others. The level of community functioning is an aspect of 
self-concept. It determines how he or she attends to and responds to her or his environment. For 
organizations, community functions emerge in changes in division of labor, in collective 
behavior, and in organizational boundaries. At the regional level, community functions 
determine the buzz that draws in residents (or drives them away). 
A Multilevel Theory of Learning 
The functions of community—identification, integration, and differentiation—lead to 
increases in capabilities and knowledge, and mutually-reinforcing relationships between, liberty, 
prosperity, and wellness. As individuals build communities they improve their personal, 
organizational, and regional vision, and expand their connections. This gives persons a truer 
understanding of what is and what is possible at each level, and it increases their access to 
information and materials.  
Community emerges in different forms at each level via the factors that determine 
outputs at that level. At the personal level community provides better models and support for 
self-regulation, which increase capabilities. At the organizational level community provides for 
improvements to division of labor, resulting in better performance. At the regional level 
community promotes stronger yet more flexible institutions, which fosters knowledge sharing 
across sectors, and enhances advantages from location and natural resources. Across all levels 
community facilitates agentic action, reflexivity, and information networks.  
146 
At the highest level of community, individuals come to define themselves and their worth 
vis-à-vis the community. At this level community becomes generative, and the forms of freedom 
become mutually supportive. Liberty enhances prosperity, which fosters wellness, which 
promotes liberty. The innate human drives become aligned such that drives for autonomy and to 
bond, for example, reinforce each other: Persons achieve autonomy by bonding. The functioning 
of the community takes on greater meaning and value than the individuals’ personal functioning. 
In order to reach this level of community, one must invest a great deal of time, resources, 
and attention in conjunction with others. This can only happen if all share a clear and compelling 
vision of the future that they believe is not only beneficial but desirable, and not only possible 
but practical. The highest level of community can only occur if members not only share strong 
and flexible connections among themselves, but also share connections outside the community 
(in order to draw in requisite information and materials). Otherwise the community members will 
be driven to avoid risk and seek short-term gratification, which means they will not make the 
necessary investment, and the community will breakdown or fail to develop. Or, they will 
exclude others from the community, undermining its ability to generate new knowledge and 
contribute to personal capabilities, organizational performance, or regional advantage. 
A high level of community at the regional level creates knowledge spillovers that provide 
organizations in the regional with competitive advantage. It is means to constructed advantage 
(Cooke & Leydesdorff, 2006). At the organizational level, a high-level of community improves 
division of labor, which increases performance for those within the organization. Individuals’ 
capabilities increase as availability of models and support for self-regulation increase with the 
level of community.  
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Theoretical Models 
I provide three models of learning based on this theory: a causal model, a logic model, 
and a mathematical model. A causal model shows how the independent variable’s (community) 
input functions (identification, integration, and differentiation) lead to the dependent variable’s 
(capabilities) output functions (liberty, prosperity, and wellness). It is intersubjective—useful for 
practical application and for theoretical testing—and is amenable to qualitative description and 
quantitative measurement. The logic model is most amenable to qualitative description. It is a 
subjective version of the theory that is primarily intended for practical purposes, for planning and 
evaluation. The mathematical model describes the relationships between elements of the theory, 
and is a basis for quantitative hypothesis testing. 
A Causal Multilevel Model of Learning 
The essence of this theory is that community yields learning. Or, the input functions to 
community cause increases in the output functions of capabilities, and learning the process of 
increasing capabilities. The causal model is not a normative statement about what is best, nor is it 
a hypothetical proposition that can be falsified. It has some aspects of both, and could be 
interpreted for those purposes. Instead, it is a general view of the way the learning works, 
synthesized from the literature reviewed in this paper. This model is the result of a virtual dialog 
among academic disciplines and between theoreticians and practitioners. Of course, the dialog 
has not actually occurred, which is part of this dissertation’s contribution to the field via an 
applied, trans-disciplinary approach. 
The causal model is described in the discussion of levels and units of analysis and 
variables, above. At the core of this model are community and capabilities, which are clearly 
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latent, unobservable variables. They are complex, abstract socio-cognitive constructs. There are 
indicators or mediators of these things—for example, a specific competence may indicate 
capabilities—but they do not equate. So, if a person is competent at auto repair or computer 
programming, that does not mean they are prosperous, let alone liberated and prosperous. Or, 
just because a person refers to her or his neighborhood as “community,” that does not mean the 
neighborhood substantially contributes to that person’s capabilities. It is important to understand 
the relationship between these mediating factors, but it is beyond the scope of the present 
discussion because we are focused on the “big picture” causes of learning. I revisit the issue of 
indicators and mediators in the discussion section, below. 
The input and output functions are more concrete than community and capabilities, and I 
treat them as observable variables for the moment. These variables need to be further 
operationalized, which I address in detail in the “Discussion” section. While one might 
experience identification or liberty, they are not directly observable. I discuss this below, also: 
We cannot observe identification or liberty but we can observe behavior and states of being 
associated with these functions. For the moment I will focus on the conceptual, theoretical 
aspects of the model, illustrated in figure 7.  
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Figure 7 Causal Model of Learning 
 
Simply, identification, integration, and differentiation are functions that create 
community; they lead to a shared sense of belonging, influence, needs fulfillment, and emotional 
commitment (McMillan & Chavez, 1986). The strength of each function depends on prior 
functions: differentiation can only occur among the integrated, and integration can only occur for 
the identified. The curved arrows from identification to integration and from integration to 
differentiation indicate this cascade effect. These functions occur at each level. There are 
personal, organizational, and regional communities. The core issue is not “where” the 
community is—remember, in this framework, communities are not “things” that have location—
but what purposes and topics are invoked in the functions; the behaviors-connections-visions that 
go into the functions.  
At the personal level, community directly impacts capabilities (see figure 7). Each input 
function directly increases liberty, prosperity, and wellness; reduces drives and needs; and fulfills 
the individual as a person. Each function also allows individuals greater access to models, 
stimuli, means of self-reflection, and scaffolding for self-regulation. These are the means to 
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increasing capabilities, but community and its input functions are the causes. One set of 
behaviors-connections-visions come in, and identification, integration, and differentiation 
transform them into very different behaviors-visions-connections.  
The personal level community functions are supplemented by similar functions at 
organizational and regional levels. Of course, personal capabilities contribute to organizational 
capabilities, which contribute to regional capabilities, but for moral and practical reasons (as 
discussed above) this theory focuses on how all of these impact individuals’ real freedoms. It is 
important to understand the causes and factors of organizational performance and regional 
advantage in order to understand personal fulfillment and individual freedoms. The literature 
reviewed in this dissertation is not even the tip of the proverbial iceberg on these topics, yet 
knowledgeable persons would likely admit there are still may questions to answer. This 
dissertation could help with such questions. An important proposition is implicit in this theory, 
and particularly in this model: Organizational performance and regional advantage come from 
fostering personal fulfillment and individual freedoms. Community causes increase in individual 
freedoms and personal fulfillment. Thus, organizations and regions can improve by cultivating 
communities within them. I revisit this proposition in discussion section. 
On the output end of the causal model, the latent variable capabilities lead to liberty, 
prosperity, and wellness. As discussed above, the relationships between liberty, prosperity, and 
wellness are as important as the levels. Hypothetically, the stronger the input factors the greater 
the positive relationships among the output factors. The causal model shows that there is an 
interactive relationship between levels. Regions contribute to organizations, which contribute to 
persons, but causation also goes in the other direction: Persons contribute to organizations, which 
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contribute to regions. That said, the ultimate unit of analysis is the individual, and the dependent 
variables are liberty, prosperity, and wellness. 
A Learning Logic Model 
The logic model of this theory is basically an idealized version of the learning process, of 
how learning should operate. I theorize that community functions cause or lead to learning. The 
learning logic model shows how community functions do that, how they are integrated into the 
learning process. The specific elements of the model—what qualifies as learning activities and 
assets, or even as outcomes—is contingent and subjective. The content depends on the subject 
but, theoretically, for learning to occur, learning activities must fit the steps of the model 
illustrated in figure 8.  
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Figure 8 The Learning Logic Model 
 
 
The primary purpose of the logic model is to qualitatively describe or document increases 
in capabilities and the activities that led up to those increases. Such a description can be 
invaluable for evaluating learning, for using during the process to improve outcomes or after the 
process to assess its efficacy. The logic model is also useful for planning a learning process, for 
anything from creating a lesson plan to planning a regional economic development project. Of 
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course, it is a logic model for learning, not planning, so the focus is on freedom outcomes—
liberty, prosperity, and wellness—rather than on an event or object.  
The logic model makes the role of behaviors-connections-visions (or doing, having, and 
seeing) explicit. Essentially, behaviors-connections-visions are means to describe, measure, and 
specify the content of each step in the model. The community functions are implicit in the steps 
in the logic model: Identification is a natural outgrowth of prior knowledge, intentions, and 
motivations. Imitating models and responding to stimuli via practice is effectively integration. 
Feedback and reflection, together, differentiate the community and those within it. I have not 
discussed the learning process elsewhere, and it is an important part of this dissertation 
particularly the learning logic model, so I discuss each component is some detail before moving 
on to describe the mathematical model. 
Prior knowledge. Knowledge is what learning is all about, and prior knowledge is the 
starting point for learning. It is an understatement to say that knowledge has been to topic of a 
great deal of discussion and study. Rather than attempting to review the voluminous literature on 
the topic I shall simply build upon the classical philosophical definition of knowledge as justified 
true belief (Audi, 2010) with more contemporary perspectives, such that: 
Humans are viewed as goal-directed agents who actively seek information. 
They come to formal education with a range of prior knowledge, skills, 
beliefs, and concepts that significantly influence what they notice about 
the environment and how they organize and interpret it. This, in turn, 
affects their abilities to remember, reason, solve problems, and acquire 
new knowledge. ... In the most general sense, the contemporary view of 
learning is that people construct new knowledge and understandings based 
on what they already know and believe. (Commission on Behavioral and 
Social Sciences and Education, 2000, pg. 10) 
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Roschelle (1995) maintains that prior knowledge is not just the foundation upon which 
new knowledge is built, it is the raw material for constructing new knowledge, the lens through 
which they perceive new knowledge, and “[n]eglect of prior knowledge can result in the 
audience learning something opposed to the educator's intentions, no matter how well those 
intentions are executed” (Roschelle, paragraph 1). Roschelle suggests three assumptions or 
insights for designers of interactive educational experience: 
First, designers should seek to refine prior knowledge, and not attempt to 
replace learners' understanding with their own. Second, designers must 
anticipate a long-term learning process, of which the short-term 
experience will form an incremental part. Third, designers must remember 
that learning depends on social interaction; conversations shape the 
form and content of the concepts that learners construct. Only part of 
specialized knowledge can exist explicitly as information; the rest must 
come from engagement in the practice of discourse of the community. 
(1995, paragraph 27, emphasis in the original) 
Bransford, Brown, and Cocking (2000) sum up seminal literature to make many of the 
same points, noting that, “If students’ initial ideas and beliefs are ignored, the understandings 
that they develop can be very different from what the teacher intends” (p. 10). Prior knowledge 
must be analyzed and enhanced, they maintain, as it is built into and transferred to new subjects. 
Ability of an organization to recognize new, valuable information (innovation) and 
incorporate it into practices or processes depends on prior collective knowledge, according to 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990):  
[P]rior knowledge includes basic skills or even a shared language but may 
also include knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological 
developments in a given field. [It] confers an ability to recognize the value 
of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. These 
abilities collectively constitute what we call a firm's “absorptive capacity.” 
(p. 128) 
154 
Absorptive capacity builds on diverse general knowledge, problem solving, and learning skills 
through intensive and repeated exposure. It is different than the sum of individual parts, 
involving communication across organizational subunits, and within units, as well as from the 
environment. Christensen (2006) extends prior knowledge to include the value networks in 
which organizations are embedded. Regional theorists such as Boschma (2005; Boschma & 
Lambooy, 1999), Cooke (2002; Cooke & Morgan, 1998; Cooke & Leydesdorff, 2006), and 
Florida (1995) make similar contentions about regions. Over-reliance on prior knowledge can 
lock firms and regions into technologies, causing them to miss innovations and to 
socioeconomically decline as the technologies become obsolete. 
Intention and motivation. Intention and motivation are primary cognitive determinants of 
behavior, in general, and learning, more specifically, and are fundamentally shaped by self-
concept interacting with social circumstance (Heider, 1958; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Bandura, 
1977, 1986, 1989, 1997; Ajzen, 1985, 1991; Ryan and Deci, 2000). Generally, intention’s 
influence is a function of what one believes he or she can do (behavioral control or self-efficacy) 
and what he or she expects to result from that behavior. Attitudes, beliefs, and norms related to 
behavior are derived via experience and observation in various social settings. Together, 
outcomes-expectations and self-efficacy, based on experience and observation, add up to agency, 
or self-determination, the capability to act on one’s intentions, in one’s own interest: the greater 
the sense of agency on some topic, the harder and longer one will work toward success. 
Scholars have often differentiated between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, based 
largely on the works of Deci and Ryan (1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000), between innate curiosity 
and drive, and enticements and threats from others. Other scholars, particularly those studying 
second language acquisition, have made a further distinction between behavior as an end or a 
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means, and between instrumental and integrative motivations (Carreira, 2005). The fundamental 
issues are the source of motivation—other or self—and motive purpose for the behavior as either 
a means or end. Self-motivation can be integral to self-concept, or peripheral to what one desires 
or feels important.  
Identification. How we identify ourselves, others, and objects in our environment 
depends on prior knowledge, and on our intentions and motivations. We are identified by what 
we do and have, and how we identify others depends on how and what we see. 
Models and stimuli. Learning involves a change in behavior. Just as any behavior 
involves intentions, motivations, and knowledge, so does any change in behavior, particularly 
intentional, methodical behavioral change. This need not be explicit: there is a natural tendency 
to imitate behavior, which is reinforced when the observed behavior results in valued outcomes 
and reversed when it results in undesirable outcomes. Classical conditioning research shows that 
some stimulus, when associated with a particularly desirable or feared thing, evokes a response 
appropriate to that thing, even when the thing is not presented (Pavlov, 1927/2003).  
In nature, all living beings learn the connection between cause and effect in very practical 
terms, informing them about dangers and opportunities. Learning by observing others, or 
modeling, was developed by Bandura (1977, 1986) as a central element of social learning theory. 
He noted that the learner must attend to the modeled behavior, be able to recall and reproduce it, 
and have the motivation and opportunity to do so; and similar holds for avoiding undesirable 
behavior. Collectively, the issue becomes how individuals attend to others as they respond to 
models and/or stimuli, how does one change her/his behavior in response to the behavior of 
others, and how are autonomy and relatedness balanced by competency? 
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Practice. Practice, as related to learning, typically means “repeated performance or 
systematic exercise for the purpose of acquiring skill or proficiency” (practice, n.d.). But other 
definitions of the term—“ habitual or customary performance ... habit; custom ... the action or 
process of performing or doing something ... the exercise or pursuit of a profession or 
occupation” (practice, n.d.)—involve acquisition or creation of knowledge and potential for 
different behavior, or learning. Practice involves components similar to those involved in 
modeling: awareness of what the behavioral ideal is, breaking it into components, repetition of 
those components, integrating those components into a performance, and continuing the enhance 
the performance (cf., Moretti, 2009).  
Practice is essentially the process and result of habituating behavior to the point that 
ceases to depend on a model or stimulus. It is the difference between a novice and an expert. 
Bransford, Brown, and Cocking (2000) discuss the differences between novices and experts, 
beginning with several fundamental principles of expertise: 
1. Experts notice features and meaningful patterns of information 
that are not noticed by novices. 
2. Experts have acquired a great deal of content knowledge that is 
organized in ways that reflect a deep understanding of their 
subject matter. 
3. Experts’ knowledge cannot be reduced to sets of isolated facts 
or propositions but, instead, reflects contexts of applicability: 
that is, the knowledge is “conditionalized” on a set of 
circumstances. 
4. Experts are able to flexibly retrieve important aspects of their 
knowledge with little attentional effort. 
5. Though experts know their disciplines thoroughly, this does 
not guarantee that they are able to teach others. 
6. Experts have varying levels of flexibility in their approach to 
new situations. (p. 31) 
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To relate this back to earlier discussions, experts have fully integrated their knowledge 
into their behaviors such that intention is coincident with action, and motivation ceases to be an 
issue because the behavior is so automatic and natural that it needs no motivation. It is simply 
part of the expert’s identity. It is fully internalized. Where novices struggle to remember facts 
and rules, experts organize their knowledge around “big ideas,” enabling them to see patterns in 
and deal handily with novel situations, and transfer their knowledge to others in other settings 
(Bransford, Brown, and Cocking, 2000).  
The issue for collective learning is how expertise is dynamically distributed throughout 
the group. How practice is defined within the group, executed by its members, and structured for 
the purpose of improvement? How does the method allow the group, as a whole, to move from 
rote application of rules to knowledge organized around big ideas. 
Integration. Practice is the means for integrating new knowledge into one’s capabilities. 
It is also the means by which one becomes integrated into a group. Models and stimuli—once 
identified—inform the individual about appropriate, expected behavior. As a group practices, its 
members become more integrated and more able. They begin to find meaning in their collective 
activity. So, integration feeds back to prior knowledge, to motivations, and to intentions. 
Feedback and Reflection. Feedback is the phenomenon of and process by which current 
action is informed by the results of past actions. It is essential to control systems of all sorts, 
including biological, cognitive, mechanical, and social. Feedback tells whether our behavior is 
acceptable or effective. Reflection is a more complex and richer version of feedback for 
conscious entities, whereby they consider the nature and implications their actions. Askew and 
Lodge (2000) maintain that “[f]eedback is a complex notion, often embedded in a common-sense 
and simplistic dominant discourse” (pg. 1) about education, but “effective learning must include 
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a wider conception of feedback ... challenging the implicit assumptions on which approaches to 
feedback are based, and touch on a bigger question – what is ‘effective’ learning?” (pp. 2-3).  
Feedback which is intended to provide information and increase 
understanding is necessary when something is not for negotiation, when it 
is important to relate rules within a social context or social conventions 
regarding work and behaviour, and to indicate the consequences of 
complying with conventions. But where we want to engage people in a 
deeper process of understanding, making connections, further insights or 
learning about their learning, this form of feedback is less effective. (pg. 
6) 
They suggest that models of teaching must be expanded to include facilitating discovery 
of new knowledge, encouraging reflection, and practicing collaborative dialog. The view of 
learning implicit in these models “involves making connections between old and new 
experiences,” incorporates the emotional and social with the cognitive, and includes meta-
learning. Where the dominant model of education views feedback as a gift from the teacher to 
student, Askew and Lodge (2000) tell us, expanded approaches use feedback as a two-way 
process for description and discussion, illuminating learning and connecting participants. 
Argyris and Schön (1978) developed these concepts outside the realm of education as the 
means for moving beyond simply detecting and correcting errors, and by Senge (2006), as means 
to enhance capabilities to create. One strategy is to simply make minor modifications to behavior 
until error is no longer detect. A more sophisticated and powerful strategy, Argyris and Schön 
observe, is to reconsider the assumptions and explanations upon which one’s behavior is based, 
which they refer to as “double loop” learning: “Double-loop learning occurs when error is 
detected and corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying 
norms, policies and objectives” (p. 3). It involves meta-learning and restructuring connections.  
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Senge (2006) presents a different kind of double loop, in which reinforcing feedback 
promotes behavior and balancing feedback attenuates it. Seeing and structuring such interacting 
systems requires ability to construct mental models, achieve personal mastery, develop shared 
vision, and engage in team learning, all of which depend on systems thinking, understanding not 
only the pieces but how they—including feedback—fit into the whole. Reflection is critical to 
rebuilding mental models, to intentionally thinking different, to include entire systems. In 
Senge’s view, feedback is an essentially mechanical process, whereas reflection is the means for 
understanding the effects of feedback.  
Schön (1983) notes that problems rarely present themselves in simple, unambiguous 
situations. Consequently, it is often necessary to construct the problem, exploring the problem 
setting, via practical experiments. The results comprise feedback that is more nuanced and useful 
than Askew and Lodge’s “gift” feedback or Senge’s double loop feedback because it emerges 
organically from practice. Schön describes this integration of feedback and reflection with the 
example: 
When good jazz musicians improvise together, they also manifest a “feel 
for” their material and they make on-the-spot adjustments to the sounds 
they hear. Listening to one another and to themselves, they feel where the 
music is going and adjust their playing accordingly. (p. 55) 
Differentiation. Schön’s quote describes how jazz musicians integrate as a group, but it 
also implies—particularly for anyone who is familiar with jazz—how members differentiate. The 
bassist, drummer, and pianist all have complementary yet distinct roles. Other instrumentalists—
sax, horns, guitar, etc.—add to the performance in unique ways. It is the differentiation that 
determines impacts and contributes to personal freedoms. Differentiation cannot occur without 
integration, and identification before it. But it is this last function that makes community truly 
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meaningful and valuable to its members. And, it is differentiation that those outside the 
community identify the community and by which the evaluate it. There is nothing that makes a 
person want to play jazz like seeing a truly talent jazz musician step out and play a solo. That is 
true freedom! 
Multilevel Learning Logic. The underlying principle for a learning logic model is that all 
content and ultimate outcomes must be put in terms of individual freedoms. While it may be 
useful to consider how personal fulfillment contributes to organizational performance, and how 
that contributes to regional advantage, ultimately we must ask how all other these contribute 
individual freedoms. There are two general ways to accomplish this with the learning logic 
model. The first, as illustrated in figure 8, is to simply incorporate personal, organizational, and 
regional behaviors-connections-visions into descriptions/specifications of each step in the model. 
While this approach is conceptually simple, it could easily become impractically complex.  
The second approach is basically that of Cooksy, Gill, and Kelly (2000); Yang, Shen, 
Cao, and Warfield (2004); and Beer and Reed (2009): Multilevel case studies. But, where their 
studies aggregate up—micro feeds into meso, which feeds into macro—the learning logic model 
cascades down: regional learning enables (or constrains) organizational learning, which enables 
(or constrains) personal learning. Under this approach the learning logic model is to conduct one 
or a few regional case studies (or plans), several case studies of organizations in each region, and 
multiple case studies of persons in each organization. Then the learning logic model can be used 
to identify differences and similarities between cases at each level and between levels.   
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A Mathematical Model of Multilevel Learning 
The mathematical model is a set of propositions about the relationships between elements 
of the theory: how variation in the independent variables explains variation in the dependent 
variable. The mathematical model discussed below, more than the causal model and logic model 
I presented above, addresses the issue of levels. Each level is embedded in the higher level such 
that variation between persons is the same as variation within organizations and/or regions. The 
purpose of this mathematical model is to allow the theory to be quantitatively tested. In order to 
advance our understanding how learning occurs it is useful to test hypotheses about similarity 
between learning at different levels of socioeconomic aggregation, and about how learning at one 
level affects learning at other levels.  
The measures and data used in this model, as with the constructs and variables I lay out in 
this study, must be empirically validated. The model and its outputs might be useful in decision-
making after it has been rigorously tested and consistently supported (not falsified) in a variety 
of settings. Even then, because this is a general, highly abstracted version of the theory, much 
work will need to be done to achieve more detailed and nuanced understanding.  
Actually, what I present here are two different mathematical models, one descriptive and 
one explanatory. The descriptive model, summarized in figure 9, is a mathematical restatement 
of the levels of analysis discussion, above. To recap: Capabilities are a function of capacity, 
which is determined by physical form and is practically fixed, and by ability, which is 
determined by socio-cognitive functions. Capacity of a unit (person or organization) can be 
impeded and supplemented by higher levels adding more units, but it cannot be increased. 
Ability can be developed and utilized by higher levels, but cannot be diminished.  
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Figure 9 A Descriptive Mathematical Model of Multilevel Learning  
(adapted from Heck & Thomas, 2009) 
 
As with all models in this dissertation, the unit of analysis is the individual, and the 
general question for this model is, “What explains variation in individual freedoms?” While, it 
may be useful to understand how lower level factors—individual freedoms and personal 
fulfillment—contribute to organizational performance and/or regional advantage, my concern 
here is with what maximizes the capabilities of individual human beings. My general purpose is 
to promote freedom through learning, and that can only be accomplished by focusing on the 
individual. It is only by and for individuals that we can build better organizations and regions. 
Personal fulfillment is equivalent to individual freedoms. 
Figure 9 shows personal fulfillment as a function of personal capacity, personal ability, 
organizational performance, and regional advantage. Organizational and regional capabilities can 
constrain personal capacity and/or enhance personal ability. Regional capabilities can either 
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constrain an organization’s capacity (capital and labor) or enhance its ability (division of labor 
and technology). The combination of ability and capacity explains variation within levels—
between persons within organizations and regions, and between organizations within regions.  
Equation 1 puts this in mathematical terms. Individual freedoms and personal fulfillment 
(which are equivalent) are represented by yijk. This is an observation (measurement of some 
salient action/asset) of the ith individual in the jth organization in the kth region are. The 
intercept, β0ijk, represents the personal capacity, which is assumed to be fixed—although, 
conceptually, it is constrained by negative coefficients by organizational and regional 
variables—and the same for all individuals. x1ijk is an observation of personal ability and β1ijk is 
the slope coefficient, representing the relationship between {y,x}, between 
measurements/observations of ability and freedoms/fulfillment. x2jk and x3k are organizational 
and regional capabilities (or, at least, particular measurements/ observations of indicators of 
capabilities), respectively, and β2jk and β3k are the slope coefficients. A key empirical and 
practical issue is whether these coefficients are positive or negative. The error term, eijk, 
represents unexplained variation in personal fulfillment/individual freedoms. It is assumed to 
have a mean of zero and constant variation across all persons/individuals. 
 
€ 
yijk = β0ijk + β1ijk x1ijk + β2ijk x2ijk + β3ijk x3ijk + eijk  (1) 
Essentially, what equation 1 says is that variation in individual freedoms and personal 
fulfillment are explained by individual capacity, individual ability, organizational performance, 
and regional advantage. Equations 2 and 3 describe variation in organizational performance and 
regional advantage. Equation 2 basically indicates that variation in organizational performance is 
explained by capital and labor (organizational capacity, β0jk); division of labor and technology 
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(organizational ability, β1jkz1jk); and regional capabilities (β3kx3k). Equation 3 is a similar 
explanation of regional advantage: Environment, infrastructure, and location (regional capacity, 
β0k) and institutions (regional ability, β1ka1k) explain its variation. The primary structural 
difference between these two equations and equation 1 is that β0jk and β0k are randomly varying 
rather than fixed. That is, while we can assume that individuals all have the same capacity, we 
cannot make the same assumption about organizations and regions.  
 
€ 
x2 jk = β0 jk + β1 jkz1 jk + β3kz3k + e jk  (2) 
 
€ 
x2 jk = β0k + β1ka1k + ek  (3) 
So, if we assume that organizational and regional capacities vary, what explains that 
variation? Organizations have various sets of capital and labor. Each region has an environment, 
infrastructure, and environment that are different from any other region. Both organizations and 
regions are socio-cognitive constructions. People, using their capabilities, build them. So, 
variations in organizational and regional capacities—capital and labor; and environment, 
infrastructure, and location—are explained by the individuals that comprise them.  
 
€ 
β0 jk =ϕ00 +ϕ01yij + u0 jk  (4) 
 
€ 
β0 jk =ϕ00 +ϕ01yijk +ϕ10x2 jk + u0k   (5) 
Equation 4 indicates that organizational capacity (capital and labor, symbolized by β0jk) is 
determined by the overall mean for measurements/observations of individuals over organizations 
(ϕ00) and the capabilities of individuals in that organization (y1ij, and ϕ01 is the coefficient of 
relation between individual capabilities and organizational capacity). Equation 5 shows a similar 
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explanation for variation in regional capacity (environment, infrastructure, and location), except 
that it includes organizational capabilities (ϕ00 y2jk). 
These equations describe how capabilities at various levels are related. But they do not 
explain how capabilities change. This theory explains learning as a result of community input 
functions—identification, integration, and differentiation—across levels: Gains in capabilities 
are caused by extent and strength of community. While there are personal, organizational, and 
regional communities, community functions extend across and connect these levels. 
Hypothetically, the more extensive the reach of a community is, the greater its learning potential. 
It is community that determines how higher-level activities and assets impact lower level 
capabilities, enhancing abilities or impeding capacity.  
Equation 7 appears to be the same as equation 1 but it represents very different variables. 
yijk still represents capability but here it is an observation of individual in the ith differentiation 
function from the jth integration from the kth identification function. So, here the levels are 
levels of community. This equation basically says that the stronger the community input 
functions are the greater the resulting capabilities are. Equation 6 states this in non-mathematical 
terms. β0ijk in equation 7 represents capabilities without community, which is essentially the 
same as capacity (capability with no ability), so it is the same as the intercept coefficient in 
equation 1. And, x1ijk in equation 7 represents measurements of differentiation, and β1ijk is the 
effect that differentiation has on capabilities (how much of the variation in yijk is explained by 
variation in x1ijk). x2jk and x3k in equation 7 represent measurements, respectively, of integration 
and identification. 
 Capabilities = f (Differentiation, Identification, Integration) (6) 
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€ 
yijk = β0ijk + β1ijk x1ijk + β2 jk x2 jk + β3k x3k + eijk  (7) 
Equations 8 through 13 break this down further. They show how the community input 
functions are embedded in each other. Equation 8 shows that the extent to which differentiation 
explains variation in capabilities is a function of integration as well as feedback and reflection. In 
equation 9, which states this in mathematical terms, x1ijk represents measurements of feedback, 
x2ijk are measurements of reflection, and x3jk represents measurements of integration. The 
intercept, γ0ijk, represents the effect of differentiation on capabilities without integration, 
feedback, or reflection, which is 0. The regression coefficients—γ1ijk, γ2ijk, and γ3jk—are the 
effects that integration, feedback, and reflection have on capabilities via differentiation. 
Equations 10 and 11 illustrate that integration is embedded in identification in the same way that 
differentiation is embedded in integration. Equations 12 and 13 indicate that identification is a 
function of prior knowledge, and motivation. 
 Differentiation = f (Integration, feedback, reflection) (8) 
 
€ 
x1ijk = γ 0ijk +γ1ijkz1ijk +γ 2kz2k + eijk  (9) 
 Integration = f (Identification, models & stimuli, practice) (10) 
 
€ 
x2 jk =ϕ0 jk +ϕ1 jka1 jk +ϕ2 jka2 jk +ϕ3ka3k + e jk  (11) 
 Identification = f (prior knowledge, intention & motivation) (12) 
 
€ 
x3k = τ0k +τ1kb1k +τ2kb2k + ek  (13) 
The implications of these equations are simple. An individual’s capabilities are correlated 
with her or his experience of community. The strength of that is determined by identification, 
integration, and differentiation of members at the personal, organizational, and regional levels. 
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Individuals must experience integration to experience differentiation, and must experience 
identification to experience integration. What then is the difference between capabilities and 
community? Capabilities inhere to the individual; community is a collective experience, which 
must be shared by all members. 
There is one more aspect of the mathematical model, which is described in equations 14 
through 21: Capabilities are correlated with liberty, prosperity, and wellness. And, liberty, 
prosperity, and wellness are correlated with each other. In the ideal situation, the regression 
coefficient with each output function of capabilities on each other is positive; they are mutually 
reinforcing. In the worse situation, they are trade-offs and the regression coefficients are 
negative. If liberty, prosperity, and wellness have no effect on each other, the regression 
coefficients would be zero. 
 Capabilities = f (Liberty, Prosperity, Wellness) (14) 
 
€ 
yi = β0i + β1ix1i + β2ix2i + β3ix3i + ei (15) 
 Liberty = f (Prosperity, Wellness) (16) 
 
€ 
β1i = γ 0i + γ 2ix2i + γ 3ix3i + ui  (17) 
 Prosperity = f (Liberty, Wellness) (18) 
 
€ 
β2i =ϕ0i +ϕ1ix1i +ϕ3ix3i + u2i  (19) 
 Wellness = f (Liberty, Prosperity) (20) 
 
€ 
β3i = τ 0i +τ1ix1i +τ 2ix2i + u3i (21) 
This mathematical model describes how personal, organizational, and regional learning 
relate to each other, and how community and its input functions relate to capabilities and its 
output functions. The learning logic model describes the process by which community is built 
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and how that results in increased capabilities (individual freedoms and personal fulfillment). The 
causal model describes how community invariably precedes increases in capabilities.  
While the mathematical model is conceptually more amenable to testing than the other 
two models, it contains variables that are not so easy to operationalize. This is because it 
considers capabilities as the result of capacity and ability, rather than knowledge (which can be 
described via knoels) or real freedoms (which can be observed). The two general approaches that 
one might take to operationalizing these variables objective and subjective. The objective 
approach would be to define the variables in economic/financial terms. Capacity, in this 
approach, would be the cost or replacement value of what each level has, e.g., infrastructure, 
natural resources, equipment, facilities, labor, etc. Ability would be the functional value—costs 
avoided or revenue generated—with these assets. The subjective approach would be to develop 
scales for subjects to rate the capacity of resources available to them and their (or others) ability 
to use those resources. I discuss these approaches more in Chapter 5. 
Summary 
Community makes people smarter and increases real freedoms. But, community is not a 
thing. It is a set of psychosocial functions that operates differently at different levels; not because 
the functions are different, but because the levels are. Metaphors at each level—individual 
cognitive constructer, organizational loops of learning, and regional triple helix—point to 
integrative theory. They provide the bases for a theory of composition for independent variables. 
Capacity and ability at the individual/personal level have equivalent factors at organizational 
(capital & labor, division of labor & technology) and regional (environment & infrastructure, and 
institutions) levels. Learning requires capacity (quantity of information & materials over time) to 
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increase ability, which means a temporary decrease in capability during the learning process. 
Dependent variable(s)—real freedoms—liberty, prosperity, and wellness are objective and only 
pertain to individuals. Personal fulfillment is the subjective version of this. Organizational 
performance and regional advantage are intersubjective versions. All of these can be described in 
terms of vision, measured in terms of connection, and are evident in behavior.  
These factors are independent across levels, which is essentially what distinguishes the 
levels: Regional advantage does not necessarily translate into organizational performance or 
personal fulfillment, or vice versa. My proposed theory suggests that community functions link, 
as well as contribute to, capabilities across levels. So, based on this theory, we would predict that 
the more pervasive and stronger community functions are at multiple levels, the more rapid and 
sustainable the capability gains will be. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Literature on Learning at Micro, Meso, and Macro Levels 
There are distinct bodies of theoretical literature regarding learning by individuals, 
organizations, and regions. All three bodies of literature deal with how knowledge is acquired, 
applied, and created. There are other overlaps, as discussed in Chapter 2. Theoretically, each 
level involves entities acting in their own interests.  Another common concept is that the agents 
are embedded in information networks. An implication is that agents also act in the interest of 
others as they exchange information. Information networks are simply patterns of transactions. 
The third theoretical overlap between levels is that agents are aware of, reflect on, and modify 
their actions based those reflections. This reflexivity is essential to agentic action, and is enabled 
by information networks. All of the literature is about individual human beings, their agentic 
action, reflexivity, and information networks. 
Beyond their common concern and common underlying concepts, texts about learning 
can be divided into three bodies based on level of analysis, the context of individual action as 
persons, organizations, or regions. I refer to these as the micro, meso, and macro levels. Most of 
literature advances and/or refutes particular concepts or metaphors regarding how learning 
occurs at one level. The literature includes a wide range of outputs, or dependent variables, and 
inputs, or independent variables, for each level. These diverse variables can be boiled down to a 
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few core constructs based on the recognition that learning is essentially an improvement or 
increase in the output resulting from modifying a fixed set of input factors. 
At the micro level, the overarching metaphor is that of a human “machine” cognitively 
constructs itself and its world, which I refer to as the “cognitive constructor.” While the concept 
of agentic action appears throughout the literature, this metaphor exemplifies this concept. 
Individuals generally act to achieve fulfillment as persons based on models and 
stimulus/reinforcement. Individuals learn directly from models and stimulus/reinforcement, or 
indirectly from texts about these things. For example, an individual might learn to dance by 
imitating others, watching videos, and being told he or she dances nicely, which give her or him 
a sense of personal fulfillment. Thus, personal fulfillment is the output produced by cognitive 
constructors from information derived from models, stimulus/reinforcement, and texts about 
these things. 
The metaphor at the meso level is “loops of learning,” which involves groups of 
cognitive constructors repeatedly working together to improve their organizations. This 
metaphor illustrates the concept of reflexivity. Individuals act together as organizations to 
increase their collective performance, as determined by the ways they arrange available capital 
and labor. Technology is essentially these arrangements compiled into replicable, standardized 
forms. For example, a restaurant performs well if it has employees, quality foodstuffs, 
equipment, and a well-located building, but only if those employees know what to do, how to 
work together, and technologies for managing the restaurant and its funds. These things don’t 
simply appear; they must be acquired, developed, and maintained through an iterative process. 
So, organizational performance is produced via loops of learning based on capital, labor, and 
technology. 
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The macro level metaphor is the “triple helix” formed by loops of learning from various 
economic sectors interacting within a geographic region. The concept of information networks is 
especially important to this metaphor. The output of this interaction is that those within the 
region have an advantage over those in other regions. The advantage is derived from the region’s 
infrastructure and institutions, which translate physical characteristics of the region into usable 
resources. For example, a river becomes a transportation asset, potable water, and a source of 
electric power only via interaction between public agencies, private corporations, and academic 
institutions. Effective utilization of transportation, water, and power that gives those around the 
river an edge over those around other rivers requires an even higher level of interaction. This 
illustrates how the triple helix produces regional advantage from infrastructure, institutions, and 
resources. 
The gap between literature on individual learning, organizational learning, and regional 
learning is twofold. First, there appears to be no theory that is applicable at the micro, meso, and 
macro levels. If we can say that learning occurs at all levels, then it stands to reason that there 
should be a consistent explanation of this phenomenon that applies at all levels. In addition, there 
appears to be no conceptual framework that applies equally to all levels, which would make it 
difficult to develop a theory that applies to all levels. (There are the concepts of agentic action, 
information networks, and reflexivity, but I have found no literature that integrates them into a 
theory of learning that applies to multiple levels of social aggregation.) 
The second gap between theories of individual, organizational, and regional learning 
regards the relationship between learning at different levels. There seems to be no complete 
theory about how learning at one level affects learning at other levels. So, for example, does an 
increase in capabilities of an organization necessarily involve an increase in the capabilities of 
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individuals within that organization or of the regions in which the organization operates? 
Coleman (1988) and Upton and Egan (2010) partially address the relationship between learning 
by individuals and organizations, but their theories are not comprehensive, nor do they address 
regional learning. Bapuji and Crossan (2004) and Morse (2004) note this gap. I contend that 
these gaps can only be filled simultaneously, that we cannot understand how learning at different 
levels relate until we are clear about how they are similar, about how improvements in persons, 
organizations, and regions can all be validly characterized as learning. 
A Conceptual Framework, Theory, and Three Models 
 The first step in filling the theoretical gaps is to recognize structural similarities across 
scale. Persons, organizations, and regions, I maintain, all have behaviors, connections, and 
visions. Or, more accurately, individual human beings have behaviors, connections, and visions 
that can be ascribed to them personally, to their organizations, and to their regions. Behaviors, 
connections, and visions are not separate things; they are different aspects of a system. In other 
words, a system is formally defined by the behaviors, connections, and visions individuals 
ascribe to it.  
Visions are the internal, subjective aspect of individual human beings. These are their 
attitudes and beliefs about what is beneficial, desirable, possible, and practical. Connections 
make up individuals’ external, objective aspect, via which they acquire the information and 
materials they need to operate. Behaviors are individuals’ intersubjective aspect, which bridges 
the internal and external. Behaviors are the interchange between connections and visions.  
I should explicate an implicit point: The unit of analysis in this theory is the individual 
human being, her or his behaviors, connections, and visions. This is because (a) we cannot 
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observe persons, organizations, or regions except through individual B-C-V and (b) because to 
do otherwise would involve the morally dubious practice of treating individuals as means to 
regional, organizational, and even personal ends. To put this another way, individuals are the 
sum of the personal, organizational, and regional B-C-V, and this theory presumes that personal, 
organizational, and regional activities and assets exist to benefit individuals. 
Together behaviors-connections-visions (B-C-V) define what a psycho-social system is. 
Behaviors are evidence of what persons, organizations, and regions do, their activities. 
Connections are evidence of what they have, their assets. And, visions are evidence of what they 
say, in expressions about what they are. Of course, connections and visions can only be 
evidenced (observed) indirectly via behaviors.  
Systems (and statements about them) are verified by B-C-V that are coherently enacted 
and expressed, consistent with other B-C-V of the system in question and others like it, and that 
correspond to reality. So, for example, an individual’s role in an organization is verified if he or 
she can clearly describe the role, if others describe it similarly, and if he or she actually processes 
the information and materials of that role. Connections can be measured via behavior, by 
measuring information and materials and the ways in which they are processed. Visions are 
described by behaviors, by what I call knoels—short for knowledge elements—which are simply 
information chunks regarding how, that, what, when, where, who, why, whether, and which. 
B-C-V provides the metrics for the theory I propose. It is a means for consistently 
describing and measuring persons, organizations, and regions. Differences in B-C-V define the 
micro, meso, and macro, but it is not the theory or even the central constructs or variables of the 
theory.  
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The theory is essentially quiet simple: community yields learning. This theory involves 
somewhat different definition of community, although my definition fits well in the diverse and 
often indefinite definitions of the term. For the purpose of this theory, a community is not a place 
or a thing. Instead, it is a phenomenon and a process. Drawing on theories of community 
(Sanders, 1975; McMillan & Chavez, 1986; Putnam, 1993; Senge & Scharmer, 2006), I suggest 
that three sociocognitive functions make up community: identification, integration, and 
differentiation. Identification involves recognizes others as similar to self, and that others and 
self are part of a group. Integration is the adoption of similar idioms, language, norms, rituals, 
etc., and interacting with each other. Differentiation is the phenomenon of individuals filling 
unique and valuable roles within the group. These functions also parallel theoretical 
sociocognitive functions from economics (Williamson, 1981), psychology (Simon, 1976; Ryan 
& Deci, 2000; Lawrence & Nohria, 2002), and sociology (Weick, 1995). Identification, 
integration, and differentiation are the independent variables in my theory, and impact 
capabilities to the extent that they culminate in community. 
The dependent variables in my theory are liberty, prosperity, and wellness, which I refer 
to as real freedoms. These variables are derived from the human capabilities approach to 
economic pioneered by Sen (1988, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000; Clark, 2005). Essentially, this 
approach breaks from much of economics by suggesting that the ultimate measure of value is not 
utility but freedom, which is practically measureable unlike utility, and it equates capabilities 
with freedoms. I go a bit farther to define capabilities as ability given capacity. Capacity is the 
quantity of information and materials a system can handle, and is determined by its physical 
components. Ability is quality of information and materials a system can handle, which is 
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determined by how the physical components are arranged and employed. Capacity is how much. 
Ability is how well.  
The dependent variables represent the intersubjective, objective, and subjective aspects of 
capabilities. Liberty is the subjective capability to associate with others and express oneself 
freely. It is freedom from coercion and persecution. Prosperity is the intersubjective capability to 
benefit from one’s efforts. It is freedom from exploitation and privation. Wellness is the 
objective capability to function as a living creature. It is freedom from disease and infirmity. 
These not only have sound philosophical basis, they are easy to describe and are eminently 
measureable via B-C-V. Another aspect of these output factors is their relationship to each other. 
Liberty, prosperity, and wellness can be complementary—each promoting the others—or 
mutually exclusive. Increasing one at the detriment of another—becoming more prosperous by 
sacrificing one’s liberty or wellness, for example—represents a superficial form or learning. 
Substantial learning occurs when the real freedoms feed into and foster each other. 
My proposed theory is that community makes people smarter. People make better, more 
productive decisions and act in their own interests more effectively than they would in the 
absence of community. To state this in terms of my variables: liberty, prosperity, and wellness 
become complementary and grow where identification feeds into integration and integration 
results in differentiation. Or, more simply community improves and increases capabilities. The 
stronger the community input functions are, the stronger the capability output functions are. This 
is learning. There are numerous factors in learning, but the extent to which those factors are 
translated into capabilities—into liberty, prosperity, and wellness—is determined by the 
community input functions: identification, integration, and differentiation. 
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I draw on the literature on theory- and model-building (especially Dubin, 1969, and 
Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010) and literature regarding multi-level models (Rousseau, 1985; Klein, 
Tosi & Cannella, 1999; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000; Heck & Thomas, 2009) to develop three 
general models from my putative theory. The mathematical model focuses on the relationships 
between and within levels. It does not consider causality, how community yields learning. The 
causal model is variable-oriented like the mathematical model, but deals only with how the 
community input functions are necessary and sufficient precursors to gains in capabilities. The 
logic model is process-oriented and incorporates the factors of learning. It is useful for 
describing and planning learning processes, but not for specifying relationships or testing 
theoretical propositions. 
Illustrating the Proposed Theory with a Thought Experiment 
I will now illustrate how a multilevel theory of learning might be applied and tested by 
presenting a thought experiment. This thought experiment asks what would happen if a region 
were to suddenly get broadband. I consider two different scenarios, one in which there is no 
community learning, and a second in which there is a community learning process. The first 
scenario is equivalent to an experimental control and the second is essentially the treatment 
group. It should be emphasized that both scenarios are totally fictitious illustrations of the 
concepts, explanations, and predictions of this study. Both scenarios feature rather unlikely 
occurrences: A regional foundation investing in broadband and a major telecommunications 
company taking on that investment, as occurs in scenario one, is rather unlikely in reality. 
Similarly, it is rather unlikely that several universities would collaborate to help a region get and 
use broadband, as occurs in scenario two. I ask the reader to suspend any doubts about such 
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occurrences and consider what might result in these scenarios, without and with community-
learning. 
The unit of analysis for this thought experiment is the individual human being, and the 
levels of analysis are personal, organizational, and regional. Analysis involves observing 
behavior to describe vision and measure connections, and comparing them to find relationships 
between behaviors and other factors. The independent variables are the input functions of 
community: identification, integration, and differentiation. These functions can be described and 
measured in terms of what those at each level do, have, and say. The dependent variables are the 
output functions of capabilities: liberty, prosperity, and wellness. These real freedoms are 
observed as particular patterns of connections and visions, measured and described via 
behaviors. Liberty involves easy connections and vision unimpeded by fear. Benefit from one’s 
labor is the essential vision of prosperity, and is evident in bountiful connections. Physical 
disease can profoundly limit visions and connections, so wellness means active, dynamic 
connections and inclusive, positive visions.  
The proposed theory suggests that the real freedoms will be strongest in situations where 
the community input functions operate across layers of socioeconomic aggregation, that 
individual, organizational, and regional learning are strongest when aligned via identification, 
integration, and differentiation. Based on this theory the effect of broadband depends on the 
extent to which individuals identify, integrate, and differentiate around and through it, as 
persons, organizations, and regions. If community is weak, my theory predicts, the benefits of 
broadband will be low and the costs will be high. If community is strong, according to this 
theory, the benefits will be high and the costs will be low. Real freedoms will increase in 
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conjunction with broadband use if and only if the technology is deployed in conjunction with 
community building.  
Introducing Greenfield, Georgia 
Greenfield, Georgia, is a fictitious city of 100,000, in a region with 250,000 people in just 
over 90,000 households. Greenfield is the regional hub, sitting halfway between two major 
metropolitan areas, near the border with two adjoining states, at the confluence of two rivers, 
between low mountains and hilly lowlands. Greenfield has a diverse economy, with abundant 
public and non-profit agencies as well as retail and service sectors. The economy is based largely 
on a cluster of tractor companies and related industries. Indeed, Greenfield promotes itself as the 
“tractor capital of the world.” The region boasts numerous specialty manufacturers and a very 
capable, inexpensive, but also under-educated workforce (many of the best workers in the tractor 
industry have not completed high school). 
At the dawn of the 21st century, Greenfield had only dial-up internet access. A scion of 
the tractor industry, whose family had become very wealthy and established a foundation for 
regional development, was deeply troubled by this. “How can we attract new business and create 
jobs,” she asked regional leaders, “without broadband.” “What’s broadband?” they replied. So, 
this young person decided to do something. With the support of her father and uncles (the tractor 
industry was highly patriarchal), she used the family foundation to get Major Telecom (MT), a 
multinational telecommunications provider headquartered in Dallas, Texas, to bring broadband 
to the region. Basically, the foundation paid to build network infrastructure, which Major 
Telecom would operate and use to sell broadband internet access.  
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The partnership, Greenfield Broadband, or GB launched in 2003, and by 2005 was 
providing high-speed internet access via optical fiber and wi-fi (wireless data network) to every 
home and business in the region. Even more amazing, subscribers—commercial and 
residential—could get the first three months’ broadband for free! The Greenfield regional 
broadband project was widely hailed as a real “game-changer” that would fuel regional 
economic development.  
So, what might happen in and around Greenfield, what might the socioeconomic impact 
of broadband be? Before I address that question, I look at Greenfield through the lens of my 
conceptual framework. I review the academic perspectives related to this question. Then I 
address the question about broadband impacts, and discuss how my proposed theory explains the 
results. 
Operationalizing the Variables, Testing the Hypothesis 
I present behaviors-connections-visions (B-C-V) as means to describe and measure 
sociocognitive phenomena. The general hypothesis is that the stronger communities are, the 
greater the gain in capabilities. This means that certain B-C-V—identification, integration, and 
differentiation, in combination—result in an expansion of B-C-V, and the more extensive or 
stronger the community input functions, the great the expansion will be. For Greenfield, this 
means that the benefits of broadband depend on the extent to which individuals identify, 
integrate, and differentiate around the technology. The dependent variables are capabilities 
related to liberty, prosperity, and wellness. The civic, economic, and health effects from using 
broadband—negative or positive—are the putative outcomes in Greenfield. These outcomes are 
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evident in behavior-connections-visions about association, expression, earnings, work, disease, 
exercise, etc.  
The independent variables are the community input functions, which, for GB (Greenfield 
Broadband), are the extent to which individuals engage with each other regarding and via 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), specifically broadband. When, where, and 
with whom to Greenfielders exchange information and materials (including money)? What do 
they see as desirable and why? Does the internet afford more beneficial decisions about whether 
and which? Does GB lead to an increase in capabilities? Change in behaviors-connections-
visions that would indicate strong community input functions include interaction with diverse 
others around ICTs. Cognitive constructors interacting in loops of learning connected via a triple 
helix. Hypothetically, this leads participants to identify better uses and reduce costs; they climb 
the learning curve farther and faster. The construction, looping, and helices can be described, 
measured, and analyzed to understand how community affects learning about ICTs. 
Behavior-connection-vision in this case is how Greenfielders spend their money and 
time; what they do, have, and say. Doing involves activities, which can be recorded via diaries, 
measured by an observer (including a digital one), or recalled from memory during an interview 
or survey. Having has to do with things—assets. The rationale is that better or more things 
increases real freedoms and satisfies innate drives. Regardless, what one has can be measured 
monetarily, in terms of market value, or described in terms of reducing uncertainty, the 
informational content. One’s perspective, including attitudes and beliefs, can be captured via 
interviews and survey, and inferred from observations.  
The elements of vision can be analyzed by categorization and quantization around the 
sides of vision, particularly what is considered beneficial verses desirable verses possible verses 
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practical. Then changes in vision can be evaluated by comparing B-C-V (behaviors-connections-
visions). At a given point in time actions and expressions can be compared for an individual or a 
group to evaluate veracity. B-C-V can be analyzed across time identify changes. Those changes 
can then be evaluated in terms of relations to other factors, to establish validity. For example, 
meeting a person who knows how ICTs (information and communication technology) can really 
benefit one can be analyzed in terms of spending on ICTs, talking about ICTs, and using them 
before and after that meeting, and in terms of the actual benefits derived—for personal, 
organizational, and regional purposes—from using ICTs.  
What determines whether the two people interact and whether one changes behavior 
(along with connection and vision) as a result of that interaction? The B-C-V framework makes 
it practical to answer such questions. The W7TH framework—my typology of knowledge 
elements, or knoels, as how, that, what, when, where, who, why, which, and whether (W7TH)—
is useful here, too. Throughout the discussion above and below, the situation with Greenfield is 
discussed in terms of how, that, what, when, where, whether, which, who, and why. All of this is 
amenable to description, measurement, and relating. Indeed, W7TH (how, that, what, when, 
where, who, why, which, and whether) is the means for describing and measuring B-C-V 
(behaviors-connections-visions).  
Behaviors, Connections, and Visions of the Greenfield Region 
The starting point for analyzing the Greenfield region with my conceptual framework is 
behavior, or what individuals in the region do. Much like the nation, about three quarters of the 
region’s population is of working age, and just over half of the working age adults are employed. 
Fifteen percent of those work in manufacturing and other private goods producing industries, 
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20% in government services, and 85% work in service industries. Almost a quarter of the 
employed persons work in retail, food service, and clerical positions, and earn a median wage of 
$22,000, less than half the nation’s median earnings. The highest paying managerial and 
technical professionals make up less than 10% of employed workforce. A quarter of the region’s 
citizens are retired, 14% are in college, and unemployment is right around 5%. 
The Greenfield region has relatively more agriculture, educational services, 
manufacturing, retail, transportation, and utilities than the rest of the country. Unfortunately, 
these are not the highest paying sectors, which are under-represented in the region. Greenfield 
was notably weak in arts and entertainment; information; management; mining; professional, 
scientific, and technical services; and other higher-paying enterprises. Locally, the most firms 
and employees are in accommodations and food services; construction; healthcare; 
manufacturing; and professional, scientific, and technical services. A trend behind the numbers is 
a large-scale economic shift from goods to services. The number of information and knowledge 
firms and workers are increasing even faster than most other services. Greenfield is being 
impacted by the trends discussed in chapter one: technology is replacing labor in the global 
marketplace making innovation and knowledge increasingly critical. Inclusiveness and openness 
are necessary for making this happen humanely. 
Needless to say, this is a very brief and even simplistic description of individuals’ 
behaviors in the Greenfield region. Occupation is the yardstick by which most policymakers and 
politicians (particularly those concerned with the economic impact of broadband) describe and 
measure our world. Clearly, occupation tells us little about how people actually behave, 
particularly outside their organizational roles. That said, it is possible to make some rudimentary 
presumptions about connections and visions even from such a superficial description. For 
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example, half of the regions’ residents rely on non-work connections—parents, spouses, 
children, etc.—for their livings. And, at least a quarter of the working population does not see 
how they can earn a decent wage.  
There is a range of other high-level observations we could make about what individuals 
have and say—their connections and visions—in the Greenfield region, based on the summary 
above. But, rather than delving into these specifics, let us consider generally how to 
operationalize the components of my conceptual framework. The starting point is behavior, 
connections, and visions, or what individuals do, have, and say. As implied by the discussion 
above, behaviors in this framework are activities, events, habits, etc. These can be assigned to 
non-exclusive categories or spaces: personal space, organizational space, and regional space. 
Personal space can be defined as the home, but conceptually personal space is anything that 
primarily impacts the person with minimal influence by organizational or regional concerns. For 
connections, this means family and friends, personal belongings, personal media use. For 
visions, this means attitudes and beliefs about such things. All of this is evidenced by behavior: 
who an individual communicates and spends time with, what he or she has control over or 
possession of, and what are her or his sources of entertainment, news, etc. Where one behaves is 
also informative. 
The W7TH (how, that, what, when, where, who, why, which, and whether) framework is 
useful here to describe subjective visions and measure objective connections, particularly in 
specific context (e.g., Greenfield gets broadband). W7TH provides a means to describe and 
measure where individuals spend their time and money, the appliances, devices, tools, and 
vehicles they use, and how these things are used. It is also a way to assess attitudes toward and 
beliefs about these activities, items, and others. Specifically, in Greenfield, this framework can 
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be used to document what people see as beneficial/possible with and desirable/practical about 
broadband—what drives and what limits their broadband use. Current attitudes and beliefs about 
these things now and in future can be compared with past attitudes and beliefs. And, both are 
true for comparison and contrasting across organizations, based on individuals’ personal 
orientation, organizational affiliations, and regions. The same is true for available information 
and materials: current versus past amounts and types by personal, organizational, and regional 
characteristics. 
When applied to the proposition that community causes an increase in capabilities, the 
framework should allow valid measurement and verifiable description of the dependent and 
independent variables. With the combination of B-C-V (behaviors-connections-visions) and 
W7TH researchers, policymakers, and practitioners can assess the impacts of broad in the 
Greenfield region across persons and organizations, and can compare them to other regions. 
More importantly for the theory presented in this dissertation, the B-C-V/W7TH framework 
makes it possible to examine the assertion that the community input functions occur before, and 
are positively correlated with, the impacts. And, that this effect is stronger when those functions 
occur across personal, organizational, and regional spaces. 
Broadband 
Much of the investment in broadband around the turn of the 21st century, particularly 
public investment, was based on the Field of Dreams (Robinson, Gordon, & Gordon, 1989) 
metaphor, “If you build it, they will come.” This metaphor has two presumptions built into it (for 
examples of the presumptions see Eaton (2012), Helms (2012), and Worstall (2012)). First, if 
broadband service becomes available people will take it up and use it. This is about adoption. 
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Second, broadband will attract companies to relocate to, start up in, and hire employees where it 
is available, which is about impact. Both presumptions involve use. Individuals will change 
behavior by using the broadband, or at least to use it. Organizations that use broadband will favor 
those with it, or at least shun places without broadband. 
Broadband Adoption 
In some ways, broadband is a prime example of the adoption of new technologies (i.e., 
innovations) as described by Rogers (2003)—generally known as “diffusion of innovations 
theory,” or just “diffusion theory.” According to this theory, there are five steps—knowledge, 
persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation—in a linear adoption process. Diffusion 
occurs at varied speed: slowly at first with a few early adopters then it increases rapidly as the 
majority adopts the new technology relatively quickly until diffusion tapers off with a few 
laggards holding out and the innovation becomes generally accepted. Represented graphically, 
diffusion takes the form of a learning curve (Yelle, 1979; Adler & Clark, 1991). 
The rate of adoption/diffusion—the slope of the learning curve—according to Rogers 
(2003) depends on characteristics of the innovation, the number and type of communication 
channels, the structure of the social system. Adoption can be contingent on authorities or 
collective decisions. Communications with different agents promote knowledge of innovations, 
according to diffusion theory. Opinion leaders effect persuasion and decision via evaluation. Of 
course, the process doesn’t happen with every innovation, and different types of innovation 
diffuse differently. General-purpose technologies diffuse differently from special purpose 
technologies. Technologies that become more beneficial as more adopt them—exhibit network 
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effects—diffuse differently than those that don’t. Fax machines and e-mail, for example, diffused 
differently than automobiles, the plow, and radio. 
Information and communication technology (ICT) researchers have evolved diffusion 
theory into the technology acceptance model (TAM), which sees perceived usefulness and 
perceived ease-of-use as the primary factors in adoption of ICTs. Perceived ease-of-use 
determines whether a person will try an ICT, and perceived usefulness determines whether he or 
she will continue using it. Major contributions to TAM come from Davis (1989) and from Davis, 
Bagozzi, and Warshaw (1989). Attewell (1992), King and Teo (1994), Taylor and Todd (1995), 
and Thong and Yap (1995) emphasize the role of leaders’ experience with and knowledge of 
ICTs in organizational adoption. Chuttur (2009) provides an overview of this literature.  
In this literature, adoption is an individualistic and rational process. The literature, not 
coincidentally, downplays the role of social norms and generally does not consider 
organizational or social arrangements. Other approaches to learning, particularly Bandura’s 
social learning theory (1977, 1988, 1997, 2006), conceive of learning as an intrinsically social 
process. Others see knowledge as socially constructed (Berger and Luckman, 1966) and learning 
as situated in particular culture, context, and activities (Brown, Collins, and Duguid, 1989). 
The technology acceptance model (TAM) has been extended with social influence and 
cognitive processes (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000), focusing on intention to use ICTs (information 
and communication technology) as the best indicator of actual use. Hybrids of TAM with socio-
cognitive theory and other approaches are used to investigate ICTs for higher education (Yi & 
Hwang, 2003), online tax (Wu & Chen, 2005), healthcare (Yi, et al., 2006), virtual communities 
(Chiu, Hsu & Wang, 2006), mobile banking (Ratten & Ratten, 2007), and knowledge 
management (Lin & Huang, 2008). Results are mixed.  
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Venkatesh, et al., (2003) draw from eight theoretical perspectives to suggest that 
performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions are the 
determinants of adoption. TAM is the best overall explanation of ICT adoption and use (Hong, 
Thong & Tam, 2006), but SCT (social cognitive theory) explains intentions to use ICTs (Ratten 
& Ratten, 2007), and task-technology fit is important for explaining ICT adoption and use in 
situations with strong task interdependence (Lin & Huang, 2008). LaRose, et al. (2007), studied 
intention to use broadband among rural residents through the lens of sociocognitive theory, and 
found that:  
Prior experience with the Internet, the expected outcomes of broadband 
usage, direct personal experience with broadband, and self-efficacy had 
direct effects on broadband intentions. Age and income, but not education 
or ethnicity, also had direct impacts. (p. 359) 
Beyond their conclusions about broadband adoption, LaRose, et al., find that: 
Social-cognitive theory and the conventional diffusion of innovations 
paradigm provide complementary views of the adoption process. The 
present research equated the diffusion concept of relative advantage with 
the socio-cognitive concept of expected outcomes, trialability with 
enactive learning, observability with observational learning, complexity 
with self-efficacy, and compatibility with prior experience with related 
technologies. This presented a fresh approach to conceptualizing 
innovation attributes that stressed the role of the adopter/user rather than 
the properties of the innovation. (p. 368) 
Beyond the theoretical explanations, actual internet adoption and use have been tracked 
by the Federal Communications Commission (Horrigan, 2010) and Pew Internet and American 
Life Project (Pew Internet, 2012). They find that 81% of Americans use the internet, and show 
an adoption trend that takes a learning-curve form. Two-thirds of Americans have broadband at 
home. Internet users tend to be younger, white, higher income, and more educated. The internet 
is used for a wide range of general and special purposes and tasks according to Pew Internet. 
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Horrigan (2010) notes that the social aspects of the internet are more important than 
entertainment. The more knowledgeable users are, the more they get from broadband, according 
to Horrigan (2010), and cost is major barrier to adoption. Dwivedi and Lal (2007) found the 
difference between adopters and non-adopters to be attributable to socioeconomic factors—age, 
education, income, occupation, etc.—except for gender. 
So we know how many people have adopted the internet, the characteristics of those 
people, and generally what they do with it. We know the when, where, and who of internet use. 
What we’re less clear of is why, particularly in relation to innate drives to acquire, bond, and 
defend. The literature on adoption of broadband and other ICTs (information and communication 
technology) implies various impacts. Hypothetically, the practical value of the internet comes 
from it being actually useful. The individuals, organizations, and regions that acquire broadband 
do so with expectation of benefits of use to outweigh the costs. Are there benefits? What 
determines the value of ICTs? What are their impacts? 
Diffusion theory provides understanding of how awareness and use of innovations 
spread. TAM (technology acceptance model) highlights the importance of expectations and 
intentions, especially fit between tasks and the technology. The extensions of TAM—particularly 
sociocognitive theory—suggest that social and other-oriented factors are important in ICT 
(information and communication technology) adoption, but results are inconsistent. The 
questions become what makes broadband use important, how it increases individual capabilities, 
and what the nature of the social factors are; are they community? 
Through my conceptual lens, the adoption issue is one of change in B-C-V (behaviors-
connections-visions). A person (or organization or region) does not use digital technology; then 
he or she does. He or she uses it a little, then uses it a lot, or doesn’t, and stops using it. Certain 
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types of connections precede and follow change in behavior, as do general beliefs—a new source 
of information is credible, ICT could be beneficial, costs and risks are low, etc. Theoretically, the 
concept of community input functions builds on factors in the range of literature on the topic. So, 
social networks, models, and self-efficacy are important factors, but these functions explain how 
those factors—specifically, regarding broadband and other ICTs—are translated into real 
freedoms. 
Broadband Impacts 
The impacts of ICTs, and broadband specifically, are construed in several ways—as gross 
economic product, in terms of social integration, and on productivity. Fischer (1992) says the 
telephone as one of the harbingers of modernity was accompanied by concerns about: 
The growth of cities, wider communication, more material goods, mass 
media, and the specialization of land use and institutions … fostered 
individualism and interpersonal alienation, abraded the bonds of social 
groups, and bred skepticism in place of faith. (p. 4) 
The technology is seen as both alienating and liberating, Fischer notes, which are common 
themes in social history of technology. Indeed, we see the alienating and liberating themes in 
discussion of impacts of broadband and other ICTs (information and communication 
technology). Fischer (1992) concludes that: 
[W]hile a material change as fundamental as the telephone alters the 
conditions of daily life, it does not determine the basic character of that 
life. Instead, people turn new devices to various purposes, even ones that 
the producers could hardly have foreseen or desired. As much as people 
adapt their lives to the changed circumstances created by the new 
technology, they also adapt that technology to their lives. The telephone 
did not radically alter American ways of life; rather, Americans used it to 
more vigorously pursue their characteristic ways of life. (p. 5) 
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Fischer emphasizes the importance of considering both first- and second-order consequences of 
technology: the effect for or on the user, and what widespread use means for others. For ICTs in 
general, and broadband in particular, scholars see these effects in terms of two paradoxes.  
The Productivity Paradox  
Solow (1987) pointed out the first paradox, “You can see the computer age everywhere 
but in the productivity statistics” (p. 36). The rationale for investing in ICTs is that they make 
organizations more productive, profitable, and successful. Research supports this rationale 
(Mahmood and Mann, 1993; Melville, et al., 2007), particularly for specific industries and with 
specific technologies (Mukhopadhyay, et al., 1997; McAfee, 2002; Bartel, et al., 2007). These 
effects were not evident to Solow—an eminent economist—in 1987 because ICTs require 
learning, and learning takes time. Consequently, the benefits from ICTs tend to lag behind the 
costs. 
Productivity tends to decrease immediately after deployment before rising above pre-ICT 
(information and communication technology) levels (Attewell, 1992; Nilsson, 1995; Greenwood, 
1999; Lee and Barua, 1999; McAfee, 2002). This gives the cost/benefit curve for ICTs look 
much like the diffusion learning curve, discussed above. The steeper the curve, the stronger the 
return on ICT investment is, and the greater the gain in organizational performance. 
What factors determine whether ICTs increase performance and improve outcomes? 
Organizations that utilize ICTs tend to have integrated products and services, complex and 
informal structures, melding of technical and manual jobs, and participative management (Burris, 
1998; Wozny & Regli, 1996; Vizard & Neel, 2000; Black & Lynch, 2001). Organizations that 
invest in ICTs tend to be smaller and less vertically integrated, and have closer working 
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relationships with a relatively smaller set of suppliers (Reddi, et al., 1993; Brynjolfsson, et al. 
1994). Organizations in diverse, dynamic industries realize greater benefits from ICTs than those 
in highly concentrated, static industries (Melville, et al., 2007), as do organizations from 
advanced economies as opposed to those in developing countries (Tam, 1998). Clearly, there are 
contextual—including cultural—issues that impact utilization of ICTs, and that are impacted by 
it. Organizations must have a form and structure, and be in an environment, that enables them to 
capitalize on ICTs. 
The organizations that are most successful with ICTs digitize their processes as well as 
their products (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2008). These organizations focus on non-routine 
information, delegating routine information tasks to their information systems (Martin, 1999), 
and they experiment with various types of ICTs (Haltiwanger, et al., 2003). They have small 
production runs and make frequent changes in production (Kelley, 1986, 1994), and have more 
customized products. ICT utilization is correlated with higher skill requirements, particularly for 
problem-solving and technical skills, and for executives and managers as well as workers 
(Swanson 1994; King and Teo, 1994; Thong and Yap, 1995; Mata, et al., 1995; Burris, 1998; 
Bartel, et al., 2007). The implication, which is not explicit in the literature, is that firms that 
benefit from ICTs are not low-quality commodity producers who compete solely on cost. Firms 
that benefit from ICTs are flexible yet specialized, with highly collaborative and knowledgeable 
employees that compete on the basis of relationships, quality, and uniqueness.  
The broad conclusions are that ICTs do drive economic growth, particularly increases in 
labor productivity (Oliner and Sichel, 2000), but “the business value of computers is limited less 
by computational capability and more by the ability of managers to invent new processes, 
procedures and organizational structures that leverage this capability” (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 
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2000, pg. 24). The quality of information, service, and system determine the net benefits of ICTs 
via use and user satisfaction (DeLone and McLean, 2003), but the use has to be appropriate to 
the competitive environment (Soh and Markus, 1995). Return on ICT investment is increased by 
assuring that executives, technologists, and users share reasonable assumptions and expectations 
for the technology, and by having focused goals for ICT investment that aligns with the 
organization’s strategic goals (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994; Tallon, et al., 2001) 
The later research discussed here (McAfee, 2002; Bartel, et al., 2007; Melville, et al., 
2007; McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2008) suggests that the competitive environment itself is 
experiencing fundamental changes enabled by ICTs. Popular business press books reiterate and 
expand this thesis. One of the earliest such books, Re-inventing the Corporation (Naisbitt and 
Aburdene, 1985), argued that the very nature of organizations and work was going to change 
from the bottom up, driven by ICTs. The predicted changes weren’t about ICTs—many, such as 
fostering employees’ personal growth and paramount importance of quality, seem to have little 
to do with ICTs. It is a broader shift in the environment, enabled by ICTs, that is driving these 
changes. Naisbitt and Aburdene’s predictions are borne out in ways that even they could likely 
not have imagined, as documented in books such as A Whole New Mind (Pink, 2005), The Spider 
and the Starfish (Brafman and Beckstrom, 2006), Wikinomics (Tapscott and Williams, 2006), 
Here Comes Everybody (Shirky, 2008), and Tribes (Godin, 2008). By decentralized and open 
organizations that tap their customers’—as well as employees’—capabilities, organizations are 
able to solve intractable problems, radically reduce costs, and create innovations and new 
knowledge. These improvements enable the organizations to overturn markets and traditional 
market leaders. All of this is because ICTs reduce the need for formal organizational structure.  
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In sum, the literature reviewed above makes some bold propositions about the impacts of 
ICTs. The literature suggests that ICTs are not just tools for increasing productivity, or even for 
changing what is produced—although use of ICTs is having these effects. ICTs are changing the 
way production is carried out and even very concept of what it means to produce, according to 
this literature. ICTs are being integrated into organizations as transparent infrastructure (Star, 
1999) even as they transform the organization. The literature suggests that to fully benefit from 
ICTs, organizations must fundamentally change the way they do business by eliminating 
hierarchy, opening up to customers, developing intangibles assets, and, most of all, focusing like 
a laser beam on customer-defined quality. ICTs do not invariably lead to these changes; they 
enable such changes when coupled with willingness to learn and disciplined, visionary 
leadership. 
The Internet Paradox 
The internet paradox, as discussed by Kraut, et al. (1998, 2002), occurs when use of 
internet technology, which is presumably social, causes depression and loneliness. The internet 
was predicted to engage and mobilize citizens (and consumers), but in more fragmented manner 
independent of existing institutions (Bimber, 1998; Calhoun, 1998). Galston (2000) worried over 
autonomy versus connection, and whether online communities had limited membership, shared 
norms, affective ties, and a sense of mutual obligation. Exit is too easy online to drive 
development of mutual obligation or personal voice, and there will be scant acknowledgement of 
authority. 
Early results showed that the combination of face-to-face and online communication 
builds stronger community than either approach alone (Etzioni & Etzioni, 1999; Hampton & 
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Wellman, 2000). Community-related internet content emerged from non-profit, governmental, 
and commercial sources, but the technology did not build social capital or increase civic 
participation (Tonn, Zambrano & Moore, 2001). The internet makes it easy extend and maintain 
social connections (Howard, Rainie & Jones, 2001), especially to reach those “just out of reach” 
(Hampton & Wellman, 2001). Internet use does not decrease or increase attachment to place or 
civic involvement, but does increase communication and social interaction (Katz, Rice, & 
Aspden, 2001; Kavanaugh & Patterson, 2001; Stern, 2006).  
These things hold especially for the tech-savvy, who tend to be more involved (Howard, 
Rainie & Jones, 2001; Kavanaugh & Patterson, 2001; Stern, 2006). People with greater 
participation and more connections are more likely to use internet because they are better off, 
more educated, and younger (Nie, 2001; Stern, 2006). Those who are online the least and the 
most tend to be less involved and committed than those who balance online and face-to-face 
(Wellman, Haase, Witte & Hampton, 2001).  
“Explaining Internet behaviors entails understanding that the Internet is not a separate 
entity but instead a (potential) complement to ongoing activity” (Haythornthwaite, 2001, p. 379). 
In re-examination of the Internet paradox, any depressive effects seemed associated with initial 
frustrations and faded (Kraut, et al., 2002). LaRose, Eastin, and Gregg (2001) found that internet 
use could only be connected to depression via self-efficacy, but social support via e-mail reduced 
depression.  
The internet paradox does not address why people would, or would not, adopt internet, 
but the literature implies that the general purpose is to access information and communicate. It 
seems that sociability can suffer as one learns ICTs (information and communication 
technology), but also those who are pre-disposed to sociability use ICTs more than others. The 
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internet paradox literature doesn’t delve into economic issues but it is reasonable to presume this 
effect would hold for productive activities and work. Could it be that individual ICT impacts can 
be explained by factors similar to those of organizations? Based on the internet paradox 
literature, could it be said that flexible yet specialized persons with ability to invent, reasonable 
expectations, focused goals, and less need for formal structure would make the most of 
broadband. 
The internet has real potential to enhance productivity, conclude Litan and Rivlin (2001), 
but the greatest impacts may be in “old economy” industries due to changes in information 
flows. The internet creates many opportunities for efficiencies in various areas of business 
performance, adding 0.2 to 0.4 percent to the economy’s total output according the Litan and 
Rivlin. This estimate does not include the value of improved choice and convenience, which may 
be even more valuable than productivity gains and lower costs. 
Crandall, Jackson, and Singer (2003) estimate the consumer surplus, investment in 
broadband infrastructure, and broadband equipment production, but focus on employment and 
output for telecommunications providers. Crandall, Lehr, and Litan (2007) find that broadband 
contributes to employment in education, healthcare, financial services, and manufacturing. 
Pilat and Wolfl (2003) examine the impacts of ICT production and ICT (information and 
communication technology) use, as well as ICT diffusion. They delve into explanations for 
variation in national investment, factors that firms benefit from ICTs, and how ICTs impact 
performance. They find that ICT cost differentials, need for complementary investments, and 
regulations impede adoption. ICTs contribute to capital deepening as the replace labor, increase 
firm efficiency, and contribute to network effects. The ICT-producing sectors are strongly 
impacted by these contributions, and are well-positioned to overcome the impediments. Pilat and 
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Wolfl found relatively high productivity growth among ICT-using industries, particularly 
business services, finance and insurance, transportation, wholesale trades, and retail. 
Lehr, et al. (2005) begin their assessment by noting that broadband affords information 
productivity and innovation, complex, non-routine problem-solving, and more intensive use than 
dial-up. They also noted that literature on ICTs and productivity focuses on organizations while 
broadband policy has focused on residential. Flexible work arrangements, home-based 
businesses, higher quality labor force, and higher quality of life could contribute to the impacts 
of broadband at home. Their findings confirm the link between internet and economic 
development, but “[t]he positive impact on establishment growth was higher for larger 
establishments and for IT intensive sectors of the economy” (Lehr, et al., 2005, p. 22). 
Broadband boosts employment, productivity, property values and rents, but not wages. Places 
with broadband had more businesses per capita but relatively fewer small businesses. They leave 
open the question of whether these are short-term, transitory effects, or whether they can be 
sustained. They conclude that, “differences in economic outcomes are likely to depend more on 
how broadband is used than on its basic availability” (Lehr, et al., 2005, p. 24). 
In a cross-country analysis, Quang, Rossotto, and Kimura (2009) found that broadband 
impacts knowledge, productivity, and community competitiveness via various sectors. The 
technical qualities of broadband, including complementary products, are important to impacts. 
Quang, Rossotto, and Kimura maintain that the literature misses the importance of critical mass, 
confuses activities and applications with benefits, and has issues with bias and causality. Human 
capital as an “impact” of broadband—skill learning-by-doing, dynamic knowledge sharing, and 
attracting talent—transcends traditional institutions enabling collective innovation. Quang, 
Rossotto, and Kimura found impacts via efficiency and productivity and community 
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competitiveness, but emphasized that broadband is “general purpose technology that can 
fundamentally restructure the economy” (p. 39). They conclude by emphasizing the need for 
complementary investments:  
[Broadband’s] benefits are major and robust for both developed and 
developing countries, although the significance is higher for the former, 
which have a longer track record of broadband diffusion. … Realizing the 
benefits of broadband also requires development of new content, services, 
and applications, as well as increased human capacity to adopt the 
technology in economic activities. (p. 45) 
Katz (2009, 2010) also finds that broadband has positive economic impact, which 
increases with penetration. ICT investment is associated with broadband penetration, and with 
productivity and growth. Broadband is fostering an economic transition, Katz (2009) maintains, 
that is strengthening this relationship. “Economic impact varies by region indicating that 
broadband deployment needs to be carefully coordinated with economic development policies 
(training, firm relocation, etc.) to maximize impact” (Katz, 2010, p. 13). 
Applying my B-C-V (behaviors-connections-visions)/W7TH (how, that, what, when, 
where, who, why, whether, which) framework to the issue of ICT (information and 
communication technology) impacts begins with what it is that’s being impacted: Real freedoms. 
Human capabilities, as the ultimate ends—improvements in individuals’ liberty, prosperity, and 
wellness, provide a philosophically and practically sound basis for evaluating ICT impacts. The 
framework allows for multilevel analysis because it applies at all levels—individual/personal, 
organizational, and regional. The fundamentally different natures of the levels—cognitive 
constructor versus loops of learning versus triple helix—can be translated into real freedoms: 
personal fulfillment, organizational performance, and regional advantage.  The B-C-V/W7TH 
framework also allows adoption and related factors to be related to impacts. With the framework, 
199 
it is more practical to related changes in B-C-V related to (use of) ICTs to more general changes 
in B-C-V that indicate real freedoms. More fundamentally, this dissertation suggests that the 
difference in adoption and impacts of ICTs for individuals, organizations, and regions can be 
explained by the extent to which community input functions were applied to their situations. 
Broadband in Greenfield 
The most important thing to consider in regards to broadband in Greenfield is the 
individual, her or his interests, and how he or she is able to pursue them. Individuals putatively 
use broadband for personal, organizational, and regional purposes, and they think and act on 
broadband for those purposes. How does broadband impact individuals’ capabilities? What 
determines individuals’ adoption of—or just investment in—broadband? How does broadband 
relate to fundamental drives? The following describes what might occur, inferred from the 
empirical literature reviewed above. 
In Greenfield, the scion sees broadband as critical infrastructure and is connected to a 
foundation that can be focused on broadband. The visions of the scion and the foundation board 
members converge on broadband as a business attractor. And, it could be good for existing 
organizations, for improvements in business, education, healthcare, safety, etc. The board 
members and many of their peers have no real experience with internet technologies, though, so 
they can’t envision applications. They think in terms of computer-, mainframe-, or even paper-
based processes. How internet applications enable social interaction is not even a consideration. 
And, they do not see economic transformation necessarily as a good thing. They see broadband 
as an infrastructure game-changer. The game is industrial attraction.  
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For Major Telecom (MT), Greenfield Broadband (GB) is an odd thing. It’s not a game-
changer, but it’s definitely not a standard operation. The Greenfield Regional Foundation (GRF) 
put up the capital for the infrastructure (along with state and federal grants), and they cover the 
maintenance costs, too. Major Telecom pays the marketing and customer service costs, including 
provisioning service and tracking accounts. GB contracts much of the construction and 
maintenance to MT. The hybrid fiber and wi-fi network is not something that they—MT’s 
directors—are used to; they’ll bring in contractors to do the work. GB doesn’t compete with any 
of their existing offerings, and they feel they can convert GB customers to their customers when 
the time comes. They see it as project, and as a learning opportunity.  
So, who signs up for GB, what do they do with it, and why? In the first three months of 
GB’s operations, over 3,000 households and almost 700 organizations sign up. The strongest 
response by far (given their portion of the population) comes from young, well-educated 
families. When Greenfielders get broadband, they spend time online. For many of them, 
particularly those who have little or no exposure to the internet, much of this time is spent 
exploring—surfing the web—by searching for people and things of interest to them. GB 
(Greenfield Broadband) is used to supplement other media—particularly newspapers and TV 
(television), searching for information about artists, authors, recordings, shows, etc.—and 
telecommunications. Other uses include finding classmates, old friends, and, relatives; 
investigating hobbies; looking for cars, clothes, music, news, and jobs. Much of this is done 
alone, although about a quarter of Greenfielders’ time online involves communicating with other 
people. There is some social surfing, about 20% of time online, in family and social settings, 
particularly young people helping parents and elders to find particular information or use certain 
internet features. More experienced users do similar things, but tend to have more distributed and 
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extensive social networks so spend more time communicating with distant relations. They also 
tend to do more work online, more than do individuals with less internet experience, and spend 
more personal time working, due to easy and fast internet access.  
This level of adoption and use mirrors the results discussed in the literature. People use 
Greenfield Broadband (GB) to do what is meaningful to them, activities they enjoy, pursuing 
valued outcomes and fulfilling their commitments and responsibilities. This includes acquiring 
resources that are means to valued ends. Some may value GB intrinsically, as something to 
experiment with or explore, but even these people will use GB only provides some benefits. GB 
must directly or indirectly ameliorate fundamental human drives and motivations. It may be 
assumed that people are already responding to their innate drives as best they can. Even if GB or 
similar information and communication technologies (ICT) could greatly improve their efforts 
and increase capabilities, people are not going to significantly alter their B-C-V without high 
levels of certainty (information) about exactly how and how much things will improve. And, 
they have to be sure the cost or difficulty of using the technology is fully offset by the benefits of 
using it. The costs are not just for the technology, they are the sociocognitive expense—the 
attention, time, and relationships—required to benefit from the technology. What we seen in this 
scenario is that individuals generally don’t clearly see the personal benefits of GB. Indeed, they 
don’t what the benefits might be, or how to realize them.  
What about organizational use? Only a few companies sign up for GB right away. 
Slightly more non-profits do, but then unsubscribe after a couple months. Most public agencies 
sign up for GB, but only one location per agency. To better understand the organizations’ 
behavior one might conduct case studies, or just do interviews. The basic questions are: What 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) does the organization have? What does the 
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organization do with ICTs, who uses them, and how to they use and talk about the ICTs? Why do 
they have ICTs, and how do they make ICT decisions? Generally, what do Greenfield’s 
organizations know about ICTs? 
The organizations that sign up already have substantial technology resources, and mainly 
sign up to replace more expensive, slower internet access. Greenfield’s organizations, overall, 
have limited ICT-related capabilities. They have pockets of expertise. The experts are young, 
relatively well educated (associates or bachelors degrees) lower-level employees who report to 
older, less-educated managers, often to financial managers who see ICTs as an expense to be 
minimized. Greenfield region organizations use ICTs primarily for accounting. Some have ICTs 
for sales and order entry through account aging and collections, anything having to do with 
money. The larger private companies have more extensive ICT applications for controlling and 
designing. They use ICTs to create artistic/technical works or physically manufactured goods. 
ICTs are used heavily for administrative, clerical, marketing, and media purposes; all of which 
generate digital files. ICTs are also used extensively to control manufacturing machinery, 
although a relatively small number of organizations are in manufacturing (ten of the 700 
organizational GB (Greenfield Broadband) subscribers were manufacturers). Governmental and 
non-profit organizations, with generally less technology than their private counterparts, used it in 
much the same way, for accounting.  
Organizations with GB see an increase in e-mail and web surfing, but much of it is non-
productive and not work-related. Organizations in the Greenfield region only reallocate a few 
resources to ICTs due to GB. Their technology funding stays constant, and they do not 
significantly change what technology they are spending money on. The results at the 
organizational level can be explained as the results at the personal level: There is little 
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understanding of the potential benefits of GB or how to realize those benefits. So, there is little 
change in B-C-V at either level as a result of GB. 
By the time GB is built, a quarter of the residents of the Greenfield region have e-mail, a 
third of which is work e-mail. They are generally aware of online commerce and educational 
resources, and they know of internet searching. But, since Greenfield has had only dial up 
internet, few people have experienced these things. Over half the households have a computer, 
three quarters of which are over three years old. Twenty percent of workers use computers. Use 
varies greatly, but computers are used largely for documents and for e-mails. ICTs (information 
and communication technology) are used to capture and share information about what people do, 
have, and say. Few people in the region have thought about exactly what they might do with 
ICTs, and only a few business people have considered that ICTs might enable them to change 
how they operate and even what they do. 
The use of GB (Greenfield Broadband) in the first three months is almost totally 
personal. Individuals reallocate personal time to broadband. On average, GB subscribers spent 
10 hours per week online during their first three months, totaling over 1.5 million online hours. 
There is also an increase in personal computer ownership and ICT spending. GB subscribers 
spent an average of $450 online on hardware and software over the first three months. After the 
first three months, GB subscribers pay $45 per month for broadband, so in month four over one 
hundred thousand dollars a month flows out of Greenfield to Major Telecom. And, that’s just the 
beginning. Subscriptions rates follow the classic diffusion curve (Rogers, 2003) through the first 
18 months, leveling out at 60% subscription rate or about fifty-four thousand residential 
subscribers. At that point, GB is generating $2.4 million a month for Major Telecom. 
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GB subscribers also shifted much of their other spending online. The average Greenfield 
household spent $3,000 per month on non-durables. GB households spent $330 online on these 
goods, and spent more online in hobbies and travel than non-GB households. Over their first 
three months of GB service, initial subscribers spent nearly $2.5 million on non-durable goods. 
The same is true for subscribers’ time. Although they were physically in the region, the bulk of 
their time spent online involved extra-local activities and relations. Baseball, cats, diets, hiking, 
Hummel figurines, and minerals are just a few of the interest Greenfielders explore online. They 
also discover online gambling, gaming, and pornography. Subscribers gained competencies from 
using GB—learning to find, interpret, and share information. Unfortunately, those competencies 
do not do not have work value for most subscribers because they don’t use internet in their jobs. 
Fifty subscribers, half with strong technology backgrounds, reported using GB to find jobs 
outside the region and plan to leave Greenfield. Greenfielders just kept on doing what was 
important to them; GB simply eliminated the constraints of place.  
Subsequent subscribers exhibited similar behavior. At the end of 18 months, Greenfield 
citizens were spending over $17 million online per month, or some $216 million over a year and 
a half. Since very few organizations in the region had an online presence, effectively all of this 
money was spent outside the Greenfield region. Along with online purchases of computer 
hardware and software and spending on broadband, at the end of 18 months over $240 million 
has flowed out of Greenfield due to GB. With an average of 2 users per household spending 10 
hours per week online, Greenfielders spent nearly 4.6 million hours per month online, most on 
non-local topics.  
The effect is that individuals with GB spend less time with family and friends as they 
explore and learn the internet. Individuals don’t connect to local organizations online because 
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those organizations aren’t online. When individuals buy online, they buy from distant vendors. 
They pursue their interests by engaging distant others and finding information from distant 
resources. The result is a major shift in Greenfielders’ activities, assets, and attention away from 
and out of the region. They discover the possibilities to do and have new things, based on their 
prior knowledge, that were limited by availability of information and materials in the region. As 
their connections expand via the internet, so do Greenfielders’ visions.  
GB (Greenfield Broadband) resulted in a change in Greenfielders’ behaviors, 
connections, and visions, derived from their innate drives as persons, organizations, and a region. 
The simplest way to see this is by looking at how Greenfielders spend their time and money. 
With GB, they simply pursued pre-existing interests via new means. This took them out of the 
region, economically and socially if not physically. They found new possibilities based on their 
interests, possibilities that were more beneficial or desirable, or both, than possible activities and 
assets near Greenfield. GB users found new, non-local sources of information and material, and 
then they spent their money and time on/with these sources. Greenfielders found personal 
fulfillment via GB independent of their organizations and region. That’s about individuals; 
organizations were different.  
GB meant only incremental, at most, changes in organizational connections and visions. 
The changes in collective behavior did not extend much beyond subscribing to GB, and some, 
such as personal web surfing on company time, were not good for organizations’ purposes. 
Organizational vision saw the downside of broadband more clearly than the upside, and GB did 
not impact their information and materials. GB simply didn’t affect organizations’ capital and 
labor, their assets and activities. At the regional level, GB was an infrastructure enhancement, 
but a relatively small one in comparison to transportation, utilities, and other traditional 
206 
infrastructure. The B-C-V (behaviors-connections-visions) of regional institutions—as evidenced 
in businesses, churches, hospitals, schools—does not change, either. General interest in 
Greenfield as a business location increases due to GB, but no company opens or expands because 
of it. There is only minor improvement in regional advantage. So, individuals use GB to find 
fulfillment, and leave behind organizations and the region in the process, which also deprives 
others in the region of financial, human, and social capital. 
Individuals’ vision for GB (Greenfield Broadband) gained on the topside. Prior to GB 
Greenfielders didn’t know what was possible because internet functions were not practical 
without high-speed access. GB eliminated a bandwidth constraint, and it eliminated a place 
constraint on information. Increased availability of information enabled individual behavioral 
change. Organizations, in contrast, gained no information regarding the topside, about how 
internet technology might benefit them or about why, when, and under what circumstances the 
internet is desirable. 
The analysis here is the W7TH—how, that, what, when, where, who, why, whether, and 
which knowledge elements, or knoels—of individuals’ personal, organizational, and regional B-
C-V. GB subscribers saw major personal B-C-V change; as organizations, they did not. 
Organizations, with particular purposes, could not see the benefit—particularly vis-à-vis the 
costs—while persons’ diverse interests were better served by the technology. Early adopters 
faced low personal costs relative to organizations in both direct technology costs and soft costs 
of using GB. What appeared as a limiter to organizations—personal use of the internet—was a 
driver for individuals. Organizations’ structure—capital assets, division of labor, processes, 
etc.—did not change as a result of GB. At the regional level GB entailed an objective physical 
change in infrastructure assets but no concomitant change in institutions. GB did not impact the 
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region’s rules, roles, or resources; at least, not in a directly observable manner. Regional leaders 
sought to attract business investment and create jobs, but GB ended up enabling reallocation of 
personal money and time to things outside the region. Essentially, GB functioned as a sump 
pump, pulling personal financial and social capital out of Greenfield. 
The dependent variable that I posit is capabilities as evident in liberty, prosperity, and 
wellness. In the absence of community-learning, how did GB impact Greenfielder’s capabilities? 
It was most useful for the relatively young, affluent, and well educated residents of Greenfield. 
GB increased ability to associate with others, access to information, and opportunity for self-
expression. There was some concern about privacy and government surveillance, but not enough 
to stop people who want to be online. Those who wanted to be online saw some boost in 
prosperity, too, either from purchasing something at lower cost, reducing commuting and other 
work expenses, or finding a better job. GB users gained some competencies with internet 
technologies and communications, which were useful in finding a job in a few cases. Wellness 
was a wash because some people did find useful diet, exercise, or other health information but 
GB users also increased sedentary activities. Most of this happened at the personal level. 
Clearly, this scenario is not what was intended by “if you build it, they will come.” Of 
course, this is not an account of actual events; it is a consideration of what might happen if a 
region were to suddenly get broadband. The point of this illustration is that it’s not what you 
have (or say) that matters; it’s what you do. And, community is the means by which we discover 
what to do, as a person, an organization member, and a region resident. The “build it and they 
will come” metaphor that guided Greenfield Broadband (GB) does not consider this. 
Consequently, there were few and weak community-input functions within the region, linking 
individuals to each other and to regional organizations. There was limited learning, few real 
208 
gains in capabilities or improvements in real freedoms, and those were realized by going outside 
the region. Those who instigated GB so fully internalized the “build it and they will come” 
metaphor into their vision that they were not fully conscious of it. They had no cause (model or 
stimulus) to question the metaphoric assumption or its implications.  
Essentially, what occurred at the personal and organizational level also occurred at the 
regional level: institutions used GB to keep doing what they were already doing rather than as a 
way to do new things, let alone to accomplish new ends. This is what existing theory would 
predict, and an extension of what has been found in empirical literature. But, because of the gaps 
between single-level theories of learning, and because of academic and practical difficulties of 
studying multilevel phenomena, there are scant means to predict what might happen if learning 
were to be aligned across and between levels. I maintain that the phenomenon that enables the 
structural changes necessary for substantive learning is community, or the emergence of 
community via iterated sequences of identification, integration, and differentiation. 
In scenario two, below, I consider what might occur if those involved intentionally build 
community and facilitate substantive learning across levels. As with scenario one, the second 
scenario is an illustration of my propositions that is purely fictional and involves some unlikely 
occurrences. Where the first scenario acts as the “control group” for my thought experiment—in 
which there is an absence of community-learning—the second scenario is an illustration what 
might occur with community-learning. In the first scenario, the roles and actions of the tractor 
industry scion, Greenfield Regional Foundations, and Major Telecom as instigators require some 
suspension of disbelief. But, once one accepts how the scenario was instigated, the results are 
quite reasonable, albeit totally fictional. Similar is true of scenario two: The premise might be 
209 
dubious, but the results, given the premise, have verisimilitude. First, though, let us consider how 
scholars might research GB in this first scenario. 
Researching Scenario One 
Above, I discuss scenario one, in which Greenfield gets broadband with no community-
building, omnisciently. If this were a real research project, the information I provide would have 
to be gathered and analyzed by researchers. So, let’s say this is the case: In scenario one, a team 
of university researchers studies the impacts of GB (Greenfield Broadband). How would they do 
this? First, they would have to define what they are researching, their variables. Clearly, one set 
of variables relate to GB. Let’s say the researchers are interested in signing up for and using GB. 
Going from the literature, we can see this as a dependent variable—what factors determine 
whether one subscribes to GB and/or how much one uses it—or as an independent variable—
what are the effects of subscribing to and/or using GB.  
Whether researchers are interested in effects or factors, it will be necessary for them to 
specify whether the effects/factors of interest are economic, organizational, psychological, 
sociological, etc. Of course, this may be implicit in the researchers’ academic disciplines, or they 
may opt to study effects/factors at multiple levels. The former situation is pervasive in the 
literature, so let’s just say that the researchers for scenario one are interested in effects. This 
implies that GB is the independent variable. Researchers must further specify whether this is 
simply subscribing to GB, or whether it’s amount of time spent on GB and/or for what purposes. 
And, they must specify the unit or level of analysis: individual, household, firm, etc.  
The researchers are looking at both households and organizations. So, the researchers are 
essentially asking, “what is the impact of GB on households and organizations?” To answer this 
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question, researchers cannot simply compare non-subscribers to subscribers because it could 
very well be that these two groups are systematically different. Instead, researchers would need 
to observe households and organizations prior to GB and after subscribing to GB (ideally at 
multiple intervals since, based on theory, effects are expected to lag treatment). The researchers 
also need to control for systematic differences between subscribers and non-subscribers—i.e., 
effects are not due to GB, per se, but to other factors that cause the subjects to take up the 
service. The simplest way to address this is to ignore it, and to look only at GB subscribers, but it 
requires a set of assumptions that may be difficult to explain let alone justify. It also requires 
ante facto knowledge of who will and will not subscribe. 
For scenario one, researchers can address these issues by selecting a random cohort of 
households and organizations to study. There are several issues here. First, the researchers must 
know well in advance about plans for GB. Second, presuming they must have a reasonably 
complete list of households and organizations, the researchers must make sure that there is not a 
systematic non-participation bias. For example, households of low socioeconomic status and 
struggling organizations may be highly unlikely to participate. The researchers in this thought 
experiment deal with this by oversampling households and organizations with characteristics 
might cause them to not participate. The researchers also work to make sure their cohort reflects 
Greenfield’s population in important ways, particularly demographics and line of business. 
The researchers also need to define exactly what they are measuring. For the ultimate 
dependent variable, they focus on income—earnings for households and revenue for 
organizations—as an indicator of capabilities. They then use a simple model of household and 
organization operations to develop independent and intervening variables. The model consists of 
acquiring resources, processing those resources, and generating income. The researchers use 
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qualitative methods (interview) to create case studies for randomly selected members of the 
cohort to describe them prior to adopting GB. They also use these case studies, along with 
relevant literature, to create metrics, which they measure via survey to produce quantitative data 
nine months after subjects subscribe to GB and then again after the free subscription runs out at 
the end of eighteen months. Essentially, the surveys ask how much household/organization 
members spend on GB and other ICTs (information and communication technology), how the 
technologies are used, and what impact that usage has on the costs or income related to those 
tasks. And, along with the surveys, researchers conduct follow-up interviews to more fully 
describe the uses and impacts. This is a pretty standard, and expensive, approach, which is 
academically valid but has limited practical value (see, for example, Borgida, et al. (2002) and 
Youtie, Shapira & Laudeman (2007)). 
Higher Education 
The second scenario for Greenfield Broadband (GB) is even more hypothetical than the 
first. Scenario two doesn’t just involve a region just deploying its own broadband—which is not 
too unusual, although the rapidity and means of deployment in scenario one are unprecedented—
it also involves universities partnering to supporting a learning process in conjunction with this 
deployment. Universities offer classes about business and technology relevant to a broadband 
project, and professors conduct research into the impacts of technology. But, it is admittedly 
unlikely that three universities would work together to support a regional broadband project, 
especially without funding. Regardless of the unlikelihood of such an occurrence, I maintain that 
the resulting events are quite reasonable. Indeed, I am suggesting that a different approach by 
universities might have huge positive effects. The next subsection substantiates both the need for 
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and possibilities of innovation by universities. Having said that, I should restate that the 
scenarios I present here are entirely fictional meant to illustrate the theory I propose in this study, 
to suggest how my conceptual framework can help explain learning across social levels. 
An Impending Crisis?  
Many universities are facing financial problems, with a shrinking portion of escalating 
costs going to classroom instruction, especially at research universities, tuition rising faster than 
incomes, and a growing gap between elite universities and those that serve the majority of 
students (Vedder, 2010). State budget shortfalls are squeezing public universities (Colindres, 
2009; Boehnke, 2010)—but private universities are also feeling the pinch (Jan, 2010)—even 
“revenue generating” program such as athletics are being squeezed (Humphreys, 2010). For-
profit universities are being criticized for their business practices and results (Lewis, 2007; 
Marklein, 2010). While college enrollment is at an all-time high (Rampell, 2010), the degree 
completion rates are too low and time to completion too long (Bound, Lovenheim, & Turner, 
2007; Lumina Foundation, 2010).  
A number of commentators see deeper issues with higher education. At a recent 
UNESCO world conference on higher education a researcher suggested that we are in the midst 
of “an almost unprecedented revolution in higher education—not just small changes around the 
edges, but fundamental changes” (Redden, 2009, paragraph 3). Others see more than change, 
they see calamity: a higher education “bubble bursting” (Barone, 2010), going extinct (Sines, 
2009; Lipton, 2010), melting down (Godin, 2010), or just becoming irrelevant (Hanson, 2008). 
None other than Bill Gates of Microsoft predicts that the technologies will make place-based 
colleges good for little more than parties (Young, 2010). 
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While finances are a factor, these observers see other root causes. Technology could 
increase access and quality. Instead, costs are rising as educational technology leaps ahead and 
quality is slipping as more people enter higher education (Barone, 2010; Redden, 2009; Vedder, 
2010). College experiences in and out of the classroom bear less and less resemblance to 
students’ life experiences (Hanson, 2008), and college degrees fail to keep pace with the 
evolving needs of employers (Schwartz, 2006), while academic disciplines are increasingly 
fragmented and disconnected from each other (Hollingsworth, 1986; Rowland, 2002; Weislogel, 
2008). Best selling author and internet marketing expert Seth Godin, enumerates what he sees as 
the core problems: 
1. Most colleges are organized to give an average education to average students. ... They 
are mass marketers ... emphasizing mass and sameness and rankings. 
2. College has gotten expensive far faster than wages have gone up. ... As a result, there 
are millions of people in very serious debt. 
3. The definition of ‘best’ is under siege ... The more applicants [universities] reject, the 
higher they rank 
4. The correlation between a typical college degree and success is suspect. 
5. Accreditation isn't the solution, it’s the problem ... uniform accreditation programs 
that have pushed high-cost, low-reward policies on institutions and rewarded schools 
that churn out young wanna-be professors instead of experiences that turn out leaders 
and problem-solvers. (2010, paragraphs 3 - 13) 
The functions and functioning of higher education is a regular blog topic for Rich 
DeMillo (2009), Distinguished Professor of Computing and Management at Georgia Tech, 
former Dean of the Georgia Tech College of Computing, and technology entrepreneur and 
executive. He maintains that:  
There are no statistical control charts for higher education, and models borrowed from 
manufacturing and social science are leading college administrators seriously astray.  The 
real disruptors are MIT’s Open Courseware, peer-to-peer tutoring ... , social networking 
sites like Atlanta’s OpenStudy.com, and online exchanges. These are the worlds that are 
colliding, and if they do, the next economic bubble to burst will be American higher 
education. (2009, paragraph 9) 
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DeMillo (2010a) sees the ephemeralization of higher education—disassociating the learning 
content from the physical place and experience—as inevitable and desirable, at least for the first 
couple years of general education requirements. He derides the majority of universities for not 
doing a better job of graduating researchers to fuel America’s innovation engine (DeMillo, 
2010b). Most traditional universities cannot—but must—face the possibility of their extinction, 
maintains another Georgia Tech professor, Dick Lipton (2010), and fundamentally change their 
functions, focusing on what they can do better than non-traditional universities: advanced 
degrees, innovation, and research. Lipton, too, echoes Gates (Young, 2010) when he notes the 
traditional universities may be better at networking and socializing student, but not at basic 
education. 
Economic historian and director of the Center for College Affordability and Productivity 
at Ohio University, Richard Vetter (2010) notes that, “[b]ig change is being resisted at all costs” 
and dismisses talk about “the 3 ‘A’s”—access, affordability, and accountability—as “rhetorical 
flourishes” (paragraphs 11-12). Instead, he calls for more “attention to the three ‘I’s—
information, incentives, and innovation” (paragraph 12). Universities have far too little 
information about their performance, he insists, pointing out that “[f]or a sector that worships 
research, the amount of money devoted to R and D towards improving higher education 
performance is pathetic” (paragraph 12). Vetter calls for incentives to be aligned with goals, 
rewarding professors who teach a lot and well, administrators who streamline operations, 
development that doesn’t compromise principles for funding, and universities that admit students 
rather than turn them away. Increased information and realigned incentives will result in better 
and more innovations, according to Vetter. 
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The Innovation Imperative 
Many in and out of academia see the fundamental, structural issues facing higher 
education. The general solution is innovation: a profoundly new and radically different approach, 
or the process transforming knowledge into improved or new products and services. Higher 
education needs innovation even as universities are seen as critical to innovation. In a knowledge 
economy innovation is the economic imperative, and society is the overall beneficiary of the 
imperative. Unfortunately, many are left out of the knowledge society (David & Foray, 2002), 
and many are displaced by transition to a knowledge-based economy, particularly those with less 
education and fewer skills (OECD, 1996; Powell & Snellman, 2004). Thus, universities have 
roles as a consumers, generators, and supporters of innovation. 
Innovations, as things, evolve via variation and selection in their environments, Nelson 
and Winter (1977) tell us. “Most innovations … especially the successful ones, result from a 
conscious, purposeful search for innovation opportunities,” Drucker (1985, pg. 5) maintains. 
Innovations do not necessarily come from producers, points out von Hippel (1988), they can 
come from those who use the innovation or those who supply components, as well as those who 
manufacturer the innovation. Not only is innovation a distributed process, it often involves 
informal know-how trading between firms, even competitors (von Hippel, 1988). Inter-firm 
networks—which can be seen as an alternative to hierarchies and markets—are essential to 
producing and capitalizing on innovations, particularly during periods of rapid growth; 
domination by a single large organization can impede innovation (Freeman, 1991). Abernathy 
and Clark (1985) look at innovation as a contingent and evolving process, based upon interplay 
between competitors and their customers in the market place.  
216 
The ability of an organization to recognize a useful innovation and incorporate it into 
practices or processes depends on prior collective knowledge, according to Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990):  
[P]rior knowledge includes basic skills or even a shared language but may also include 
knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological developments in a given field. 
… [It] confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and 
apply it to commercial ends. These abilities collectively constitute what we call a firm’s 
“absorptive capacity.” (pg. 128) 
Optimal absorptive capacity requires a balance between diverse, specialized knowledge 
unique to individuals and generalized knowledge common to all. Failure to invest absorptive 
capacity early and continually, say Cohen and Levinthal (1990), can result in “lock-out” from 
particular technology, intentional ignorance of “not invented here” new technologies, and self-
reinforcing reactive innovation and under-investment in knowledge. It can be nearly impossible 
to explore new markets and technologies while exploiting existing ones (March, 1991). 
Innovation depends on “a set of institutions that will allocate resources appropriately over 
a wide range of circumstances and time” (Nelson & Winter, 1977, pg. 40), and “underlying 
technologies, the nature of the demands for the goods and services, and the characteristics of the 
organizations supplying them” (pg. 41). Chapter 1 of this dissertation features a review of 
literature on learning regions (Florida, 1995), the concept of innovation as interactive learning 
(Morgan, 1997; Cooke, 2002), and the triple helix metaphor (Etzkotwitz & Leydesdorff, 1997; 
Etzkowitz, 2008). Place is important to innovation because it allows for dense, intense, and 
supportive interaction across sectors (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Porter, 2003; Asheim, 2003; Breznitz 
& Taylor, 2010).  
217 
Universities can interpret the innovation imperative in two ways. The most explicit 
interpretation is that regions and organizations need higher education to meet this imperative. 
Individual firms or small clusters of firms can innovate, but it simply isn’t practical for a region 
to support innovation across multiple firms without a university. The second interpretation is that 
universities need their regional neighbors in order to innovation. Universities need to learn from 
and with other strands of the triple helix at least as others need universities’ resources. Indeed, a 
primary driver of universities’ need to innovate is the need of governments and industries (and, 
individuals) for innovation support.  
Table 4 Approaches to Fostering Innovation 
Open Innovation 
(Chesborough, 2006) 
Strategic Innovation 
(Christensen, 1997/2006) 
• External ideas and means to market 
• Entrepreneurs and outsourcing 
o “Laboratories” 
• Internal venture capital 
o Intellectual capital as well as 
financial 
• Mobility and knowledge markets 
• New customers and new 
technologies 
o Starting at the “bottom” of the 
market 
• Learning and “theory testing” 
• Internal start-up 
• Different people, policies, processes, 
purposes, etc. 
  
Organizing to innovate. Two complementary approaches to fostering innovation emerged 
out of, and explicate, the concepts and issues discussed above (see table 4, above). The first 
approach, introduced by Christensen’s The Innovator’s Dilemma (1997/2006), is to explore 
disruptive innovations by methodically testing new business models to deliver new value to new 
customers in new ways, and is referred to as “strategic innovation” (Govindarajan & Trimble, 
2005). The innovator’s dilemma is basically the problem identified by March (1991) of 
exploitation and exploration being mutually exclusive. Christensen (1997/2006) details why this 
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is true even—especially—for well-managed organizations: exploiting and exploring are different 
competencies. Technologies can develop faster than markets, and keeping close to customer can 
cause organizations to miss innovation opportunities. Similarly, competence at delivering 
incremental innovations can blind organizations to disruptive innovations.  
Christensen (1997/2006) maintains that firms are embedded in “value networks” that 
parallel market architect—who supplies what components to whom to create value—and 
constrain capabilities to develop technologies, tolerate failure, produce goods, and make money. 
Disruptive technologies are antithetical to existing value networks, even to the point of 
threatening existing power relations. They involve wholly different value networks in providing 
simple and inexpensive means of achieving valued outcomes that are difficult and expensive 
with existing products. More fundamentally, the information required by firms to make 
reasonable decisions about disruptive innovations simply does not exist, particularly in existing 
value networks. For these reasons strategic innovation necessarily involves creating a separate, 
independent, and fully resourced unit. 
Govindarajan and Trimble (2005) discuss “CoreCo” and “NewCo,” with the former being 
the existing company and the latter created to explore some disruptive innovation. They suggest 
that NewCo must simultaneously “forget” CoreCo’s practices, processes, and even values, 
“borrow” CoreCo’s expertise, supply chain, etc., and learn about the new technology/customer 
set. This is a difficult proposition, to say the least, but will give NewCo a competitive advantage 
over its competitors. CoreCo provides scaffolding for NewCo’s network, providing a base of 
prior knowledge to draw on but also the opportunity to develop new knowledge via acquisition, 
experience, and observation. Kim and Mauborgne (2005) maintain that the fundamental goal is 
creation of new, unique benefits for consumers at a low cost; they call this “value innovation.” 
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The key, they maintain is “fair process,” including engaging stakeholders in decision-making, 
explaining the situation fully, including financial and operational issues, and being clear about 
what stakeholders can expect to result (and actually following through on those expectations). 
Such process allows strategic innovation by existing or start-up firms. Govindarajan and Trimble 
(2005) suggest “theory-focus planning,” which involves developing hypothetical propositions 
about how the new business works then methodically testing those propositions, as the 
fundamental practice of strategic innovation. Indeed, the very purpose of NewCo is to provide a 
laboratory for conducting such tests. Note that fair process and theory-focused planning are 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
The second approach to fostering innovation is open innovation. “Open Innovation 
means,” Chesbrough (2006, pg. 43) tells us, “that valuable ideas can come from inside or outside 
the company and can go to market from inside or outside the company as well” (pg. 43). This 
seems so apparent and simple, particularly in light of the literature discussed above, but it is a 
remarkable break with previous “closed” practices. The key to achieving open innovation, 
according to Chesbourgh (2006), is to practice R&D as knowledge connection rather than 
knowledge creation, particularly by learning from customers but also by contributing to erstwhile 
competitors. Another aspect of open innovation is fully engaging internal personnel in the 
innovation process via intrapreneurship, shop floor innovation, and participative management 
(Pinchot, 1986; Nonaka, 1998; Ichniowski, et al., 2000). 
Generally, open innovation is enabled by the Internet and related technologies. These 
technologies make it nearly costless to involve almost anyone in producing knowledge, to do so 
in an ad hoc, highly flexible and responsive manner, and to do so from most anywhere, or 
everywhere (Shirky, 2008; Godin, 2008; Friedman, 2005). The organizational model for open 
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innovation is not new (see, for examples, Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006), but it can now be done 
on a much larger scale (see, for examples, Friedman, 2005, and Tapscott & Williams, 2006). 
Tapscott and Williams (2006) suggest that open innovation enabled by the internet is forming the 
basis for a new, networked economic structure based on collaboration and cooperation rather 
than competition. The hallmark is providing critical data to which anyone might add value—as 
they see it—along with a means and rationale for doing so (e.g., software tools and monetary 
rewards). Gladwell (2002), Brafman and Beckstrom (2006), and Godin (2008) all discuss the 
dynamics of highly open, idea-oriented organizations. Essentially, this involves empowering 
others to act together based on a reasonably simple set of practices and principles, and providing 
a “court of last option” for resolving disputes.  
Universities can capitalize on open innovation and strategic innovation (summarized in 
table 1) by evolving from their origins as knowledge warehouses, through functioning as 
knowledge factories, to acting as knowledge hubs (Youtie & Shapira, 2008). The literature 
reviewed above suggests that universities could foster innovation by building knowledge-based 
communities (Lave & Wegner, 1991; Voosen & Conneely, 2005) of individuals and 
organizations to flexibly build on unique local ordinary knowledge by connecting it to global 
specialized knowledge. Open innovation and strategic innovation provide approaches for 
developing such a community-based approach to innovation.  
In terms of the B-C-V (behaviors-connections-visions)/W7TH (how, that, what, when, 
where, who, why, whether, which) framework, higher education is a situation in which the B-C-
V of students, faculty, and administration are complementary but misaligned. The expressed 
vision is scholarship in support of democracy and freedom, but the enacted connections are for 
fun, standing, and power. These functions are not particularly valuable outside higher education. 
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Thus there are internal and external inconsistencies with higher education, and the underlying 
elements are set up to maintain if not increase those inconsistencies. The fundamental issue 
seems to be that higher education is simply too closed and inflexible. The risk is that it will 
become less useful as an institution and will wither in relevance. The solution—greater openness 
and responsiveness—can be seen in open and strategic innovation, but comes from community. 
In spite much rhetoric to the contrary, universities are networks and organizations, but not 
communities to the extent that each is pursuing her or his own interests but not the collective, 
long-term interests of the institution. In other words, higher education has a lot to learn if it is 
going to thrive in the 21st century. 
Thought Experiment: Linking Broadband and Higher Education 
Now I will suggest what might happen in and around the fictitious city of Greenfield, 
Georgia, if universities were involved as facilitators of community-learning about broadband. 
Imagine that early in this scenario, the scion of the Greenfield Regional Foundation (GRF) 
attends a conference on innovation and higher education, and listens to a panel of universities in 
the southeast. Three of the six panelists happen to be from major universities in metropolitan 
areas about an hour and a half drive from Greenfield. The panelists are discussing knowledge 
networks and learning communities as means to foster innovation, and how universities can 
capitalize on this. At the end of the discussion, the scion stands up and asks, “We’re building a 
regional broadband network. Could your universities create learning communities to help us 
make the most of it? How might it help your universities to help us?” 
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The Identification Function 
The scion’s question illustrates the identification function. The scion recognizes a 
potential support mechanism for her region. The panelists, all tenured chairs or directors, 
recognize an opportunity. They and their colleagues need to do research, and prefer to teach 
small, high-level classes. The value of the opportunity to the panelists depends on how 
Greenfield Broadband (GB) aligns with their objectives—tactical, as much as strategic—whether 
there is financial support and the universities competitive stances. The panelists envision positive 
valence from connection to the scion, and their competitive connections to each other do not 
allow them to capitulate. Thus, their behavior is to jointly solicit more information from the 
scion.  
The Greenfield Regional Foundation (GRF) has just committed the seed funding for the 
broadband network, regional institutions and organizations are being enlisted, and GRF is 
looking for a private partner—the easiest option seems to be basically just contracting with 
Major Telecom to build and run the network. But, the foundation board members realize that 
there are various non-traditional ways to deploy broadband. GRF is looking for approaches that 
will have maximum impact. Does this connection change the behavior (and vision) of the 
universities? It depends on the amounts and types of information and materials that flow from 
GRF to the universities, and vice versa. This flow might consist of prestige and research funding 
for the individuals. If they see those resources as adequate for their purposes and appropriate to 
their institutions, then they have fully identified with GRF and the scion.  
The strength of the identification function is seen in how behavior changes, implying 
changes in connections and visions. The valence of connections and the clarity and strength of 
vision are evident in behavior. For this scenario, imagine that the universities agree to contribute 
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a professor for 18 weeks over two years and two part-time student assistants for 24 months. The 
foundation agrees to buy out one course per semester for each professor, cover travel costs, and 
provide facilities and materials for the collaborators. The universities propose to create inclusive, 
open, peer-based learning communities, focused on getting maximum benefits from broadband. 
They initially concentrate on sector-based communities of interest, but agree to help with 
whatever focus the participants decide on. There are GB-specific (Greenfield Broadband) 
learning opportunities with face-to-face discussions about operational and strategic issues, as 
well as about broadband technology. The learning communities are supported by a social media 
system that allows participants to stay connected and coordinate between meetings. The GRF 
(Greenfield Regional Foundation) commits to engage regional players, and to work with the 
universities to seek support from state and federal governments, foundations, and corporations, 
particularly ICT companies. With these roles identified, the GRF and universities begin 
integrating around GB.  
The Integration Function 
The integration function occurs as agents attend to models and respond to stimuli by 
practicing. In this hypothetical scenario, the professors, scion, and GRF board and staff meet, 
identify techniques for tapping local ordinary knowledge and connecting it with global expertise, 
and develop “best practices” for participants. The scion encourages the universities to look at this 
as innovation in higher education, partly because she sees the need this as a need for GB, and 
partly because she recognizes the professors’ needs for research and the students’ needs for real 
world education. The professors, scion, GRF board members, and others (the GB “partners”) 
agree to approach GB development as a regional learning process rather than a regional 
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broadband planning process. This means they focus on discovery what can be done with 
broadband rather than on building a network or providing internet service. Broadband is 
approached as a means to an end, rather than an end in and of itself. The end is to increase 
human capabilities, and the goal is to learn. 
One of the first learning communities focuses on building a regional broadband network. 
Composed of diverse stakeholders, this team looks at numerous other technology projects, not 
just broadband projects, as models. It subdivides into teams focused on technical, operational, 
and financial aspects of the effort. All the sub-teams come back together in a public session to 
present the options. The consensus is to create a cooperatively owned “wholesale” fiber and 
wireless (not just wi-fi) network, with entrepreneurial “retailers” selling broadband services. The 
universities will get bandwidth and facilities for research projects. Technology companies large 
and small will be recruited as partners. The areas (neighborhoods) of the region that demonstrate 
the most demand and ability to use broadband will get service first. They decide to organize the 
co-op around technical, operational, and financial teams, connected by a strategy team with 
members from the other teams. One of GRF’s (Greenfield Regional Foundation) first actions is 
to hire persons to lead each of these teams. 
The GB (Greenfield Broadband) partners (GRF, GB team leaders, and university 
personnel) decide to instigate customer teams for business & industry, government, and non-
profit organizations, and they develop workshops on how to set up neighborhood tech teams. 
Each of these teams starts with discussions of participants’ strengths and goals. From this the 
partners identify experts and resources aligned with team members’ interests. The partners 
encourage the teams to identify problems to solve or projects to undertake using ICTs. So, for 
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example, the business & industry team decided to “consult” with one of the members—a 
manufacturer—as they choose and implement an enterprise resource-planning (ERP) system.  
The neighborhood tech teams are organized via social marketing: People are asked to 
host meetings with friends in their homes, churches, bars, etc., to talk about what broadband is 
and what it could do for them. What is it that citizens might do with broadband? They say: 
searching, shopping, and socializing. People say they wanted to improve their educations, but it 
becomes clear that they really want is to increase household income, do meaningful work, and 
have plenty of leisure time.  
These views cause some concern among the other teams as they realized they do not have 
online content and services to meet people’s needs. The other teams realize they need people to 
use broadband as citizens, consumers, employees, etc. They also realize that members of the 
neighborhood tech teams are associates, friends, relatives, etc. And, as persons, members of the 
business & industry, government, and social services teams share the interests of the 
neighborhood tech teams’ members. In other words, the sector team members identify with the 
neighborhood tech teams members.  
Between the input from the neighborhood tech teams and the ideas from expert 
connections, the sector teams realize they have to figure out how to create meaningful, useful 
content for individuals. The sector teams take their goals to GB partners, with detailed requests 
for knowledge. They need to know how to interact with citizens, customers, employees, etc., 
online. They need to know what hardware, software, support, and training their organizations 
would need. They need to know how to finance all of this and generate revenue from it, or at 
least save some other costs. The sector teams develop shared visions—along with connections 
and behaviors—based not so much what they know as what they need to know. In the process 
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they become integrated, which is a direct result of identifying with the neighborhood tech team 
members. 
The Differentiation Function 
This is the point at which differentiation hypothetically begins. The actors fall into roles 
that allow them to make unique and valuable contributions to the effort. This function, more than 
the others, serves innate drives. Differentiation provides maximum capabilities gain. 
Identification and integration functions don’t cease. Differentiation is layered on them, and they 
are focused and specified. The sector teams, for example, set up formal positions to help team 
members and their customers use ICTs. The learning communities begin to formalize around 
particular purposes, which align with their formal organizational roles. The GB teams sets up 
standardized finance, operations, and tech roles to lead development of GB. Some neighborhood 
tech teams get lots of participants pre-subscribed to GB. Others get more motivated and 
organized as GB is deployed to the neighborhoods with the strongest teams. 
Differentiation doesn’t just serve the needs of the differentiated individuals, as they are 
helping or serving others. The citizens of Greenfield, clients, customers, patients, students, etc., 
benefit from differentiation. It improves organizational performance via division of labor, 
increases personal fulfillment, and contributes to regional advantage. Differentiation is the 
hallmark of strong community. Each community input function results in increased capabilities, 
but differentiation is a big leap in drive satisfaction and real freedoms. The individuals that step 
into the various roles on each team benefit socially and psychically, if not financially, from their 
work, and their work benefits others. They help the region get and use broadband and other 
ICTs. 
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Each team is differentiated by its focus and actions. The education-sector team focuses on 
success in the classroom, finding curricula, content, and assessment tools. They are also 
concerned about engaging parents and getting technology in the hands of all kids. The major 
issue for the healthcare sector team is access to and integration of clinical information systems. 
Physicians and other professionals are interested in practice management software. They are 
aware of the burgeoning and sometimes dubious health information available online, but are 
unsure how to deal with this information, let alone capitalize on it. The government team is 
primarily focused on geographic information systems (GIS) and fleet management, along with 
some interest in citizen services and “digital democracy.” The safety & security team is 
concerned with similar issues, but one of their major goals was to get data connections to 
ambulances, fire trucks, and police cruisers. They also promote surveillance technologies. The 
business & industry team has numerous committees with specific interests—asset management, 
computer-aided design, content management, customer relationship management, inventory 
management, etc.—and sub-sectors. The cross-cutting interest for all teams is personnel. Where 
are they going to find the employees with the capabilities needed to deploy and use these 
technologies? And, the teams are all concerned about paying for the technology. 
Creation of the teams depends on identification, and collective capacity is precipitated via 
integration. Differentiation enables the teams to be successful, as individuals step up and, in their 
individual ways, take action toward teams’ purposes. The resources associated with each role 
draws in persons and organizations that need the resources. Rules define how to access and 
disburse those resources. Identification and integration set the stage for differentiation to emerge 
from practice via feedback and reflection. Knowledge about practices, criteria for those 
practices, and means for feedback and reflection are implicit in each team’s focus and purpose—
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its whether, which, and why. There is tacit knowledge flowing through the teams about how to 
use technology and avoid technological pitfalls, as well as explicit knowledge about the 
technology. Each community input function involves explicit knowledge about the teams—who 
are the people, what are the purposes, and how do they operate—as well as tacit knowledge 
about the teams. Each team has different behaviors, connections, and visions, which are affected 
differently by each community input function.  
The Impact of Community-Learning on Broadband Adoption and Use 
So what are adoption and use of GB (Greenfield Broadband) like in this scenario? 
Quantitatively, adoption is similar to scenario one, but it is qualitatively different. The rate of 
adoption, for instance, is really the rate of deployment because in this scenario GB is deployed in 
response to clear demand. By the time GB construction begins, over half of the residents have 
signed up through their neighborhood tech teams. The measured deployment rate was a cost 
containment and quality assurance tactic by GB rather than a response to growing demand. The 
approach was adopted based on researching successful ICT (information and communication 
technology) projects, and because the partners approached GB as a learning process rather than 
just a network deployment project. 
Use is also qualitatively different. More time online is spent with others in this scenario 
than in the first because the teams worked together to create social learning opportunities. The 
GB strategic team wanted customer insights and early subscriptions. The sector teams wanted to 
make sure Greenfielders are engaged as customers, employees, etc. And, the neighborhood tech 
teams wanted Greenfielders to connect via GB because they get a variety of rewards for drawing 
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in subscribers. So, numerous stakeholders are aligned—have similar behaviors, connections, and 
visions—around Greenfielders getting and benefiting from GB. 
The differences between the first scenario and the second are largest at the organizational 
level. With the support of the university personnel, organizations around the Greenfield region 
invested aggressively in ICTs (information and communication technology) because they learned 
what ICTs could do for them. Through the learning process, organizational leaders saw the need 
to proactively deploy online content and services, and to develop their organizations’ 
technological capabilities. The teams offered a wide range of opportunities to gain hands-on 
experience with or learn the details of a solution, system, technology, etc. They provided a 
highly supportive environment in which different organizations learned together about common 
applications. Possibly most important, the teams developed a way to finance ICT investment, 
including software, training, web sites, etc. All of this happened as and before GB was deployed, 
with assistance from the university partners and technology companies. So, by the time GB was 
available, many companies were already digitizing their processes and developing online 
systems for interacting with customers, employees, and suppliers. Some of this work was sector-
focused, such as using GB to improve communications for emergency personnel. Other efforts, 
such as “Business Basics” training for any person who might use computers at work, were broad-
based. The teams spun up groups for techies and for executives to sharpen relevant abilities. 
Over one thousand organizations signed up for GB in its first month. On average, within 
a month (after or before) signing up, commercial subscribers increased ICT spending by $2,000, 
and more than half of that was spent with local companies, representing a $1 million dollar boost 
for the local tech economy. Over the 18 months of the initial GB period, this number trended 
upward. Organizations were spending an average $4,500 per month. Over $2,000 of this was 
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local. The number of organizations subscribed to GB increased quickly, and they increased ICT 
spending after subscribing. Organizations reported that ICT enabled them to cut costs, increase 
revenue, and launch new products and services, resulting in an average increase of $8,000 per 
month per organization. And, Greenfield’s organizations trained existing employees, and hired 
more and better-paid personnel, in order to achieve gains by being more productive with ICTs. 
A wide range of organizations also helped promote GB, supported training opportunities, 
offered special deals on technology. A non-profit umbrella organization, for example, worked 
with a number of technology companies to get a bulk discount on computers and web services 
for other non-profits, their employees and clients. In focused discussions jointly convened by the 
customer sector and neighborhood teams it was suggested that churches, salons, stores, and 
taverns were good places to introduce people to the internet. Another suggestion was to recruit 
older community members to be internet ambassadors, by giving them computers with high 
speed internet access to share with others. The ambassadors could even earn extra cash by 
getting people signed up for GB or renting their computers to others. This tactic effectively 
transformed the region’s matrons and patrons into entrepreneurial GB retailers. These ideas 
didn’t come from the community, per se; community members “stole” the ideas from other 
places they researched ICT projects as part of the community-learning process. 
The results of community-learning for broadband were that Greenfield citizens figured 
out how to use ICTs across levels more rapidly and effectively than in scenario one. More 
individuals went online sooner, and uses were more beneficial to, connected with, and embedded 
in Greenfield. The critical difference between scenarios was that organizations invested ahead of, 
or at least with, households and individuals. While substantial local dollars and time went out of 
Greenfield via GB in scenario two, local organizations also used it to export, offer new and 
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profitable products and services, and hold their own with locals. In fact, recognizing that ICTs 
can enhance but not replace relationships, some Greenfield organizations built deeper and 
stronger local customer relationships. These relationships became the basis for innovative 
products and services that fueled additional organizational growth. 
At a broader level, in scenario two the regional infrastructure was aligned with its 
institutions via the process, so that ICTs become embedded in institutional locations like 
classrooms, commission chambers, churches, boardrooms, and bars. Traditional leaders are 
effectively required to be conversant in the technology and its socioeconomic implications. And, 
they are expected to use ICTs, too. Overall the results were a net gain in capital—financial, 
human, social, etc.—flowing into the Greenfield region, and significant increase in efficiency, 
productivity, profitability, and household income. 
This is not to say that there were no problems. It is reasonable to imagine that in scenario 
two a third of all ICT projects by organizations had negative or no clear value. Sometimes the 
technology just didn’t work, although such incidents were minimized as the community-learning 
process vetted particular products and technologies. In most cases of poor return on ICT 
investment, the technology exacerbated underlying issues with the organizations. Digitizing 
broken processes didn’t fix them, and sometimes made them worse. Two general and often 
coincident problems were, one, ICTs made a task or process more difficult, or, two, ICTs were 
used to layer a digital process on an analog, manual process without replacing it. The problems 
usually weren’t with the technology; the problems were in the organizations. While 
implementing organizational solutions using GB, it became clear that many organizations don’t 
consciously know their processes, and processes too often don’t align with purpose.  
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The two general, hypothetical responses of Greenfield organizations were to learn from 
failures and to do things differently—with ICTs—or to use ICTs as an excuse. Another result 
was that the sector teams began exploring non-ICT methods for increasing performance. Many 
of the teams conducted pilot projects in which one organization implemented a solution with the 
help others, in an open, collaborative manner. These experiences enabled individuals at various 
levels within an organization to see ICTs in action in other organizations, and to engage each 
other about the other organization. Such practices minimized the need for making technology a 
scapegoat for flawed organizations, and undermined the validity of such excuses. 
Hypothetically, behaviors-connections-visions (B-C-V) changed much more in scenario 
two than in scenario one, as a result of identification, integration, and differentiation. 
Organizations connected to share information and materials about and via GB and other ICTs. 
They developed common and complementary visions for and with the technology. These 
connections and visions built on previous behaviors, existing connections, and current visions, to 
change in ways that increase capabilities and real freedoms. All of this knowledge came from 
building community around GB and ICTs. Individuals experienced increases in their senses of 
belonging, influence, needs fulfillment, and shared commitment via GB and the teams that were 
not experienced in the first scenario. In other words, individuals in Greenfield had a much 
stronger shared sense of community in the second scenario than in the first. The gain in 
capabilities and knowledge were much greater, too. 
The personal, organizational, and regional prior knowledge, intentions, and motivations 
were initially the same in both scenarios. The community input functions—particularly 
identification, which fed into subsequent functions—were much stronger in the second. In the 
first scenario, individuals were identifying assets and interests outside the region via broadband, 
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whereas organizations simply weren’t identifying GB as something for them, nor were they 
identifying via the internet. In the second scenario, identification by the scion and the university 
personnel was just the start of the community-building process. It led to integration, 
differentiation, and cascaded into additional iterations of community functions. As a result the 
gains in personal fulfillment, organizational performance, regional advantage, and real freedoms 
were greater in the second scenario. Not only that, in the second scenario, these factors become 
complementary, feeding and supporting each other, rather than mutually exclusive as in the first 
scenario. In the next section, I’ll consider in more detail how this occurred, applying and 
illustrating the models I proposed in Chapter 4 in the process. 
Applying Community-learning Models to Broadband 
The general theory I propose is that community yields learning or, simply, community 
makes people smarter. Not only that, I suggest that this theory—or, rather, community—links 
personal, organizational, and regional learning. Learning—the phenomenon and process of 
acquiring knowledge and increasing capabilities—manifests differently at each level. The 
cognitive constructor, loops of learning, and triple helix are metaphors for individual, 
organizational, and regional learning, which help us learn how learning operates across levels, 
connecting the metaphors. Individuals construct reality to better meet innate drives and to be 
personally fulfilled. Organizations engage groups in cyclic actions to improve collective 
performance on a particular purpose. Regions afford interactions between business, government, 
and university that increase advantages associated with place. Community is necessary, 
hypothetically, for all of these things to occur. Community is the independent variable. 
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Capabilities are the dependent variable. This is where my theoretical framework makes a 
break with many economic and sociological approaches. For community-learning there is an 
ultimate good, a fundamental value, and that is human capabilities. As I discussed in chapters 1 
and 2, capabilities are evident in our real freedoms, in our liberty, prosperity, and wellness. Real 
freedoms are reasonably easy to operationalize, to define in such a way as to be validly 
measurable. Perceptions or actions, for example, can tell whether people feel free to associate 
with whomever they please or to speak their minds. Data for assessing real freedoms can be 
generated by interview, observation, survey, etc., and are both qualitative and quantitative. 
The dependent variable is somewhat more challenging. I suggest that community—or, at 
least, shared sense of community—arises from three general socio-econo-cognitive functions: 
identification, integration, and differentiation. The more people identify, integrate, and 
differentiate with others, the stronger community is. And, the stronger community is, the smarter 
and more capable people are. The factors of learning are important, but it is the power of these 
functions that determines capabilities. The functions are things that people do—actions—that can 
be observed. Similarities between individuals and whether they recognize those similarities can 
be observed. Individuals adopting, coordinating, and repeating common practices are observable, 
as are differentiation activities and results. Indeed, the community input functions are more 
amenable to conjecture and testing than the factors (prior knowledge, intention and motivation, 
models and stimuli, practice, feedback, and reflection). Now I will apply each of my proposed 
models to the thought experiment. 
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GB Multilevel Learning Logic Models 
In the learning logic model prior knowledge and intentions and motivation are antecedent 
factors in the learning process. The value of these factors is determined by the identification 
function—the extent to which learners consciously share an interest. Let’s consider a specific 
situation in Greenfield, illustrated in figure 10. Various organizations around the region have 
capabilities for and interest in geographic topics: assessing taxes, building roads, delivering 
materials, handling emergencies, identifying customers, providing water, routing school buses, 
etc. In the first scenario, in which Greenfield gets broadband but not community, these interests 
are never identified. In the second scenario, actions by the GRF (Greenfield Regional 
Foundation) and university partners clearly identify these interests and they identify the common 
interests in geographic data, asset management, and improving responsiveness while minimizing 
costs.  
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Figure 10 A Learning Logic Model for the Greenfield Geo-Tech Team 
 
The input factors are the availability of models and stimuli, and practice. The value of 
these inputs hypothetically depends on the power of the integration function, the extent to which 
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individuals establish common B-C-V (behaviors-connections-visions). The GB (Greenfield 
Broadband) partners identify a range of broadband applications for geographic purposes, share 
them with the interested individuals, ask them to study them and share the results. They also 
work with these individuals to identify what defines performance and drives improvement for 
their organizations, particularly as it relates to geographic issues. These discussions require time 
and other resources. Even more resources are needed to try things out. For example, a local 
utility is deploying a mapping application for making work assignments, managing electrical 
infrastructure, and routing trucks. The utilities’ managers ask others to help them evaluate 
alternatives and implement a solution. Together with other organizations the utility reduces the 
time, money, and risk involved in deploying the mapping application. And, everyone gains 
understanding of how to evaluate and implement such applications. All involved also see the 
benefits of information and communication technologies (ICTs) more clearly, and learn how to 
avoid excess costs of ICTs. All participants do and see these things together, and they come to 
have common technologies for addressing their shared interests. They become better integrated 
in order to get greater benefits and better control costs. 
The outputs of the learning logic model are feedback and reflection, which are essentially 
information from others and from self about integration, based on identities. The value of these 
outputs are determined by the extent to which individuals can differentiate themselves in the—
what can now be called—community. The Greenfield Geo-Tech Team, as they have come to call 
themselves, members are recognized by the sources of their models and stimuli. In other words, 
their bosses and trade journals recognize and reward their efforts. The Geo-Tech Team members 
feel that they really belong and contribute to something that is important and benefits them and 
others.  
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Throughout this process, and the learning logic model, the factors and functions have 
applied differently at different levels. As persons those involved were responding to their drives, 
seeking fulfillment, based on their personal knowledge and capabilities. In the organizational 
context, individuals act for organizations’ performance based on organizational purposes, 
availability of capital, and division of labor. In the process, individuals are building regional 
infrastructure and institutions to construct advantage for everyone in the region. For Greenfield, 
this case results in more efficient and effective movement of goods and people. They save time 
and money with technology, that they can use for more valued things. They create community, 
find fulfillment, and gain real freedoms. Broadband provides a means for these outcomes, but it 
was community-building instigated by the GB (Greenfield Broadband) partners—intentionally 
conducting community input functions—that cause the gain in capabilities.  
GB Multilevel Learning Causal Models 
In the causal model, knowledge gain at one level can be independent of, or negatively or 
positively correlated to knowledge gain at other levels. My theory suggests that this is because 
community can exist—or not—at all levels. (It is this variance in the relationship between levels, 
along with different metaphors, that defines them as distinct levels.) But, the greatest levels of 
real freedoms arise following increases in community. So, for example, members of the Geo-
Tech Team got promotions and raises (increases in prosperity) and less stress (increases in 
wellness) without having to move (increases in liberty) as a result of identifying, integrating 
with, and differentiating via their learning community. Incremental gains in capabilities result 
from information acquisition, but innovation results from collaboratively processing information 
into valuable knowledge. In the following example, I show how such activities redefine the 
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relationship between healthcare patients and their providers, as well as making healthcare 
practices more efficient.  
Consider healthcare in Greenfield. In the first scenario healthcare providers make 
incremental investments in ICTs (information and communication technology); doing pretty 
much what they’ve always done. The people of Greenfield (patients), at least those who 
subscribed to GB, had a new, easy way to find information, specifically health and medical 
information. A specific behavior—patients coming to their doctors with information on their 
condition printed from the internet—is evidence of new capabilities. This behavioral change is 
changes in connections and visions, too. (In my conceptual framework behaviors, connections, 
and visions are parts of a system, and therefore have the same information content.) The patient 
(person) begins getting information from a different source other than her or his healthcare 
providers, and discovers new possibilities for disease as well as diet and exercise.  
Now consider the second scenario. In that scenario, healthcare providers are identified via 
facilitated learning process. Other than the obvious, these people shared some interest in 
cardiovascular disease. It was partly the chance expertise of some doctors, but it was partly due 
to Greenfield having high incidence of heart disease and stroke. Desire to understand the causes 
of these diseases provides the seed for collecting data on vascular disease and—since its needed 
to understand causes—comprehensive patient information. From this, stakeholders identify 
needs for more health information technology (HIT). 
The doctors interested in this issue work at a clinic and realize they need data from the 
hospitals, too. So they begin lobbying the hospitals to collect the data, which means investing in 
HIT and implementing electronic medical records. The doctors are clearly identified during 
sector team discussions on healthcare. They are not at early meetings, but others in the team 
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meetings mention them. The partners seek them out, have the address the team, and identify 
specific tasks to promote HIT. Together, they review how HIT is being implemented in other 
places, by leading healthcare enterprises. And, together, they realize that if healthcare providers 
are going to go digital, someone will have to go first for the providers to follow. Supported by 
GB (Greenfield Broadband) partners and their learning community, the doctors decide to take 
their clinic online.  
This involves a lot of experimentation and careful improvements in the clinic’s operation, 
but has benefits within GB’s first 18 months. Specifically, doctors are able to respond to patients 
with information printed from the internet: It becomes a point of dialog because the doctors can 
look it up, along with the patients record and authoritative with the patient to decide what it 
means and how to address the issue. Indeed, the doctors encourage patients to research their 
conditions and even suggest online resources for the patients’ benefit. This not only benefits the 
patients and providers—increasing wellness and reducing costs—it allows the clinic, doctors 
(and other healthcare providers and patients), and Greenfield to be recognized as innovators. The 
doctors get more business, the hospitals are pressured—guided—to go electronic, too, and 
medical technology companies and health agencies begin thinking Greenfield might be a place to 
invest. 
The interaction between the doctor and patient is a place to measure the impact of 
community-learning on the impact of broadband. The identification of interested doctors—who 
needed data, not technology per se—led to their integration around electronic health records, by 
which they differentiated themselves. Hypothetically, the strength of these functions determines 
whether and how the “information printed off the internet” discuss occurs and where it leads. 
Community results in a better and less costly response by the doctor for the patient. Both, 
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especially the patient, become more capable. (The doctor becomes more competent with 
technology, which hypothetically heralds greater capabilities.) Their liberty, prosperity, and 
wellness are enhanced much more by broadband than in the first scenario.  
Table 5 Variables and Metrics for the Multilevel Learning Causal Model 
Independent variables and metrics (community input functions) 
a1 Identification: Of Recall and recognize objects/people 
a2 Identification: As and by Strength and clarity of identity 
a3 Identification: With Inclusion in activities and assets 
b1 Integration: Experience Shared activities or experiences 
b2 Integration: Language  Shared expressions, terms, etc. 
b3 Integration: Purpose Shared set of goals and objectives 
c1 Differentiation: Power Distribution of resources 
c2 Differentiation: Reason Ideas and rules 
c3 Differentiation: Skill Carrying out tasks or roles 
Dependent variables and metrics (outcome capabilities as real freedoms) 
x1 Liberty: Association Number and strength/type of group interactions 
x2 Liberty: Expression Subjective willingness to disagree or object 
x3 Liberty: Transaction and transit Mobility and spending 
y1 Prosperity: Earnings Household earnings by demographics 
y2 Prosperity: Opportunities Number and type/value of job openings 
y3 Prosperity: Property Car, home, other major assets 
z1 Wellness: Conviviality Time with associates, family, friends 
z2 Wellness: Health Diet, exercise, and illness 
z3 Wellness: Safety Number and types of risk behaviors 
 
The gain in independent variables was low in the first scenario, and high in the second. 
Here it becomes apparent that identification, integration, and differentiation are really latent 
variables. Table 5 contains variables and metrics for the causal model. Each of the metrics is a 
version of the variable construct. Multiple metrics for each construct affords greater validity and 
veracity. The metrics can be used alone, together, or with other metrics. In the HIT case the 
variables might be measured by survey or interview, or observation, using psychological scales, 
or with diaries or field notes. My putative theory predicts that identification will be observed 
first, followed by integration, and then differentiation. Further, liberty, prosperity, and wellness 
metrics will increase following and in proportion to the community input functions. In cases with 
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very strong community input functions, when learning aligns across levels of socioeconomic 
aggregation, the real freedoms become mutually supportive. That is, there will be gains in 
capabilities above those gains explainable by community. These relationships are illustrated in 
figure 10. 
 
Figure 11 The Learning Causal Model 
 
 
The conceptual framework of this dissertation includes parallel factors at each level—
regional advantage from infrastructure and institutions, organizational performance from capital-
labor and technology, and personal fulfillment from capacity and ability—that provide a basis for 
operationalizing variables at each level. The specific metrics in the case of Greenfield’s 
healthcare sector are (1) personnel rating the importance of technology, (2) number of, attendees 
at, and outputs of meetings, and (3) press mentions of doctors, organizations, or Greenfield 
region (in conjunction with ICTs (information and communication technologies)). The measures 
of the dependent variables, which are also essentially latent, are number of sources of health and 
242 
medical information, earnings (number of patients and amount of fees for doctors, additional or 
not lost productive time for patients), and, of course, incidence and severity of disease. The 
measure of wellness for doctors might be job satisfaction or job-related stress. 
GB Multilevel Learning Mathematical Models 
The mathematical model of learning that I propose describes the theorized relationship 
between learning at different levels. The unit of analysis, to review, is individual human beings, 
who are analyzed on the personal, organizational, and regional level. So, the question becomes 
what are total capabilities of the individual, and how do personal, organizational, and regional 
capabilities contribute to that total. The factors and variables in this model are drawn directly 
from the literature, then are related to community input functions and capabilities as real 
freedoms. What does this mean in practical terms? It means that indicators and metrics, while 
derived from the literature, must be defined in context. This is helpful because, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, the ability and capacity constructs can be difficult to define as variables. 
The simplest way to think about operationalizing the variables in the mathematical model 
is that they are resources associated with each level that the individual knows of and uses. 
Objectively, this reduces ability and capacity to dollar amounts. So, capacity would simply be 
the replacement costs of equipment, facilities, infrastructure, etc., and amount of money spent on 
labor or personnel, divided by number of persons, members, or residents. Ability would be the 
revenue generated and costs avoided by these expenditures, divided by time on tasks associated 
with that revenue or avoided cost. The unit of analysis is the individual, so the approach would 
be to identify the roles played by individuals as persons (in households), as members of 
organizations, and as residents of a region, calculate the objectively defined capacity and ability 
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at each level. In order to avoid the danger of circularity (the dependent and independent variables 
being measures of the same thing), the dependent variables in this approach would need to be 
subjective ratings of regional advantage, organizational performance, and personal fulfillment. 
For example, organizational performance might be operationalized as customer satisfaction. 
The subjective approach to operationalizing the independent variables would be to 
develop scales for individuals to rate ability and capacity at each level. So, for example, 
individuals would rate the availability of infrastructure and resources in their region, and the 
efficacy of regional institutions. In order to make these measures valid, researchers should have 
individuals rate themselves, their organizations, and their regions; have others rate them; and, 
have independent experts assess and rate them. With subjectively defined independent variables, 
it would be best to have objectively defined dependent variables such as economic growth of 
regions, organizations, and persons.  
With either approach, the dependent and independent variables might be validated and 
verified by correlating them to measures of community input functions and capability output 
functions. What are individuals’ perceptions of identification with, integration into, and 
differentiation within their households, organizations, and regions? Or, what is the evidence of 
these functions in personal, organizational, and regional contexts? Similar questions can be asked 
about liberty, prosperity, and wellness. Hypothetically, there should be a significant positive 
relationship between dependent variables and community input functions, and between 
independent variables and capability output functions, because they are essentially indicators of 
the same underlying phenomena. A hybrid approach would be to replace the dependent variables 
with measures of community input functions, or replace independent variables with measures of 
capability output functions. Such an approach moves beyond the mathematical model’s purpose 
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of describing relationships between levels because the input and output functions operate at all 
levels. Regardless of approach, it should be clear that applying the mathematical model could be 
rather difficult and expensive.  
For GB (Greenfield Broadband), personal capabilities might be measured in terms of how 
individuals spend their money and time. The money represents their capacity, and allocation of 
that money represents their ability. For organizations, ability equates to division of labor, 
including automation, and capacity is essentially their capital and labor. Infrastructure represents 
capacity at the regional level, and institutions represent ability. Regardless of the metaphors, I 
hypothesize that certain arrangements at each level lead to major increases in value. (Value can 
be defined as a gain in capabilities but also as improvements in connections and/or visions.) 
Using capabilities in certain ways increases capabilities. Those certain ways are community, 
specifically identification, integration, and differentiation. The use of capabilities to carry out 
these functions explains a significant amount of the variation in how people spend their money 
and how much money they have to spend.  
In the first GB scenario, without the university partners, although there was investment in 
regional infrastructure, (a) adoption and use were relatively small compared to other types of 
infrastructure, and (b) adoption and use did not impact regional institutions, the ways in which 
churches, schools, government, etc., worked. Nor were there notable changes in organizations’ 
capital base, labor pool, or processes. At the individual level, GB users were very different from 
other Greenfield citizens, and from themselves prior to GB. The community input functions did 
not occur at the organizational and regional levels, but they did occur at the personal level. 
Individuals used GB to extend and restructure their communities. For many of those individuals, 
the result was both beneficial and desirable, increasing their information and materials. GB 
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helped them to be more liberated, prosperous, and well, generally speaking, with some 
exceptions. But, while individual capabilities benefited from personal use, there was little if any 
contribution from organizational and regional factors. 
The second scenario featured much higher levels of identification, integration, and 
differentiation. Essentially, what the mathematical model says is that variation in individuals 
capabilities are largely explained by community input functions at all levels. The actions of the 
GB partners—the GRF (Greenfield Regional Foundation) staff and board, and the university 
professors and assistants—catalyze identification, integration, and differentiation. The partners 
work through the learning factors at each level, and conscientiously link them across levels. 
Regional institutions are transformed by learning from experts and interaction. Organizations, 
similarly, restructure their processes and division of labor. These are done in conjunction with 
individuals’ ability improvements via and with internet technologies. Thus individuals’ 
competencies are better aligned with organizational performance imperatives, based on regional 
advantage.  
Around Greenfield, in the tractor industry, ICTs (information and communication 
technology) are at first ignored then rapidly adopted and enthusiastically used. The adoption 
curve was so steep for the industry because multiple firms, through their executives and 
managers, studied the value of digitization from the automotive industry. With the support of the 
GRF (Greenfield Regional Foundation) and university experts, the tractor industry developed 
standards, demonstrated business value, and invested the necessary resources. This enabled 
tractor companies and companies in allied industries to restructure their process—increasing 
capital in ICTs and skilled labor, while decreasing capital in facilities and inventory—and boost 
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their profitability (performance). Individuals saw increases in household earnings as the tractor 
industry hired more skilled workers and trained existing workers to do more technical tasks.  
The GRF and the university partners provided the institutional counterpart to GB’s 
infrastructure. That change explains a significant amount of the variation in organizational 
performance with ICTs, both between scenarios and within the second scenario. Community-
learning catalyzed by GB, facilitated by the university partners, and supported by the GRF is the 
difference. The difference from community-learning was especially great because regional, 
organizational, and individual learning about ICTs was aligned in the tractor industry: Cognitive 
constructors were linked in loops of learning embedded in a triple helix of interactive learning. 
The mathematical model of my proposed theory should allow it to be tested with 
empirical data. Both the relationships between levels can be explored, as can the impact of 
community on capabilities at each level. An interesting issue that is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation is the shape of the curves. I provide linear, multivariate regression. For particular 
technologies the community functions translate into the three portions of the learning curve. But 
are there more complex relationships between capabilities and community between or within 
levels? This issue is intellectually interesting and has practical, strategic implications.  
Integrating the Models 
As noted above, the tractor industry has a strong presence in and around Greenfield. By 
the time the scion began contemplating the possibility of bringing broadband to the region, the 
industry was beginning a slow decline due to the combination of changing consumer preferences 
and foreign competition. Micro, meso, and macro level B-C-Vs (behaviors-connections-visions) 
related to tractor production were not changing as fast as the market realities. Those in the region 
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could not know that trend would accelerate and would interact with the “Great Recession” in 
2009 to decimate their industry. At least, that’s what would happen in scenario one, in which the 
industry did not adopt and use GB (Greenfield Broadband).  
In scenario two, the prior knowledge of tractor production was connected at the micro, 
meso, and macro levels to non-local expertise, facilitated by the university partners. This 
identification function resulted in tractor industry leaders seeing models and stimuli to change 
their practices. The executives and top managers of tractor manufacturers, their suppliers, and 
even local customers came together and began working together to understand the value of 
broadband and other ICTs. Those who participated in this process were most able to capitalize on 
GB, as discussed in the previous sub-section on the mathematical model. They were also able 
differentiate themselves in terms of the technology use, growth, and overall organizational 
performance. And, when the “Great Recession” came they not only weathered the storm, they 
were able to sustain their growth via innovation. 
The community-learning process resulted new connections that were critical to the 
industry. One connection was to the Geo-Tech Team, another was to healthcare. The Geo-Tech 
Team became something of a new institution for the region by acquiring explicit knowledge 
about geographic information systems (GIS), building tacit knowledge about collaboration and 
culture, and combining these into implicit knowledge. B-C-V at the micro, meso, and macro 
levels changed. Families took up geo-caching (a past time that involves searching for hidden 
caches based on geographic clues). Geography became a touchstone topic in education, and was 
used across the curricula in math, reading, and science. And, the Greenfield tractor industry led 
the industry in using GPS (geographic positioning system) to automate tractors. An industry 
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consortium literally set the standards for this, and a local startup became a global sensation when 
it began selling a robotic lawn mower based on the technology.  
Connections to the healthcare industry arose from the tractor industry’s need to boost 
worker productivity. The university partners noted early on that healthcare costs, absenteeism, 
and injuries were major impediments to organizational performance in the industry. So they 
identified individuals in each sector whose personal, organizational, and regional prior 
knowledge and intentions/motivations were complementary. The partners brought these 
individuals together to review models for collaboration between healthcare providers and 
manufacturers, and engaged insurance and government officials to offer targeted wellness 
incentives as stimulus. Together all of these groups created a wellness “dashboard.” They 
identified employees of participating tractor industry companies and their families. The 
healthcare providers worked with technologists, sponsored by government agencies and private 
companies, to aggregate these persons’ health data in a way that protected their privacy. The 
dashboard allowed individuals to create a wellness plan, track their progress, compare their 
wellness with others, and mutually support each other. Then everyone employees, employers, 
health professionals, etc., came together for “Fun & Fit Together,” a weekend long program to 
set wellness goals and come up with ways to meet those goals. Everyone participated as a peer, 
since the best expert on any person’s health is that person. The overall vision they established 
was “America’s healthiest community by working together for each other’s wellness.” 
Fun & Fit Together significantly reduced disease incidents among participants, decreased 
absenteeism, increased productivity and earnings (for organizations and individuals), and created 
a situation in which persons were able and willing to share their ideas for increasing wellness. It 
made liberty, prosperity, and wellness complementary. Not only that, it created other 
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improvements and innovations. A small innovation was the tractor industry creating a network of 
in-house wellness centers where employees could consult with doctors, nurses, occupational 
therapists, and personal trainers. A big innovation was a robotic surgery startup that was 
conceived when an engineer turned surgeon and a tractor industry robotics expert met during Fun 
& Fit Together. 
In these examples—collaboration between the tractor industry and the Geo-Tech Team, 
and with healthcare providers—we can see how the community-learning process results in 
micro, meso, and macro level capabilities gains. We can also see the cascading feedback/feed-
forward of community input functions: how identification can lead to additional identification as 
well as integration, how integration leads to more identification and integration as well as 
differentiation, and how differentiation feeds into all the community input functions. We can see 
these things through the lens of the three models I suggest. The mathematical model enables us 
to explain variation in capabilities between and within levels as a function of community. We 
can examine the ways in which the community input functions lead to increased capabilities and 
real freedoms with the causal model. And, the ways in which the factors of learning fit into a 
process that results in micro, meso, and macro level impacts is evident with the learning logic 
model. The usefulness of these models for strategy, planning, and evaluation is implied by the 
examples. We might even stretch the thought experiment by saying that the university partners 
had these models at their disposal and used them as a practical and theoretical basis for their 
work. While this may stretch the reader’s credulity a bit too far, it does suggest the implications 
of this dissertation for research and practice. 
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Paradoxes and imperatives 
The internet paradox and the productivity paradox can both be seen as artifacts of 
learning, at the macro and meso as well as micro levels. Social isolation from use of a nominally 
social technology result from families and regions, as well as individuals, learning how to 
connect via the internet. The learning involves fundamental changes in the structure and function 
of institutions (like the family). These changes take time, resources, and effort. During that time 
the individuals and institutions involved inevitably perform at lower levels. The same can be said 
for organizations as they work to adopt (and adapt) and use ICTs (information and 
communication technology). As they re-organize to capitalize on ICTs, organizational 
performance necessarily declines temporarily. Hypothetically, capabilities not only rebound, they 
are greatly increased—at macro, meso, and micro levels—as a result of learning to use the 
technology. 
The Greenfield broadband thought experiment illustrates how the process of community-
building, in which identification, integration, and differentiation feed into and reinforce each 
other, can greatly increase capability gains. As discussed above, economic pressures are driving 
profound change at all levels. Deploying broadband does not alleviate these pressures, or lessen 
innate human drives. Innovation does, but it can be very costly and risky. Community reduces 
these costs and risks, and boosts the autonomy, belonging, competency, etc. So, community 
hypothetically enables innovation, which makes sense if we think of innovation as a general 
form of increased capabilities, involving new knowledge and leading to gains in real freedoms. 
These points are illustrated by what happened for the university partners in the thought 
experiment. In the first scenario, not only did the universities not realize any gain in capabilities, 
they were totally disengaged, not even in the picture. In the second scenario, the university 
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partners acted as learning facilitators, but they also learned a great deal in the process. The 
universities learned to engage organizations and regions, as well as individuals, as learners. The 
universities learned to capitalize on a new technology, and it wasn’t broadband. It was 
community-learning. The way in which the universities accomplished this was a essentially a 
combination of open innovation and strategic innovation, drawing in knowledge from customers 
and peers, and creating a functionally different, new unit in Greenfield to do so. 
The need and opportunity to step out of the “sage on the stage” role allowed the 
university partners to improve their outcomes by collaborating as co-learners. The learning that 
resulted in the second scenario had unprecedented scope, extending across multiple organizations 
that the universities would have been unlikely to reach otherwise. The universities were able to 
achieve these learning outcomes with relatively few personnel because they simply (so to speak, 
for this type of learning would be no simple matter) initiated and supported the community input 
functions. One the most profound transformation in this thought experiment occurred for the 
universities as they built a highly innovative and impactful partnership, linked to place, among 
their institutions through their work with Greenfield Broadband. 
Researching Scenario Two 
The research approach implicit in scenario two is nearly as much of an innovation as the 
universities’ educational practice. It involves the university personnel learning along with their 
“subjects.” Rather than the universities “doing studies,” everyone studies together. The 
university personnel don’t act as teachers or traditional researchers. Instead, they provide 
structure—“scaffolding”—for the learning along with others, gathering data together in the 
process. The process was essentially loops of learning, as discussed by organizational thinkers 
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(Argyris & Schön, 1978; Deming, 1986; Liker, 2004; and Senge, 2006), and was akin to action 
learning (Revans, 1998; Kramer, 2008), appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005), 
and Peters’ (2009) DATA-DATA. Within these processes the university personnel and other 
participants were socio-cognitively constructing their worlds. And, the processes were embedded 
in triple helices of interactive learning with firms and government agencies. The research 
methodology that incorporates such multilevel processes is similar to intervention research as 
discussed by Rothman and Thomas (1994) and their contributors and to Jarvis’s (1999) 
practitioner-researcher, but in the context of community. 
The fundamental issue for this research is how the researchers recognize that community 
and, more importantly, the input functions of community and how they result in increased 
capabilities. They subjectively experience community and recognize functions when pointed out 
to them. It is possible that, coming from various disciplines, the university personnel would 
dialog about their scholarly perspectives on learning. It is even possible that they would bring 
these together to consider learning at different levels. But it is rather less likely that, living inside 
their respective paradigms, they would develop a conceptual framework and theory of 
composition that would result in a comprehensive explanation such as “community results in 
learning.” The point being that without such as framework and theory in place the university 
personnel would likely have looked at GB, as researchers, in terms of the adoption and impacts. 
They would have started from the internet paradox and productivity paradox, possibly drawing 
on social constructionism, to prove that such lagging or poor effects are temporary artifacts of 
learning. But, in the end, they would have used a research approach much like described in 
conjunction with scenario one. 
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If, in contrast, the university personnel started from the fundamental proposition of this 
dissertation, that community makes people (and organizations and regions) smarter, they may 
would take a different approach. A different research approach is even more likely if they 
accepted that the ultimate good is real freedoms, and recognized that it is immoral and 
impractical to treat individuals as means to an end (such as producing objective research results). 
This approach basically involves engaging others in creating and testing hypotheses about the 
relationship between community input functions and real freedoms. 
The general hypothesis—which would have been developed with as part of the 
community-building process among university partners and Greenfield Regional Foundation 
(GRF) members—would be that community-building will result in the greatest capability gains 
from Greenfield Broadband (GB) at the least cost for individuals as persons, members of 
organizations, and residents of the region. For each individual the specific hypothesis is a bit 
different, as are the community input functions. This is because each individual’s interests at 
each level are different. While they all reside in the region, they interact in unique ways with the 
infrastructure and institutions. Some share organizational affiliations, but play a unique role as 
labor and with capital. And, each individual has unique personal ability and capacity. The 
process for creating and testing these hypotheses is the same—the community-building process 
of identification, integration, and differentiation—though these functions manifest somewhat 
differently for each individual. 
Because the process has the same structure for each individual (as persons, organization 
members, and region citizens), the set of methods and tools used to support the process are the 
same. These methods and tools are developed and managed by the university partners. As they 
use the tools to identify, integrate, and differentiate, individuals generate data. The data are 
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primarily used to test practical hypotheses about the value of GB. For example, neighborhood 
teams use simple survey forms to gather information about interests, goals, concerns, etc., of 
their neighbors. They use data from these forms to organize house parties on various topics. 
Additional data are generated by participation in the parties, and that data is used to identify 
specific opportunities for individuals to realize benefits from or with GB. Individuals generate 
data about impacts as they act on these opportunities.  
Each of these activities represents steps of community-building, increasing capabilities, 
and data generation for research. The university partners analyze the data to answers question 
such as, “Do those individuals who go through the most community-input functions realize the 
greatest gains in real freedoms?” The data gathered during GB activities are associated with 
demographic data, so the researchers can control for confounding factors, identify intermediate 
outputs (i.e., competencies), and isolate mediating influences. The data are used to specify the 
models, test the hypotheses, and validate and verify (falsify) the theory. The methods and tools 
for gathering data become part of the university personnel’s practice, as well as means for GB 
stakeholders to work through the community-building process. Thus, the methods and tools 
allow for feedback to and reflection by the university partners regarding their roles for evaluation 
and learning purposes. 
Conclusion 
What is the relationship between learning by individuals, organizations, and regions? It 
depends on how one defines learning. A central element of this theory is the definition of 
learning as a gain in capabilities, which equate to knowledge and real freedoms—liberty, 
prosperity, and wellness. In common language, capabilities are what one does, has, and says. The 
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relationship between micro, meso, and macro level learning is most strongly positive when 
community links the levels. And, learning is structurally the same—involving changes in visions 
and connections as well as behaviors at all levels—even though the learning takes a different 
form (persons, organizations, regions) and has different functions (fulfillment, performance, 
advantage).  
The foundation of my proposed theory is that, while capabilities can be attributed to 
persons, organizations, and regions, morally we must only consider individuals as ends in and of 
themselves, and practically capabilities are only evident in individual behavior. Thus the unit of 
analysis is the individual human being, which can be analyzed at the personal, organizational, 
and regional levels. But each of these is a component of individual capabilities: Individual 
capabilities are a function of personal, organizational, and regional capabilities.  
One way to understand the relationship between learning at different levels is to consider 
the metaphors that emerge from the literature: individual cognitive constructors (micro level) 
engaged with others in organizational loops of learning (meso level) embedded together in 
regional triple helices (macro level). This may be evocative, but it is not useful for explaining or 
predicting learning, why some persons, organizations, and regions learn better or faster than 
others. 
But, before we can explain or predict or critique or improve, we must describe and 
measure capabilities in ways that valid and verifiable. The ordinary concept of capabilities as 
evident in what one does, has, and sees provides a starting point. In this dissertation I have 
provided a conceptual framework that I believe is a philosophically and scientifically sound 
version of such common wisdom. Behaviors, connections, and visions (B-C-V) are what we do, 
have, and say. B-C-V includes the intersubjective, objective, and subjective aspects of agents—
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collective and individual—which provide the basis for valid description and measurement. B-C-
V can be verified in terms of coherence, consistence, and correspondence. Behaviors are evident. 
They provide means for validly measuring the information and materials acquired via 
connections, and for verifiably describing the “sides” of visions (what is perceived as objectively 
beneficial and possible; subjectively desirable and practical; drivers and limiters; past and 
future).  
Further, B-C-V can be described and measured as knoels (knowledge elements) linked in 
webs of meaning that appear as explicit, implicit, and tacit knowledge at each level. Each person, 
organization, and region has a unique B-C-V—the differences in B-C-V essential define the 
boundaries and characteristics of each level—and each individual’s capabilities are the product 
of associated B-C-V at all levels. Practically, B-C-V manifest as liberty, prosperity, and 
wellness, which are the product(s) of an individual’s personal, organizational, and regional 
capabilities. 
In this dissertation I propose that learning can be explained and predicted by community. 
I propose that the input functions of community determine capabilities; that community makes 
people smarter. The optimal circumstances are when liberty, prosperity, and wellness are 
mutually reinforcing rather than trade offs. Such circumstances result from connecting learning 
across levels via community. When implemented in an inclusive yet purposive manner, the 
community input functions—identification, integration, and differentiation—set up real freedoms 
that feed into and reinforce each other. The community input functions align liberty, prosperity, 
and wellness via micro, meso, and macro level interactions. Community operates at micro, meso, 
and macro levels determine individual freedoms, and its effect is strongest when those functions 
align across levels. Positive actions on the community input functions—more extensive and 
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stronger identification, integration, and differentiation—result in great socioeconomic gains for 
the regions, organizations, and individual people who undertake those actions. 
These concepts are synthesized from various academic disciplines—particularly 
philosophy and the behavioral-social sciences—to provide means for describing and measuring 
capabilities at various levels. These concepts do not explain the relationship between learning at 
each level—how capabilities gain at one level affects capabilities at another—or even explains 
differences in capabilities between individuals (within levels). The subjective validity of this 
theory comes from my personal and professional experience and from my studies. Greenfield is 
an amalgamation of my past clients. My experience is also the source of correspondence: This 
dissertation is partly an attempt to explain phenomena that I’ve personally experience.  
The objective validity rests in the practical aspects of observing and predicting behavior 
(and connections and visions) covered by the theory. I believe this dissertation is a substantial 
contribution because it can be consistently applied at multiple levels and in many different 
contexts to describe and measure, and to explain and predict, learning. The consistency of my 
framework arises from its philosophical foundations, from building on components that appear in 
various areas of research and practice, and from integrating qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. My concepts and conjectures have a consistency that flows from the need to 
describe and measure in meaningful ways regardless of subject or topic. The concepts and 
conjectures have intersubjective validity because they are synthesized from multiple, disparate 
yet complementary, academic sources. While disciplinarians might take issue with how I 
associate and use certain concepts, such objections would overlook obvious gaps and parallels in 
the literature. The abutments for the proposed theory were in place but the bridges were missing. 
What I have attempted to do is provide a coherent explanation of the relationship between 
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learning at different levels, an explanation that can make sense of the diversity of established 
thoughts on these matters. 
As noted in the introduction of this dissertation, Lakotos (1976, 1978) maintains that 
theory must be judged by its consistence with accepted knowledge, it heuristic value, and the 
novelty of its predictions. I believe I addressed the first issue via the validity and verifiability of 
my conjecture that communities increase capabilities across levels. The theory could provide 
heuristic value in practice and research. The practice of GB’s (Greenfield Broadband) university 
partners in the second scenario suggests how the concepts in this dissertation might apply in 
practice. The discussion of how each model might be applied, above, provides some guidance for 
research, and chapter four provides conceptual depth for extending and refining the theory. 
Novel predictions, which were Lakotos’s criteria for true science, are more challenging. 
The general prediction, that those individuals with stronger community across levels will have 
the greatest capabilities, is somewhat novel. Community has been used in various conceptual 
forms in learning theory, particular at the organizational and regional levels. But my proposed 
theory conceives of community as a phenomenon or process—not a thing—that determines 
capabilities. I believe my proposed theory has other novel implications, particularly for the fuzzy 
space between paradigms, for how concepts from different disciplines fit together. The 
Greenfield thought experiment provides examples. The illustration of GB without community-
learning is far from what would be expected under the “if you build it, they will come” 
paradigm. The predications of my proposed theory are somewhat novel simply because the 
concept of community-learning is novel. As the models are applied to various circumstances, I 
believe it will generate more novel predictions, along with valuable heuristics and intellectual 
consistency. 
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The Greenfield broadband thought experiment suggests some novel, albeit totally 
hypothetical, outcomes. In the first scenario the community input functions were weak, 
especially at the organizational and regional levels. Those who adopted Greenfield Broadband 
(GB) in scenario one, particularly those who were technology savvy, had negative vision of the 
region and its organizations. They did not see adequate resources for personal fulfillment. We 
know because of what they did: They used GB to search for things they personally valued—
goods to purchase, educational activities, new jobs—outside the region. In the process, they 
shifted their time, money, and attention out of Greenfield. In scenario one, individuals increased 
their real freedoms by exiting the region, virtually if not actually. Those who used GB for 
organizational purposes ended up working more, shifting time away from personal purposes, and 
trading a bit of liberty and wellness for a modicum of prosperity. Individuals in organizational 
and regional roles did not adopt GB or capitalize on it to improve their divisions of labor or 
institutions.  
These imagined results are quite a contrast to the “if you build it, they will come” 
presumption; it is more like, “if you build it, they will leave”! Of course, these are little more 
than predictions of what would happen in a situation like Greenfield’s, based on the theory that 
community yields learning. But, the imagined results of scenario one are consistent with 
empirical findings of research into adoption and use of information and communication 
technologies. And, the results in scenario one are quite reasonable and follow logically from the 
manner in which GB (Greenfield Broadband) was instigated.   
Essentially, those who saw the potential value of broadband—those who, in terms of my 
conceptual framework, had a strong frontside and outside vision for it—adopted and used GB in 
ways that disconnected them from Greenfield. Those who had a strong belief in—vision for and 
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of—their organizations and regional institutions did not adopt and use GB. It did not fit their 
visions. They did not change how they acquired information and materials for their organizations 
or the region, nor did they change what information and materials they had. Specifically, they 
didn’t buy more ICTs (information and communication technology), hire more technologists, or 
send their employees to ICT-related training. This illustrates how B-C-V (behaviors-
connections-visions) can be used to describe and measure changes and impacts, as well as lack of 
learning between and within levels. 
In the second scenario of this thought experiment, the Greenfield tractor scion and the 
university representatives identified each other during a conference, based on complementary 
visions, and integrated through follow-up meetings, changing their B-C-V. This led the 
universities to further identify with each other, drawing other university personnel, and integrate 
via their work on GB. They then became an identification mechanism to connect organizational 
and regional agents with each other and GB. As a result, the organizations shifted their capital 
and labor toward ICTs, and ICTs were incorporated into regional institutions. So, by the time GB 
was deployed and individuals began to adopt it, activities and assets of interest to them were 
available online from local organizations and regional institutions. Individuals in scenario two 
shifted fewer connections to non-local sources, or established weaker non-local connections that 
were more likely to draw capital into the region. Again, this is fictitious scenario, and the results 
are nothing more that predictions of what might happen in this situation if, as I propose, 
community-building results in gains in capabilities. While the circumstances push the limits of 
credulity, the imagined results are reasonable, do not contradict other theories or the conclusions 
of empirical research cited in this study, and can be described by my models and explained by 
the theory I suggest. 
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Taken together the two imaginary scenarios—summarized in table 6—illustrate the 
usefulness of my conceptual framework, and the potential power of my putative theory. The 
thought experiment also suggests opportunities for applying the content of this dissertation to 
research and practice. The general opportunity is to investigate the effects of the community 
input functions on real freedoms, how much variation in and relations between real freedoms can 
be explained by variation in community input function. One set of research opportunities involve 
validating the concepts I’ve laid out in this dissertation, including operationalizing the variables 
and establishing reliable means for describing and measuring them. Another set of opportunities 
involves testing the central propositions of this dissertation in various contexts, particularly the 
relationships between learning at various levels.  
 
Table 6 A High-Level Comparison of the Greenfield Broadband Thought Experiment Scenarios 
 Scenario one: broadband deployment 
with weak community input functions 
Scenario two: broadband deployment with 
strong community input functions 
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Macro Medium Weak Weak Negative Medium Medium Strong Positive 
Meso None None None 
 
None Strong Strong Strong 
 
Positive 
Micro None None None Weakly 
positive 
Medium Medium Medium Positive 
 
The B-C-V and W7TH (how, that, what, when, where, who, why, whether, which) 
frameworks and the concepts of capabilities and community provide bases for carrying out these 
tasks, but these things need additional development for particular applications. Possibly the most 
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fundamental research opportunity is to validate these concepts in the B-C-V and W7TH 
frameworks in practice. These are little more than extensions of existing concepts from the 
behavioral and social sciences presented in an integrated and simplified manner, so they have 
prima facie validity. Further validation would need to come from application.  
There are opportunities to examine how the community input functions feed into each 
other. Do these functions actually exist apart from factors of learning such as prior knowledge 
and practice? Community-learning is conceived to be a complex process with diverse 
interactions between its component functions. Can it be validly characterized as a process? I 
suggest that innate drives are evinced differently with each community input function. Is this 
true? If so, this could show that the functions are real and distinct parts of a process. How are the 
functions related to each other? Are they connected in a linear and sequential manner or are the 
relationships between functions more complex, and, if so, under what circumstances are they 
related in complex or simple ways? So, for example, I suggest that integration is driven by 
selfish intentions and motivations, but those motives change with differentiation as personal 
drives are fulfilled. At that point individuals will act on behalf of the community and even 
sacrifice for it based on the extent to which their role in the group is part of their identity.  
There are similar opportunities to better understand real freedoms—liberty, prosperity, 
and wellness—and relations between them. Are these valid concepts? Can they be 
complementary or are they necessarily mutually exclusive? The strength of interaction effects 
between real freedoms could be considered a dependent variable in studies of multilevel 
learning, but such research would almost have to be preceded by research that establishes the 
constructs and identifies these interaction effects.  
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Of course, the central question of this dissertation is the relationship between individual, 
organizational, and regional learning. My proposed answer is that community input functions not 
only explain learning at one level but also relations between levels. This is a novel proposition. It 
also presents something of a research challenge becomes in requires micro, meso, and macro 
level, and of both the community input functions and the capabilities or real freedoms. To make 
matters worse, such research might also involve assessing learning factors to control for 
confounding factors and assessing competencies to identify short-term results. So, for example, 
based on my theoretical propositions, a researcher might hypothesize that the more diverse the 
parties involve in identification are, the greater potential and actual knowledge gains will be. Or 
it might be hypothesized that community input functions that involve individuals acting in 
personal, organizational, and regional roles, so the functions operate at the micro, meso, and 
macro levels, will have the greatest outputs. These are both novel predictions, particularly the 
latter, and have important practical implications. 
The simple way to investigate community-learning is likely to be to study the functions at 
one level in a particular context. Such studies could afford consideration of spillover effects to 
other levels, especially if the study is designed to accommodate such analysis. Another approach 
might be to have multiple, parallel studies of learning at different levels by scholars in different 
disciplines coordinating their work to examine cross-level effects. Of course, ideally studies 
could focus on relationships between learning at different levels. It would be interesting to 
examine how changes in personal abilities, division of labor and technology, and institutions—
micro, meso, and macro level phenomena—interact and relate. The discussion of Greenfield 
broadband suggests how this might be practically accomplished by focusing on particular 
activities or projects. A multilevel learning research agenda, though, would almost have to start 
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with validation of essential concepts, developing methods for describing and measuring them, 
and then turn to examining relationships between the constructs. 
I suggest that the unit of analysis for learning research must be the individual human 
being, for philosophical and practical reasons. But, the most opportunities for further work with 
this theory may be in organizational performance. This is simply because regional development 
is a larger-scale phenomenon, and less open to new practices, and because individual education 
and personal development are too politically charged. Organizations have strong need for greater 
capabilities, and scholars in management and social sciences are attuned to factors that impact 
organizational performance. That said my proposed multilevel theory of learning could have 
novel value in understanding and improving school performance and accelerating economic 
development. Innovation and technology are two topics that present abundant opportunities for 
further research, as suggested by the discussion, above. 
This dissertation has provided a textual analysis of theories of learning and identifying 
commonalities and differences across these bodies of literatures. It describes clear gaps between 
bodies of literature on individual, organizational, and regional learning. On one hand, the 
literature does not provide a conceptual framework for learning that could apply at macro, meso, 
and micro levels. On the other hand, there is scant consideration of how learning at these various 
levels relates. I have applied theory- and model-building methods to suggest ways to address 
these gaps. I have also illustrated how my concepts and models might be applied. It is my sincere 
hope that this dissertation provides practical bases for investigating community-learning, and can 
contribute to learning practices as well as scholarly endeavors. 
265 
REFERENCES 
 
Abernathy, W. J. and Clark, K. B. (1985). Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative 
Destruction. Research Policy, 14, 3-22. 
act. (n.d.). Dictionary.com Unabridged. Retrieved from 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/act. 
Adams, L. (2011). Learning a new skill is easier said than done. Gordon International Training 
website. Retrieved from http://www.gordontraining.com/free-workplace-
articles/learning-a-new-skill-is-easier-said-than-done/ 
Adler, P. S. & Clark, K. B. (1991). Behind the Learning Curve: A Sketch of the Learning 
Process. Management Science, 37(3), 267-281. 
Ajzen, I. (1985). From Intentions to Actions: A Theory Of Planned Behavior. In J. Kuhl & J. 
Beckmann (Eds.), Action Control: From Cognition to Behavior. Berlin, Heidelberg, New 
York: Springer-Verlag. 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The Theory of Planned Behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes. 50: 179-211. 
Amin, A. (Ed.). (2008). Post-Fordism: A reader. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Amin, A. & Thrift, N. (1995). Globalization, institutional ‘thickness’ and the local economy. In 
P. Healy, S. Cameron, S. Davoudi, S Graham, & A. Madani-Pour (Eds.), Managing 
Cities: The New Urban Context (pp. 91- 108). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.  
266 
Anderson, L. & Krathwohl, D. A. (2001) Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching and Assessing: A 
Revision of Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives New York: Longman 
Arensberg, C. M. & Kimball, S. T. (1965). Culture and Community. New York, Chicago, 
Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 
Argyris, C. (1999). On organizational learning (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1978). Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective. 
Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley. 
Arrow, K. J. (1962). The economic implications of learning by doing. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 29(3), 155-173. 
Arrow, K. J. (1970). Social choice and individual values. 3rd ed. New Haven, CT, and London: 
Yale University Press. 
Arrow, K. J. & Hurwicz, L. (1977). An optimality criterion for decision making under ignorance. 
In K. J. Arrow & L. Hurwicz (Eds.), Studies in resources allocation processes (pp. 463-
474). London, UK, New York, NY, and Melbourne, AU: Cambridge University Press. 
Ashby, W. R. (1970). Analysis of the system to be modeled. In R. M. Stogdill (Ed.), The Process 
of Model-Building in the Behavioral Sciences (94-114). Ohio State University Press. 
Asheim, B. T. (2003). Industrial districts: The contributions of Marshall and beyond. In G. L. 
Clark, M. S. Gertler, & M. P. Feldman (Eds.), The handbook of economic geography (pp. 
413-431). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Askew, S. & Lodge, C. (2000). Gifts, Ping-pong and Loops – Linking Feedback and Learning. In 
S. Askew, editor. Feedback for Learning (pp. 1-18). Psychology Press.  
Associated Press. (2004). End of an era: Gold eludes grasp of Team USA for first time since 
NBA players used. SI.com, Sports Illustrated. Retrieved from http:// 
267 
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004/olympics/2004/basketball/08/27/usa.argentina.ap/ 
Attewell, P. (1992). Technology diffusion and organizational learning: The case of business 
computing. Organization Science, 3(2), 1-19. 
Audi, R. (2010). Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. 
Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy Series. Taylor & Francis. 
Audretsch, B. (1998). Agglomeration and the location of innovative activity. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 14(2), pp. 18-29.  
Babbie, E. R. (2010). The basics of social research (5th ed.). Cengage Learning. 
Baldwin, M. W., Keelan, J. P. R., Fehr, B., Enns, V. & Koh-Rangarajoo, E. (1996). Social-
cognitive conceptualization of attachment working models: Availability and accessibility 
effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(1), 94-109.  
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Alexandria, VA: Prentice Hall. 
Bandura, A. (1986). Social Foundations Of Thought And Action: A Social Cognitive Theory. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Bandura, A. (1988). Organizational application of social cognitive theory. Australian Journal of 
Management, 13(2), 275-302. 
Bandura, A. (1989). Human Agency in Social Cognitive Theory. American Psychologist. 44(9), 
1175-1184.  
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of Control. New York: Freeman. 
Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 52: 1-26. 
Bandura, A. (2006). Guide for constructing self-efficacy scales. In T. Urdan & F. Pajares (Eds.). 
Self-efficacy beliefs of adolescents (pp. 307-337). Information Age Publishing. 
268 
Bandura, A. (2006). Towards a psychology of human agency. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 1(2), 164-180. 
Bapuji, H. & Crossan, M. (2004). From questions to answers: Reviewing organizational learning 
research. Management Learning. 35, 4: 397-417. 
Bargh, J. A. & Ferguson, M. J. (2000, November). Beyond behaviorism: On the automaticity of 
higher mental processes. Psychological Bulletin, 126(6), 925-945.  
Barney, B. (2011). Concepts and terminology: von Neumann architecture. In Introduction to 
parallel computing (no pagination). Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory. Retrieved from 
https://computing.llnl.gov/tutorials/parallel_comp/#Neumann. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (1991). Precursors to a theory of mind: Understanding attention in others. In A. 
Whiten (Ed.), Natural theories of mind: Evolution, development and simulation of 
everyday mindreading (pp. 233-251). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Barone, M. (2010). Higher Education Bubble Poised to Burst. Washington Examiner, posted 
September 3, 2010. Retrieved October 4, 2010, from 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/Higher-education-bubble-poised-to-burst-
720594-102180809.html#ixzz0ykCoj5fL 
Bartel, A., Ichniowski, C., & Shaw, K. (2007). How does information technology affect 
productivity? Plant-level comparisons of product innovation, process improvement, and 
worker skills. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4): 1721-1758. 
Beer, T. & Reed, E. D. (2009). A model for multilevel advocacy evaluation. The Foundation 
Review, 1, 3: 149-161. 
Befu, H. (1977). Social exchange. Annual Review of Anthropology, 6: 225–281.  
269 
belief. (2003). The American heritage dictionary of the English language. (4th ed.). Retrieved 
from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/belief. 
Bennet, D. & Bennet, A. (2008). Engaging tacit knowledge in support of organizational learning. 
VINE, 38(1), 72-94. 
Berger, P. L. & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the 
sociology of knowledge. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. 
Bertalanffy, L. von. (1950). An outline of general system theory. British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 1, 134-165. Retrieved from 
http://www.isnature.org/events/2009/Summer/r/Bertalanffy1950-
GST_Outline_SELECT.pdf. 
Bertalanffy, L. von. (1968). General system theory: Foundations, development, applications. 
New York: George Braziller. 
Bimber, B. (1998). The internet and political transformation: populism, community, and 
accelerated pluralism. Polity, 31, 1, 133-160. 
Black, S. E. & Lynch, L. M. (2001). How to compete: The impact of workplace practices and 
information technology on productivity. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(3): 
434-445 
Blalock, H. M., Jr. (Ed.). (1985). Causal models in the social sciences (2nd ed.). New York: 
Aldine Publishing Company. 
Blau, P. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. New York: Wiley. 
Block, P. (2008). Community: The structure of belonging. San Francisco, CA: Barrett-Koehler 
Publishers. 
Bloom, B. S., Engelhart, M. D., Furst, E. J., Hill, W. H., & Krathwohl, D. R. (1956). Taxonomy 
270 
of educational objectives: the classification of educational goals; Handbook I: Cognitive 
Domain New York, Longmans, Green, 1956. 
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press. 
Boehnke, M. (2010). State braces for widespread impact of UT system cutbacks. Chattanooga 
Times Free Press, October 4, 2010, 141(294), pg. A1 
Boisot, M. H. (1995). Information Space: A Framework for Learning Organizations, Institutions, 
and Culture. London, UK: Routledge.  
Bontis, N. (2001). Assessing knowledge assets: A review of the models used to measure 
intellectual capital. International Journal of Management Reviews, 3(1), 41-60. 
Borgida, E., Sullivan, J. L., Oxendine, A., Jackson, M. S., Riedel, E. & Gangl, A. (2002). Civic 
culture meets the digital divide: The role of community electronic networks. Journal of 
Social Issues, 58(1), 125-141. 
Boschma, R. (2005). Proximity and innovation: A critical assessment. Regional Studies, 39(1), 
61–74.  
Boschma, R. & Lambooy, J. (1999). The prospects of an adjustment policy based on collective 
learning in old industrial regions. GeoJournal. 49(4), 391-399.  
Bound, J., Lovenheim, M., and Turner, S. E. (2007). Understanding the Decrease in College 
Completion Rates and the Increased Time to the Baccalaureate Degree. PSC Research 
Report No. 07-626. November 2007. Retrieved October 4, 2010, from 
http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr07-626.pdf.  
Brafman, O. & Beckstrom, R. A. (2006). The spider and the starfish: The unstoppable power of 
leaderless organizations. Portfolio. 
271 
Bransford, J. D., Brown, A., & Cocking, R. (Eds.) (2000). How people learn: Mind, brain, 
experience and school (Expanded ed.). Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Retrieved from http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=9853 
Braybrooke, D. (1987). Philosophy of social science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. 
Breznitz, D. and Taylor, M. (2009, October). The communal roots of entrepreneurial-
technological growth? Social fragmentation and the economic stagnation of Atlanta’s 
technology cluster (Working paper). Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1481857.  
Brown, J. R. & Fehige, Y. (2011). Thought experiments. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition). E. N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/thought-experiment/. 
Brown, J. S. & Duguid, P. (2002). Local knowledge: Innovation in the networked age. 
Management Learning, 33(4), 427-438.  
Brown, J. S., Collins, A. & Duguid, S. (1989). Situated cognition and the culture of learning. 
Educational Researcher, 18(1), 32–42. Retrieved from 
http://www.exploratorium.edu/IFI/resources/museumeducation/situated.html. 
Bruner, J. S. (1966). Toward a theory of instruction. Cambridge, MA: Belkapp Press.  
Bruner, J. S. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Brynjolfsson, E. & Hitt, L. M. (2000). Beyond computation: Information technology, 
organizational transformation and business performance. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14(4): 23-48. 
Brynjolfsson, E., Malone, T. W., Gurbaxani, V., & Kambil, A. (1994). Does information 
technology lead to smaller firms? Management Science, 40(12): 1628-1644. 
Burris, Beverly H. (1998). Computerization of the workplace. Annual Review of Sociology, 24: 
272 
141-157. 
Burrows, R., Gilbert, N. & Pollert, A. (Eds.). (1992). Fordism and flexibility: Divisions and 
change. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Burt, R. S. (2004). Structural holes and good ideas. American Journal of Sociology. 110(2), 349-
399. 
Busch, P. (2008). Tacit knowledge in organizational learning. Hershey, PA: IGI Publishing. 
Cairncross, F. (2001). The death of distance: How the communications revolution is changing 
our lives. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Calabrese, R. L. (2009). The dissertation desk reference: The doctoral student's manual to 
writing the dissertation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing. 
Calhoun, C. (1998). Community without propinquity revisited: Communications technology and 
the transformation of the urban public sphere. Sociological Inquiry, 68(3), 373-397.  
capable. (n.d.). Dictionary.com Unabridged. Retrieved from 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/capable. 
Capobianco, R. (2010). Engaging Heidegger. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto 
Press. 
Carreira, M. J. (2005). New framework of intrinsic/extrinsic and integrative/instrumental 
motivation in second language acquisition. The Keiai Journal of International Studies, 
16: 39-64. 
Chesbrough, H. (2006). Open innovation: The new imperative for creating and profiting from 
technology. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Chisholm, R. (1982). Knowledge as justified true belief: The foundations of knowing. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
273 
Chiu, C-M., Hsu, M-H., & Wang, E. T. G. (2006). Understanding knowledge sharing in virtual 
communities: An integration of social capital and social cognitive theories. Decision 
Support Systems, 42, 3, 1872-1888. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167923606000583. 
Chomsky, N. (1967). A review of B. F. Skinner’s “Verbal Behavior.” In L. A. Jakobovits & M. 
S. Miron (Eds.), Readings in the Psychology of Language (pp. 142-143). Prentice-Hall. 
Retrieved from http://www.chomsky.info/articles/1967----.htm. 
Choo, C. W. (1998). The knowing organization: How organizations use information to construct 
meaning, create knowledge, and make decisions. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
Christensen, C. M. (2006). The innovator's dilemma: When new technologies cause great firms 
to fail. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. (Original work published in 1997) 
Chuttur, M.Y. (2009). Overview of the Technology Acceptance Model: Origins, Developments 
and Future Directions. Sprouts: Working Papers on Information Systems, 9(37). 
Retrieved from http://sprouts.aisnet.org/785/1/TAMReview.pdf 
Clandinin, D. J. & Connelly, F. M. (2000). Narrative inquiry: Experience and story in 
qualitative research. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Clark, D. A. (2005). The capability approach: Its development, critiques and recent advances. 
Economic and Social Research Council. Oxford, UK: Global Poverty Research Group. 
Retrieved August 30, 2010 from http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-
wps-032.pdf. 
Coase, R. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (1), 1–44. 
Cohen, W. M. & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning 
274 
and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, Special Issue: Technology, 
Organizations, and Innovation, 35(1), 128-152. 
Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of 
Sociology, 94(Supplement), S95-S120. 
Colindres, A, (2009). State universities facing big financial problems because of slow payments. 
Gatehouse News Service, Posted Nov 24, 2009. Retrieved October 4, 2010, from 
http://www.rrstar.com/elections/x1682938275/State-Capitol-Q-A-State-universities-
facing-big-financial-problems-because-of-slow-payments 
Collins, J. C. (2001). Good to great: Why some companies make the leap... and others don’t. 
HarperCollins. 
community. (2003). The American heritage dictionary of the English language (4th ed.). 
Retrieved from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/community. 
competence. (2000). American heritage dictionary of the English language (4th ed.). Houghton 
Mifflin. Retrieved from http://www.freedictionary.com/competence. 
Conrad, K. J., Randolph, F. L., Kirby, M. W. Jr. & Bebout, R. R. (1999). Creating and using 
logic models: Four perspectives. In K. J. Conrad, M.D. Matters & P. Hanrahan (eds.), 
Homelessness Prevention in Treatment of Substance Abuse and Mental Illness: Logic 
Models and Implementation of Eight American Projects (pp. 17-31). Taylor & Francis. 
Cook, S. D. N. & Brown, J. S. (1999). Bridging epistemologies: The generative dance between 
organizational knowledge and organizational knowing. Organization Science, 10(4): 
1999, 381-400. 
Cook, S. D. N. & Yanow, D. (1996). Culture and organizational learning. In M. D. Cohen & L. 
S. Sproull (eds.), Organizational learning, Organization Science series (pp. 430-459). 
275 
Sage. 
Cooke, P. (2002). Knowledge economics: Clusters, learning, and cooperative advantage. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Cooke, P. & Leydesdorff, L. (2006). Regional development in the knowledge-based economy: 
The construction of advantage. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 31(1), 5-15 
Cooke, P. & Morgan, K. (1998). The associational economy: Firms, regions, and innovation. 
Oxford University Press. 
Cooksy, L. J., Gill, P. & Kelly, P. A. (2001). The program logic model as an integrative 
framework for a multimethod evaluation. Evaluation and Program Planning, 24: 119-
128. 
Cooperrider, D. L. & Whitney, D. (2005). Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Revolution in 
Change. Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
Corning, P. A. (2002). The re-emergence of “emergence”: A venerable concept in search of a 
theory. Complexity, 7(6): 18–30. Retrieved from 
http://www.complexsystems.org/publications/pdf/emergence3.pdf. 
Cortright, J. (2001). New growth theory, technology, and learning: A practitioner’s guide. 
Reviews of Economic Development Literature and Practice:  No. 4. Washington, DC: 
Economic Development Administration.  
Council on Competitiveness. (2005). Innovate America: National Innovation Initiative Summit 
and Report. Washington, DC: Council on Competitiveness. Retrieved May 22, 2010, 
from http://www.compete.org/images/uploads/File/PDF%20Files/NII_ 
Innovate_America.pdf 
Crandall, R. W., Jackson, C. L., & Singer, H. J. (2003). The Effect of Ubiquitous Broadband 
276 
Adoption on Investment, Jobs, and the U.S. Economy. Washington, DC: Criterion 
Economics, LLC, and New Millennium Research Council. Retrieved from 
http://www.newmillenniumresearchcouncil.com/archive/bbstudyreport_091703.pdf. 
Crandall, R., Lehr, W., & Litan, R. (2007). The effects of broadband deployment on output and 
employment: A cross-sectional analysis of U.S. data. The Brookings Institute. Issues in 
Economic Policy, 6. Retrieved from 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/crandall/200706litan.pdf. 
Crossan, M. M., Lane, H. W. & White, R. E. (1999). An organizational learning framework: 
From intuition to institution. Academy of Management Review, 24(3) 522-537. 
Davenport, T. & Prusak, L. (1998). Working knowledge: How organizations manage what they 
know. Harvard Business School Press. 
David, M. (2009). The correspondence theory of truth. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition). Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of 
Language and Information. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/truth-correspondence/. 
David, P. A., & Foray, D. (2002). An introduction to the economy of the knowledge society. 
UNESCO. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. Retrieved from 
http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/research/WP/PDF/paper084.pdf.  
Davis, F. (1989). Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and user acceptance of information 
technology. MIS Quarterly, 13, 319-340. 
Davis, F., Bagozzi, R., & Warshaw, R. (1989). User Acceptance of Computer Technology: A 
Comparison of Two Theoretical Models. Management Science, 35, 982-1003. 
Deci, E. L. & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human 
277 
behavior. New York: Plenum. 
DeLone, W. H. & McLean, E. R. (2003). The DeLone and McLean model of information 
systems success: A ten-year update. Journal of Management Information Systems, 19(4): 
9–30.  
DeMillo, R. (2009). Edupunk: It’s Alien vs Predator With Relevance of Universities at Stake. 
When Worlds Collide personal blog. Posted October 14, 2009. Retrieved from 
http://wwc.demillo.com/2009/10/14/edupunk-its-alien-vs-predator-with-relevance-of-
universities-at-stake/ 
DeMillo, R. (2010a). Ephemeralization of American Universities. When Worlds Collide personal 
blog. Posted July 18, 2010. Retrieved from http://wwc.demillo.com/2010/07/ 
DeMillo, R. (2010b). Damaged Pipelines and the Future of Innovation. When Worlds Collide 
personal blog. Posted September 6, 2010. Retrieved from 
http://wwc.demillo.com/2010/09/06/damaged-pipelines-and-the-future-of-innovation/ 
Deming, W. E. (1986). Out of the crisis. Boston, MA: MIT Press.  
Descartes, R. (1998). Discourse on method and meditations on first philosophy (4th ed.) (D. A. 
Cress, Trans.). Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. (Original 
works published 1637 and 1641, respectively). 
Dewey, J. (1984). The quest for certainty: A study of the relation of knowledge and action. In J. 
A. Boydston & H. Furst-Simon (Eds.), John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, 
Volume 4: 1929 (pp. 1–254). Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois 
University Press. (Original work published in 1929) 
Dewey, J. (1991). How we think. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. (Original work published in 
1910) 
278 
Doloreux, D. & Parto, S. (2005). Regional innovation systems: Current discourse and unresolved 
issues. Technology in Society, 27, 133–153. 
Drucker, P. F. (1985). Innovation and entrepreneurship: Practice and principles. Harper & Row.  
Drucker, P. F. (2002). The discipline of innovation. Harvard Business Review. 80(8), 95-100. 
(Original published in 1985)  
Dubin, R. (1969). Theory building. New York: The Free Press. 
Durkheim, E. (1997). Suicide. J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson (Eds., G. Simpson, Trans.). New 
York: Simon and Schuster. Original published in 1897. 
Dwivedi, Y. K. & Lal, B. (2007). Socio-economic determinants of broadband adoption. 
Industrial Management & Data Systems, 107, 5, 654 – 671. 
Easterby-Smith, M. & Araujo, L. (1999). Organizational learning: Current debates and 
opportunities. In M. Eastby-Smith, J. Burgoyne, and L. Araujo (Eds.), Organizational 
learning and the learning organization: Developments in theory and practice (pp. 1-22). 
San Francisco, CA: Sage. 
Eaton, K. (2012). What Does 2,000-Times-Faster Broadband Look Like? Fast Company website. 
Posted November 7, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.fastcompany.com/3002790/what-
does-2000-times-faster-broadband-look 
Ebbinghaus, H. (1913) Memory: A contribution to experimental psychology (H. A. Ruger & C. 
E. Bussenius, trans.). New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University. 
Retrieved from http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Ebbinghaus/index.htm. 
Edvinsson, L. & Malone, M. S. (1997). Intellectual capital: Realizing your company’s true value 
by finding it’s hidden brainpower. HarperBusiness. 
Einstein, A. (1920). Relativity: The special and general theory (R. W. Lawson, Trans.). London: 
279 
Methuen and Company, Ltd. 
Etzioni, A. & Etzioni, O. (1999). Face-to-face and computer-mediated communities, a 
comparative analysis. The Information Society, 15, 241-248. 
Etzkowitz, H. (2008). The triple helix: University-industry-government innovation in action. 
Routledge.  
Etzkowitz, H., & L. Leydesdorff. (1997). Universities and the global knowledge economy: A 
triple helix of university-industry-government relations. London: Pinter. 
Feyerabend, P. K. (1993). Against method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge. (3rd 
ed.). Verso. 
Fiorina, M. P. (1975). Formal Models in Political Science. American Journal of Political 
Science, 19(1), 133-159. 
Fischer, C. S. (1982). To Dwell Among Friends: Personal Networks in Town and City. 
University of Chicago.  
Fischer, C. S. (1992). America calling: Social history of the telephone to 1940. University of 
California Press. 
Fischer, C. S., Jackson, R. M., Stueve, C. A., Gerson, K., Jones, L. M. & Baldassare, M. (1977). 
Networks and Places: Social Relations in the Urban Setting. New York, NY: The Free 
Press. 
Fishbein, M. & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to 
theory and research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Flick, U. (2009). An introduction to qualitative research. (4th ed.). London and Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE. 
Florida, R. (1995). Toward the learning region. Futures. 27(5), 527-536.  
280 
Frankl, V. E. (1984). Man’s search for meaning. Pocket Books. 
Freeman, C. (1991). Networks of innovators: A synthesis of research issues. Research Policy, 
20, 499-514. 
Freud, S. (1961). Civilization and its discontents (J. Strachey, Trans). New York: W. W. Norton. 
(Original work published in 1930) 
Friedman, T. (2005). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux. 
Friedman, V. J. (2006). Action science: Creating communities of inquiry in communities of 
practice. In P. Reason & H. Bradbury (eds.), Handbook of Action Research (paperback 
edition), pp. 131-143. London: SAGE.  
Gadamer, H-G. (2004). Truth and method. (2nd ed., revised), (J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, 
Trans.). New York: Crossroad. (Original work published 1960). 
Gertler, M. S. & Wolfe, D. A. (2004). Local social knowledge management: Community actors, 
institutions and multilevel governance in regional foresight exercises. Futures, 36, 1: 45-
65.  
Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23: 121-123. Retrieved from 
http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html. 
Gibson, J. J. (1977). The theory of affordances. In R. Shaw & J. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, 
acting, and knowing: toward an ecological psychology (pp. 67-82). Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Giddens, A. (1986). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration (reprint 
ed.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Gioia, D. A. & Pitre, E. (1990). Multiparadigm perspectives on theory building. The Academy of 
281 
Management Review, 15(4), 584-602. 
Gladwell, M. (2002) The tipping point: How little things can make a big difference. Back Bay. 
Gödel, K. (2000). On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related 
systems (M. Hirzel, Trans). Retrieved from 
http://www.research.ibm.com/people/h/hirzel/papers/canon00-goedel.pdf. (Original 
published in 1931) 
Godfrey, M. D. & Hendry, D. F. (1993). The computer as von Neumann planned it. IEEE Annals 
of the History of Computing, 15(1), 11-21. Retrieved from 
http://cva.stanford.edu/classes/cs99s/papers/godfrey-computer-as-von-neumann-planned-
it.pdf. 
Godin, S. (2008). Tribes: We need you to lead us. Portfolio. 
Godin, S. (2010). The coming meltdown in higher education. Seth Godin personal blog, posted 
April 29, 2010. Retrieved from http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2010/04/the-
coming-meltdown-in-higher-education-as-seen-by-a-marketer.html 
Goldstein, J. (1999). Emergence as a construct: History and issues. Emergence: Complexity and 
Organization, 1(1), 49–72, http://www.anecdote.com.au/papers/ 
EmergenceAsAConsutructIssue1_1_3.pdf  
Govindarajan, V. & Trimble, C. (2005). Ten rules for strategic innovators: From idea to 
execution. Harvard Business Press. 
Gozdz, K. (Ed.) (1995). Community building: Renewing the spirit and learning in business. San 
Francisco, CA: Sterling and Stone.  
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. The American Journal of Sociology. 78, 
1360-1380. 
282 
Granovetter, M. S. (1983). The strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited. Sociological 
Theory, 1, 201–233. 
Granovetter, M. S. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481-510. 
Gratton, S. (2007). Hot spots: Why some teams, workplaces, and organizations buzz with 
energy—and others don’t. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc.  
Habermas, J. (1979). Communication and the evolution of society (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: 
Beacon Press. 
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action, Vol. 1: Reason and the rationalization 
of society (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
Hacking, I. (1999). The social construction of what? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
Haltiwanger, J., Jarmin, R. & Schank, T. (2003). Productivity, investment in ICT and market 
experimentation: Micro evidence from Germany and the U.S. Center for Economic 
Studies Research Paper CES 03-06. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
Hampton, K. N. & Wellman, B. (2000). Examining community in the digital neighborhood: 
Early results from Canada’s wired neighborhood. In T. Ishida and K. Isbister (Eds.). 
Digital cities: Technologies, experiences, and future perspectives, pp. 194-209. 
Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Verlag. 
Hampton, K. N. & Wellman, B. (2001). Long distance community in the network society: 
Contact and support beyond Netville. American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 476-495. 
Hanson, T. J. (2008). Higher education – Dangerously close to becoming irrelevant. Open 
Education, posted 08/12/2008. Retrieved from 
http://www.openeducation.net/2008/08/12/higher-education-dangerously-close-to-
283 
becoming-irrelevant/ 
Hassink, R. (2005). How to unlock regional economies from path dependency: From learning 
region to learning cluster. European Planning Studies, 13(4), 521-535.  
Hauser C., Tappeiner G., & Walde, J. (2007). The learning region: the impact of social capital 
and weak ties on innovation. Regional Studies, 41(1), 75–88.  
Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, 35(4), 519-
30.  
Haythornthwaite, C. (2001). Introduction: The Internet in Everyday Life. American Behavioral 
Scientist, 45, 363-382. 
Heck, R. H. & Thomas, S. L. (2009). An introduction to multilevel modeling techniques (2nd ed.). 
Quantitative methodology series. New York and Hove: Routledge, Taylor Francis Group. 
Heidegger, M. (1996). Being and time (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press. (Original work published in 1927) 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Heisenberg, W. (1930). The physical principles of quantum theory (M. Hirzel, Trans.). Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Helms, S. (2012). DOCSIS 3.0 — If You Build It, They Will Come. The Business of Broadband. 
ZCorum website. Posted May 21, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.zcorum.com/docsis-
3-0-if-you-build-it-they-will-come/ 
Herzberg, F. (1959). The motivation to work. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons 
Hickman, L. & Alexander T. (Eds.), (1999). The essential Dewey (Vols. I and II). Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press. 
Hillery, G. A., Jr. (1955). Definitions of community: Areas of agreement. Rural Sociology, 
284 
20(June), 111-123. 
Hillery, G. A., Jr. (1958, March). Critique of selected community concepts. Social Forces, 37(3), 
237-242.  
Hippel, E. Von (1988). The sources of innovation. Oxford University Press. Retrieved May 16, 
2010, from http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/sources.htm. 
Hirsch, E. D. (1987). Cultural literacy: What every American needs to know. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin.  
Hobbes, T. (1994). Leviathan. E. Curley (ed.). Hackett Publishing. 
Holland, J. H. (2006). Studying complex adaptive systems. Journal of Systems Science and 
Complexity, 19, 1: 1-8. 
Hollingsworth, J. R. (1986). The decline of scientific communication within and across academic 
disciplines. Policy Studies Journal, 14(3), 422-428. 
Homans, G. C. (1958). Social behavior as exchange. American Journal of Sociology, 63, 597–
606.  
Hong, S., Thong, J. Y.L. & Tam, K. Y. (2006). Understanding continued information technology 
usage behavior: A comparison of three models in the context of mobile internet. Decision 
Support Systems, 42(3), 1819-1834. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167923606000492 
Hord, S. M. (1997). Professional learning communities: What are they and why are they 
important? Southwest Educational Development Laboratory. 
Horrigan, J. B. (2010). Broadband adoption and use in America. Omnibus Broadband Initiative 
working paper series no. 1. Washington, DC: Federal Communications Commission. 
Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296442A1.pdf 
285 
Howard, P. E. N., Rainie, L. & Jones, S. (2001). Days and nights on the internet: The impact of a 
diffusing technology. American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 383-404. 
Huber, G. P. (1996). Organizational learning: The contributing processes and the literature. In M. 
D. Cohen & L. S. Sproull (Eds.), Organizational Learning, Organization Science series 
(pp. 124-162). Sage. 
Hudson, R. (1999). The learning economy, the learning firm and the learning region: A 
sympathetic critique of the limits to learning. European Urban and Regional Studies. 
6(1), 59-72. Retrieved from http://eur.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/6/1/59. 
Hull, C. L. (1951). Essentials of behavior.  Yale University Press. 
Humphreys, B. (2010). Financial problems beleaguer UC Berkeley. Christian Science Monitor, 
posted April 28, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/The-Sports-
Economist/2010/0428/Financial-problems-beleaguer-UC-Berkeley 
Ichniowski, C., Kochan, T. A., Levine, D. I. Ian, Olson, C. A., and Strauss, G. (2000). What 
Works at Work: Overview and Assessment. In C. Ichniowski (ed.), The American 
Workplace: Skills, Compensation, and Employee Involvement (pp. 1-37). Cambridge 
University Press. 
Institute for the Psychological Sciences. (2012, March). Doctoral dissertation handbook. 
Arlington, VA: Institute for the Psychological Sciences. 
Isanski, B. & West, C. (2010). The body of knowledge: Understanding embodied cognition. 
Association for Psychological Science Observer. January. Retrieved from 
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/getArticle.cfm?id=2606 
Jaccard, J. & Jacoby, J. (2009). Theory construction and model-building skills: A practical guide 
286 
for social scientists. Methodology In The Social Sciences. New York, NY: Guilford 
Press. 
James, W. (1975). Lecture VI: Pragmatism’s conception of truth. In Pragmatism: A new name 
for some old ways of thinking (sec. 7). Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Retrieved from http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Pragmatism:_A_New_ 
Name_ for_Some_Old_Ways_of_Thinking#Lecture_VI:_Pragmatism.27s_Conception_o
f_Truth. (Original work published in 1907) 
Jan, T. (2010). Faculty cuts at Brandeis proposed: Downturn cited; plan would end some 
programs. Boston Globe, February 23, 2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/02/23/faculty_cuts_at_br
andeis_proposed/ 
Jarvis, P. (1999). The practitioner-researcher: Developing theory from practice. San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Johnson, B. (1992). Institutional learning. In B-A. Lundvall (Ed.), National systems of 
innovation: Towards a theory of innovation and interactive learning (pp.23-45). London: 
Pinter. Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=iDXGwacw-4oC.  
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47: 263-291. Retrieved from http://www.princeton.edu/ 
~kahneman/docs/Publications/prospect_theory.pdf 
Kant, I. (1993). Grounding for the metaphysics of morals (3rd ed.). J. W. Ellington (trans.). 
Hackett. Original published in 1785.  
Kant, I. (2000). Critique of pure reason. Cambridge University Press. (Original published in 
287 
1781) 
Katz, J. E., Rice, R. E. & Aspden, P. (2001). The Internet, 1995-2000: Access, civic 
involvement, and social interaction. American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 405-419. 
Katz, R. L. (2009). The economic and social impact of telecommunications output. 
Intereconomics, 44(1), 41-48. 
Katz, R. L. (2010, November). The Impact of Broadband on the Economy: Research to Date and 
Policy Issues. Presented at 10th Global Symposium for Regulators “Enabling 
Tomorrow’s Digital World,” Dakar, Senegal. 
Kavanaugh, A. L. & Patterson, S. J. (2001). The impact of community computer networks on 
social capital and community involvement. American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 496-509. 
Kelley, M. R. (1986). Programmable automation and the skill question: A reinterpretation of the 
cross-national evidence. Human Systems Management. 6(3): 223-242. 
Kelley, M. R. (1994). Productivity and information technology: The elusive connection. 
Management Science, 40(11), 1406-25. 
Kelly, K. (1995). Out of control. Perseus Books Group. 
Kim, W. C. & Mauborgne, R. (2005). Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market 
Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant. Harvard Business Press. 
King, A. W. & Zeithaml, C. P. (2003). Measuring organizational knowledge: A conceptual and 
methodological framework. Strategic Management Journal, 24(8), 763–772.  
King, W. R. & Teo, T. (1994). Facilitators and inhibitors for the strategic use of information 
technology. Information and Management, 27(2), 71-87. 
Kirkpatrick, D. L. & Kirkpatrick, J. D. (2006). Evaluating training programs: The four levels 
(3rd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
288 
Klein, K. J. & Kozlowski, S. W. J. (2000). From micro to meso: Critical steps in conceptualizing 
and conducting multilevel research. Organizational Research Methods, 3: 211. 
Klein, K. J., Tosi, H. & Cannella, A. A., Jr. (1999). Multilevel theory building: Benefits, barriers, 
and new developments; Introduction to special topic forum. Academy of Management 
Review, 24, 2: 243-248. 
Knoke, D. & Yang, S. (2008). Social network analysis: Vol. 154, Quantitative applications in the 
social sciences (2nd ed.). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Kohn, A. (1993). Punished by rewards: The trouble with gold stars, incentive plans, A’s, praise, 
and other bribes. Bridgewater, NJ: Replica Books. 
Kolb, D. A. (1984). Experiential learning: experience as the source of learning and 
development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
Kramer, R. (2008). Learning how to learn: Action learning for leadership development. In R. 
Morse (Ed.), Innovations in public leadership development (pp. 296–326). Washington 
DC: M.E. Sharpe and National Academy of Public Administration. 
Kraut, R., Kiesler, S., Boneva, B., Cummings, J., Helgeson, V. & Crawford, A. (2002). Internet 
Paradox Revisited. Journal of Social Issues, 58(1), 49-74. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-4560.00248. 
Kraut, R., Patterson, M., Lundmark, V., Kiesler, S., Mukophadhyay, T. & Scherlis, W. (1998). 
Internet paradox: A social technology that reduces social involvement and psychological 
well-being? American Psychologist, 53(9), 1017-1031. Retrieved from 
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/53/9/1017/. 
Krogh, G. von, Roos J., & Slocum K. (1994). An essay on corporate epistemology. Strategic 
Management Journal, Summer Special Issue, 15: 53–71. 
289 
Kuhn, T. S. (1996). The structure of scientific revolutions (3rd ed.). Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. (Original published in 1962) 
Lakatos, I. (1976). Proofs and refutations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Lakatos, I. (1978). The methodology of scientific research programmes: Philosophical papers 
volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lam, A. (2000). Tacit knowledge, organisational learning and societal institutions: An integrated 
framework. Organisational Studies, 21(3), 487-513. 
LaRose, R., Eastin, M. S., & Gregg, J. (2001). Reformulating the Internet paradox: Social 
cognitive explanations of Internet use and depression. Journal of Online Behavior, 1(2). 
Retrieved from: http://www.behavior.net/JOB/v1n1/paradox.html. 
LaRose, R., Gregg, J. L., Strover, S., Straubhaar, J. & Carpenter, S. (2007). Closing the rural 
broadband gap: Promoting adoption of the Internet in rural America. Telecommunications 
Policy, 31(6–7), 359-373. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308596107000444. 
Latour, B. (2003). Promises of constructivism. In D. Ihde (Ed.), Chasing technology: Matrix of 
materiality (pp. 27-46), Indiana Series for the Philosophy of Science. Indiana University 
Press. 
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. Oxford 
University Press. 
Lave, C. A. & March, J. G. (1993). An introduction to models in the social sciences. University 
Press of America. 
Lave, J. & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
290 
Lawrence, P. R. & Nohria, N. (2002). Driven: How human nature shapes our choices. San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
learning. (n.d.) The American heritage dictionary of the English language (4th ed.). Retrieved 
from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/learning. 
Lee, K. C., Lee, S. & Kang, I. W. (2005). KMPI: measuring knowledge management 
performance. Information & Management, 42, 469–482. 
Lehr, W. H., Osorio, C. A., Gillett, S. E. & Sirbu, M. A. (2005). Measuring broadband’s 
economic impact. Tepper School of Business. Paper 457. Retrieved from 
http://repository.cmu.edu/tepper/457. 
Leontief, W. W. (1986). Input-output economics (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Levitt, B. & March, J. G. (1988/1996). Organizational learning. In M. D. Cohen & L. S. Sproull 
(Eds.), Organizational learning, Organization Science series (pp. 516-540). Sage. 
Lewis, T. (2007). University of Phoenix staggers under growing criticism. ConsumerAffairs.com, 
posted February 11, 2007. Retrieved from 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/02/univ_phoenix.html 
Liker, J. K. (2004). The Toyota way: 14 management principles from the world's greatest 
manufacturer. McGraw-Hill Professional. 
Lin, N. (2002). Social capital: A theory of social structure and action. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Lin, T-C. & Huang, C-C. (2008). Understanding knowledge management system usage 
antecedents: An integration of social cognitive theory and task technology fit. 
Information & Management, 45(6), 410-417. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378720608000839 
291 
Lindblom, C. E. & Cohen, D. K. (1979). Usable knowledge: Social science and social problem 
solving. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Lindsley, D. H., Brass, D. J. & Thomas, J. B. (1995, July). Efficacy-performance spirals: A 
multilevel perspective. The Academy of Management Review, 20, 3: 645-678. Retrieved 
from http://www.jstor.org/stable/258790. 
Lipton. D. (2010). An educational extinction event? Gödel’s Lost Letter and P=NP, personal 
blog. Posted January 29, 2010. Retrieved October 4, 2010, from 
http://rjlipton.wordpress.com/2010/01/29/an-educational-extinction-event/ 
Litan, R. E. & Rivlin, A. M. (2001). Projecting the economic impact of the internet. The 
American Economic Review, 91(2), 313-317. 
London School of Economics and Political Science. (2011, September). The dissertation. 
London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved from 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/socialPolicy/informationForCurrentStudents/dissertationGuideline
s.aspx. 
Luhmann, N. (1990). Essays on self-reference. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Luhmann, N. (2006). System as difference. Organization, Volume 13, 1, pp. 37–57. 
Lumina Foundation. (2010). A stronger nation through higher education: Special Report (Sept. 
2010). Lumina Foundation for Education. Retrieved from 
http://www.luminafoundation.org/publications/A_stronger_nation.pdf 
Lynham, S. A. (2002). The general method of theory-building research in applied disciplines. 
Advances in Developing Human Resources, 4(3), 221-241. doi: 
10.1177/1523422302043002 
Lyotard, J-F. (1984). The postmodern condition (G. Bennington & B. Massumi, Trans.). 
292 
Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. (Original work published in 1979) 
Machlup, F. (1962). The production and distribution of knowledge in the United States. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
MacKinnon, D., Cumbers, A, & Chapman, K. (2002). Learning, innovation and regional 
development: A critical appraisal of recent debates. Progress in Human Geography, 
26(3), 293–311. 
MacQueen, K. M., McLellan, E., Metzger, D. S., Kegeles, S. Strauss, R. P. Scotti, R., Blanchard, 
L. & Trotter, R. T., Jr. (2001). What is community? An evidence-based definition for 
participatory public health. American Journal of Public Health, 91, 12: 1929–1938. 
Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1446907/. 
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organizational 
Science. 2(1), Special Issue, 71-87.  
Marcus, G. F. (2001). The algebraic mind: Integrating connectionism and cognitive science 
(Learning, Development, and Conceptual Change). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Marklein, M. B. (2010). Probe finds fraud, deception at for-profit colleges. USA TODAY. Posted 
8/4/2010. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2010-08-04-
ForprofitONLINE04_ST_N.htm. 
Markus, L. M. (1990). Toward a ‘critical mass’ theory of interactive media. In C. Steinfield & J. 
Fulk (Eds.), Organizations and communication technology (pp. 194-218). Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage Publications. 
Marquis, C., Lounsbury, M. & Greenwood, R. (2011). Communities and organizations. Research 
in the Sociology of Organizations (Vol. 33). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.  
Martin, S. B. (1999). Employment in the information age: Information technology and 
293 
information work. Info, 1(3), 271-83. 
Maslow, A. H. (1970). Motivation and personality (2nd ed.). New York: Harper & Row. 
Mata, F. J., Fuerst, W. L., & Barney, J. B. (1995). Information technology and sustained 
competitive advantage: A resource-based analysis. MIS Quarterly, 19(4), 487-505. 
Maturana, H. & Varela, F. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living 
(Volume 42, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2nd ed., R. S. Cohen & M. W. 
Wartofsky, eds.). Dordecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. 
McAfee, A. (2002). The impact of enterprise information technology adoption on operational 
performance: An empirical investigation. Production and Operations Management, 
11(1), 33-53. 
McAfee, A., & Brynfolfsson, E. (2008). Investing in the IT that makes a competitive difference. 
Harvard Business Review, July-August 2008. Retrieved from 
http://hbr.harvardbusiness.org/2008/07/investing-in-the-it-that-makes-a-competitive-
difference/ar/1. 
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
McMillan, D. W. & Chavez, D. M. (1986). Sense of community: A definition and theory. 
Journal of Community Psychology, 14, 1-23. Retrieved from 
http://www.spokane.wsu.edu/academic/design/content/documents/McMillanChavis.pdf. 
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Melville, N., Gurbaxani, V., & Kraemer, K. (2007). The productivity impact of information 
technology across competitive regimes: The role of industry concentration and 
dynamism. Decision Support Systems, 43(1), 229-242. 
Merton, R. K. (1968). Social theory and social structure (3rd ed.). New York: Free Press. 
294 
Original published in 1949. 
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity 
for processing information. Psychological Review, 63(2), 81–97. 
Miller, R. E. & Blair, P. D. (2009). Input-output analysis: Foundations and extensions (2nd ed.). 
Cambridge University Press.  
Miller, S. (2012). Social Institutions. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition). Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/social-institutions/. 
Mills, C. W. (2000), The Sociological Imagination (reprint edition). Oxford University Press. 
(Original published in 1959) 
mind. (n.d.) The American heritage dictionary of the English language (4th ed.). Retrieved from 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/mind. 
Mishra, S. K. (2007). A brief history of production functions (Working paper). Social Science 
Research Network. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020577. 
Moore, W. H. (2001). Evaluating theory in political science. Retrieved from 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.134.5312&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
Moretti, R. (2009). Practice made perfect: How anyone can master anything quicker, easier and 
better than ever. Robert Salomone. 
Morgan, K. (1997). The learning region: Institutions, innovation and regional renewal. Regional 
Studies, 31, 491-503. 
Morse, R. (2004). Community learning: Process, structure, and renewal. (Doctoral dissertation). 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA. 
Morse, R. S. (2005, April). Community learning: Rethinking public participation from a 
295 
community perspective. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association 
2005 Annual Conference, Chicago, IL. Retrieved from 
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/6/3/0/pages86304/
p86304-1.php. 
Moulaert, F. & Sekia, F. (2003) Territorial innovation models: A critical survey. Regional 
Studies: The Journal of the Regional Studies Association. 37(3), 289-302. 
Musgrave, R. A. & P B Musgrave, P. B. (1989). Public Finance in Theory and Practice (5th 
edition). McGraw-Hill. 
Naisbitt, J. & Aburdene, P. (1985). Re-inventing the corporation: Transforming your job and 
your company for the new information society. New York: Warner Books.  
National Academy of Sciences. (2007). Executive Summary. Rising Above the Gathering Storm: 
Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future. Committee on 
Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century, National Academy of Sciences, 
National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine. Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press. Retrieved from http://www.nap.edu/nap-
cgi/report.cgi?record_id=11463&type=pdfxsum. 
National Science Foundation. (1983, May). The process of technological innovation: Reviewing 
the literature. Washington, DC: National Science Foundation. 
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Crofts.  
Nevis, E. C., Dibella, A. J., & Gould, J. M. (1995). Understanding organizations as learning 
systems. Sloan Management Review, 36(2), 73-85. Retrieved from 
http://sloanreview.mit.edu/the-magazine/1995-winter/3626/understanding-organizations-
as-learning-systems/. 
296 
Nickerson, R. S. (1998, June). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. 
Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175-220.  
Nie, N. H. (2001). Sociability, interpersonal relations, and the internet: Reconciling conflicting 
findings. American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 420-435. 
Nonaka, I. (1998). The knowledge-creating company. In D. Neef, G. A. Siesfeld, and J. Cefola 
(eds.). The economic impact of knowledge: Resources for the knowledge-based economy 
(pp. 175-188). Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Nonaka, I. & von Krogh, G. (2009). Perspective-tacit knowledge and knowledge conversion: 
Controversy and advancement in organizational knowledge creation theory. Organization 
Science, 20(3), 635-652. 
Norman, D. A. (1999). Affordances, conventions and design. Interactions, 6(3), 38-43.  
Nussbaum, M. C. (2000). Women and human development: The capabilities approach. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
OECD. (1996). The knowledge-based economy. OCDE/GD(96)102. Paris: Organisation For 
Economic Co-Operation And Development. Retrieved October 8, 2010 from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/8/1913021.pdf 
Oliner, S. D. & Sichel, D. E. (2000). The resurgence of growth in the late 1990s: Is information 
technology the story? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4), 3-22. 
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Onwuegbuzie, A. J., Johnson, R. B., & Collins, K. M. T. (2009). Call for mixed analysis: A 
philosophical framework for combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches, 3, 2: 114-139. 
297 
Orlikowski, W. J., & Gash, D. C. (1994). Technological frames: Making sense of information 
technology in organizations. ACM Transactions on Information Systems, 12(2), 174-207. 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ouliaris, S. (2011). Back to basics: What are economic models? How economists try to simulate 
reality. Finance & Development, 48(2), 46-47. Retrieved from 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/06/basics.htm. 
Papalia, D.E., Olds, S.W., & Feldman, R.D. (1998). Human development (7th ed.). Boston: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Papert, S. (1980). Mindstorms: Children, computers, and powerful ideas. New York, NY: Basic 
Books. 
Parsons, T. (1991). The social system. (2nd ed., reprint). Routledge Sociology Classics Series. 
London: Routledge. Original publish in 1951. 
Pavlov, I. P. (2003). Conditioned reflexes: An investigation of the physiological activity of the 
cerebral cortex (G. V. Anrep, trans.). Courier Dover Publications. Retrieved from 
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Pavlov/. (Original published in 1927) 
Peck, M. S. (1987). The different drum: Community making and peace. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Peirce, C. S., Hartshorne, C. & Weiss, P. (Eds.), (1935). Collected papers of Charles Sanders 
Peirce: Pragmaticisms and pragnoaticism, scientific metaphysics. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Penuel, B. & Roschelle, J. (1999, April). Designing learning: Cognitive science principles for the 
innovative organization. In A. L. Cohen (Ed.), Designing learning: Principles and 
298 
technologies paper series (SRI Project 10099). Center for Technology in Learning, SRI 
International. Retrieved from http://cilt.concord.org/resources/DesigningLearning.PDF.  
Peters, P. (2009). DATA-DATA: A model for practitioner-researchers. The International 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, 4(3), 147-157. 
Pew Internet. (2012). Trend data (Adults). [Web page]. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. 
Retrieved from http://pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-(Adults).aspx. 
Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective. New York, NY: Harper and Row. 
Pfeffer, J. & Sutton, R. I. (2000). The knowing-doing gap: How smart companies turn knowledge 
into action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Piaget, J. (1973). To understand is to invent: The future of education (G-A. Roberts, trans., 
Viking Press ed.). New York: Grossman Publishers. Retrieved from 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0000/000061/006133eo.pdf. 
Piaget, J. (1983). Piaget’s theory. In P. Mussen (Ed.), Manual of child psychology (4th ed.) (Vol. 
1, pp. 703-732). New York, NY: Wiley. 
Piaget, J. & Inhelder, B. (1999). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence: 
An essay on the construction of formal operational structures (reprint edition). New 
York: Taylor & Francis Group. Original published in 1958. 
Pilat, D. & Wölfl, A. (2003, April). ICTs and economic growth: New evidence from international 
comparisons. Presented at The ‘New Economy’ and Post-Socialist Transition, Warsaw, 
Poland. Retrieved from 
http://www.tiger.edu.pl/konferencje/kwiecien2003/papers/Pilat_Woelfl.en.pdf 
Pinchot, G. (1986). Intrapreneuring: Why You Don't Have to Leave the Corporation to Become 
299 
an Entrepreneur. Harper & Row. 
Pink, D. H. (2005). A whole new mind: Why right-brainers will rule the future. Riverhead Books. 
Pink, D. H. (2009). Drive: The surprising truth about what motivates us. New York, NY: 
Riverhead Books, Penguin Group. 
Pinker, S. & Mehler, J. (1988). Connections and Symbols. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.  
Piore, M. & Sabel, C. (1984). The second industrial divide: Possibilities for prosperity. New 
York, NY: Basic Books.  
Plato. Meno (B. Jowett, Trans.). Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1643/1643-
h/1643-h.htm. 
Plato. The republic (B. Jowett, Trans.). Retrieved from 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1497/1497-h/1497-h.htm. 
Plato. Theaetetus (B. Jowett, Trans.). Retrieved from 
http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/7/2/1726/1726-h/1726-h.htm. 
Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Polanyi, M. (1983). The tacit dimension (Reprint ed.). Gloucester, MA: Doubleday & Co. 
(Original published in 1966) 
Popper, K. R. (2003). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. London, 
UK: Routledge. (Original work published in 1963) 
Porat, M. (1977). The information economy: Definition and measurement. Washington, DC: US 
Department of Commerce.  
Porter, M. E. (1990). The competitive advantage of nations. New York: The Free Press.  
Porter, M. E. (2003). Location, clusters, and strategy. In G. L. Clark, M. P. Feldman, M. S. 
300 
Gertler & K. Williams (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of economic geography (pp. 253-
274). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Powell, W. W. & Snellman, K. (2004). The knowledge economy. Annual Review of Sociology, 
30:199–220. 
practice. (n.d.). Dictionary.com Unabridged. Retrieved from 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/practice 
Premack, D. G. & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 4: 515–526. 
Prigogine, I. (1997). The end of certainty. New York: The Free Press. 
process. (2003). The American heritage dictionary of the English language (4th ed.). Retrieved 
from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/process. 
Putnam, R. D. (1993). The prosperous community: Social capital and public life. The American 
Prospect, 13(March), 35-42. Retrieved from 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_prosperous_community. (Online version 
dated November 30, 2002) 
Quang, C. Z-W., Rossotto, C. M. & Kimura, K. (2009). Economic impacts of broadband. 
Information and communications for development 2009: Extending reach and increasing 
impact. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications. Pp. 35-50. Retrieved from 
http://books.google.com/books?id=_5DL8RXJUbgC 
Quinn, R. E. & Rohrbaugh, J. (1983). A spatial model of effectiveness criteria: Towards a 
competing values approach to organizational analysis. Management Science, 29(3), 363-
377. 
Ramberg, B. & Gjesdal, K. (2009). Hermeneutics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
301 
(Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of 
Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/hermeneutics/. 
Rampell, C. (2010). College enrollment rate at record high. New York Times, April 28, 2010. 
Retrieved October 4, 2010, from http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/ 
04/28/college-enrollment-rate-at-record-high/ 
Ratten, V. & Ratten, H. (2007). Social cognitive theory in technological innovations. European 
Journal of Innovation Management, 10(1), 90-108. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14601060710720564. 
Redden, E. (2009). An academic revolution. Inside Higher Ed. Retrieved from 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/07/07/unesco 
Reddi, S. P., Row, M. C., & Clemons, E. K. (1993). The impact of information technology on 
the organization of economic activity: The ‘move to the middle’ hypothesis. Journal of 
Management Information Systems, 10(2), 9 – 35. 
Renger, R. & Hurley, C. (2006). From theory to practice: Lessons learned in the application of 
the ATM approach to developing logic models. Evaluation and Program Planning, 29, 2: 
106-119. 
Revans, R. W. (1998). ABC of action learning. London: Lemos and Crane. 
Ricardo, D. (1817). On the principles of political economy and taxation. London: John Murray. 
from http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP.html.  
Ries, E. (2011). The lean startup: How today’s entrepreneurs use continuous innovation to 
create radically successful businesses. Crown Business. 
Robinson, P. A. (Director). Gordon, L. & Gordon, C. (Producers). (1989). Field of dreams. 
302 
[Motion picture]. United States: Universal Pictures. 
Rogers, E. (2003). Diffusion of innovations, 5th edition. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Roloff, M. E. (1981). Interpersonal communication: The social exchange approach. Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage. 
Roos, J., Roos, G., Dragonetti, N. C., & Edvinsson, L. (1998). Intellectual capital: Navigating in 
the new business landscape. New York University Press.  
Roschelle, J. (1995). Learning in interactive environments: Prior knowledge and new experience. 
Excerpted from Public Institutions for Personal Learning: Establishing a Research 
Agenda. The American Association of Museums. Retrieved from 
http://www.exploratorium.edu/IFI/resources/museumeducation/ 
priorknowledge.html 
Rothman, J. & Thomas, E. J. (eds.) (1994). Intervention research: Design and development for 
human service. New York, NY: The Haworth Press.  
Rotter, J. B. (1954). Social learning and clinical psychology. New York: Prentice-Hall. 
Rousseau, D. M. (1985). Issues of level in organizational research: Multilevel and cross-level 
perspectives. Research in Organizational Behavior, 7, 1-37 
Rowland, S. (2002). Overcoming fragmentation in professional life: The challenge for academic 
development. Higher Education Quarterly, 56(1), pp. 52–64. 
Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R. J. Spiro, B. C. 
Bruce, & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension (pp. 33-53). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Russell, B. (1911). Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, XI (1910-1911), 108-128. 
303 
Ryan, R. M. & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic 
motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55: 68-78. 
Ryle, G. (1946). Knowing how and knowing that: The presidential address. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 46(1945-1946), 1-16. Retrieved from 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/26910585/Ryle-Knowing-How-and-Knowing-That 
Ryle, G. (2002). The concept of mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work 
published in 1949) 
Safford. S. (2009). Why the garden club couldn't save Youngstown: the transformation of the 
Rust Belt. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Sanders, I. T. (1975). The community (3rd ed.). New York: Ronald Press. 
Saxenian, A. (1994). Regional advantage: Culture and competition in Silicon Valley and route 
128. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Scardamalia, M. & Bereiter, C. (2006). Knowledge building: Theory, pedagogy, and technology. 
In K. Sawyer (Ed.), Cambridge Handbook of the Learning Sciences (pp. 97-118). New 
York: Cambridge University Press.  
Schön, D. A. (2008). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action (Reprint ed.). 
Ashgate. (Original published in 1983) 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1976). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy (5th ed.). New York: Harper 
and Brothers. (Original published in 1942)  
Schunk, D. H. (2008). Learning theories: An educational perspective (4th ed.). Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Pearson Education, Merrill/Prentice Hall. 
Schütz, A. (1962). Collected papers (Vols. I & II). The Hague: Nijhoff. 
Schwartz, S. K. (2006). Beyond the degree: The skills employers want. Bankrate.com. Retrieved 
304 
from http://www.bankrate.com/finance/college-finance/beyond-the-degree-the-skills-
employers-want.aspx 
Sen, A. K. (1988). The concept of development. In H. Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (Eds.), 
Handbook of development economics (Vol. 1, pp. 9-26). Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Sen, A. K. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Senge, P. M. (2000). Schools that learn: A fifth discipline fieldbook for educators, parents, and 
everyone who cares about education. Doubleday. 
Senge, P. M. (2006). The fifth discipline (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Currency Doubleday. 
Senge, P. M. & Scharmer, C. O. (2006). Community action research: Learning as a community 
of practitioners, consultants, and researchers. In P. Reason & H. Bradbury (eds.), 
Handbook of Action Research (paperback edition), pg. 195-206. London: SAGE. 
Senge, P. M., Kleiner, A., Roberts, C., & Ross, R. (1994). The fifth discipline fieldbook: 
Strategies and tools for building a learning organization. Crown Business. 
Shannon, C. E. & Weaver, W. (1949). The mathematical theory of communication. Urbana, IL: 
The University of Illinois Press.  
Shirky, C. (2008). Here comes everybody: The power of organizing without organizations. 
Penguin Press. 
Simon, H. (1976). Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making processes in 
administrative organizations (3rd ed.). New York: The Free Press. (Original work 
published in 1947) 
Simon, H. (1991). Bounded rationality and organizational learning. Organization Science, 2(1), 
125–134. 
Sines, V. J. (2009). Why traditional colleges and universities are becoming extinct. Associated 
305 
Content from Yahoo! Posted September 14, 2009. Retrieved from 
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2174767/why_traditional_ 
colleges_and_universities.html?cat=4  
Skinner, B. F. (1950). Are theories of learning necessary? Psychological Review, 57, 193-216. 
Retrieved from http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Skinner/Theories/. 
Small, M. L. (2011, August). How to conduct a mixed methods study: Recent trends in a rapidly 
growing literature. Annual Review of Sociology, 37: 57 -86  
Smart, J. C., Feldman, K. A. & Ethington, C. A. (2000). Academic disciplines: Holland's theory 
and the study of college students and faculty, Vanderbilt issues in higher education. 
Vanderbilt University Press, 2000. 
Smelser, N. J. (1965). Theory of collective behavior. Retrieved from 
http://openlibrary.org/books/OL19331041M/Theory_of_collective_behavior. 
Smith, A. (1904). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (5th ed., E. 
Cannan, Ed.). London: Methuen and Co., Ltd. Retrieved from 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html. (Original work published in 1776)  
Soh, C. & Markus, M. L. (1995). How IT creates business value: A process theory synthesis. 
ICIS 1995 Proceedings. Paper 4. Retrieved from http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1995/4  
Solow, R. (1987). We’d better watch out. [Book review]. New York Times, July 12, 36. 
Spek, R. van der & Spijkervet, A. (1997). Knowledge management: Dealing intelligently with 
knowledge. In Liebowitz & L.Wilcox (Eds.), Knowledge management and its 
intergrative elements. New York: CRC Press.  
Spence, K. W. (1958). A theory of emotionally based drive and its relation to performance in 
simple learning situations. American Psychologist, 13, 4: 131-141. 
306 
Spender, J. C. & Grant, R. M. (1996). Knowledge and the firm: overview. Strategic Management 
Journal, Winter Special Issue, 17: 5–10. 
Star, S. L. (1999). The ethnography of infrastructure. American Behavioral Scientist, 43(3), 377-
391. 
Stern, M. J. (2006). How use of the internet impacts community participation and the 
maintenance of core social ties: An empirical study. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
Washington State University, Pullman, WA. 
Stewart, T. A. (1997). Intellectual capital: the new wealth of organizations. 
Doubleday/Currency. 
Supply Chain Council. (2008). Supply-chain operations reference-model: SCOR overview. 
Version 9.0. Cypress, TX: Supply Chain Council. Retrieved from http://supply-
chain.org/f/SCOR%2090%20Overview%20Booklet_0.pdf 
Sutherland, J. W. (1975). Systems: Analysis, administration, and architecture. New York: Van 
Nostrand.  
Swanson, E. B. (1994). Information systems innovation among organizations.  Management 
Science, 40(9), 1069-1086. 
Swanson, R. A. (2007). Theory framework for applied disciplines: Boundaries, contributing, 
core, useful, novel, and irrelevant components. Self-published monograph. Retrieved 
from http://www.uttyler.edu/cbt/hrd/documents/Swanson_Theory_Framework.pdf 
Tajfel, H. (2010). Social identity and intergroup relations (Reprint edition), Volume 7 of 
European Studies in Social Psychology. Cambridge University Press. 
Tallon, P. P., Kraemer, K. L., & Gurbaxani, V. (2001). Executives’ perceptions of the business 
value of information technology: A process-oriented approach. Working Paper #ITR-
307 
148. Center for Research on Information Technology and Organizations, Graduate 
School of Management. Irvine, CA: University of California. 
Tam, K. Y. (1998). The impact of information technology investments on firm performance and 
evaluation: Evidence from newly industrialized economies. Information Systems 
Research, 9(1), 85-98. 
Tapscott, D. & Williams, A. D. (2006). Wikinomics: How mass collaboration changes 
everything. Portfolio.  
Tashakkori, A. & Teddlie, C. (2008). Integrating qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
research. In D. J. Rog & L. Bickman (eds.), The SAGE handbook of applied social 
research methods (2nd edition) (283-317). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Taylor, S. & Todd, P. A. (1995). Understanding information technology usage: A test of 
competing models.  Information Systems Research, 6(2), 144-176. 
Thibault, J. W. & Kelley, H. H. (1952). The Social Psychology of Groups. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Thong, J. Y. & Yap, C. S. (1995). CEO characteristics, organizational characteristics, and 
information technology adoption in small businesses. Omega: International Journal of 
Management Science, 23(4), 429-442. 
Thorndike, E. L. (1910). The contribution of psychology to education. The Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 1, 5-12. Retrieved from 
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Thorndike/education.htm. 
Tolliday, S. & Zeitlin, J. (Eds.). (1992). Between Fordism and flexibility: The automobile 
industry and its workers (reprint edition). London: Berg. 
Tonn, B. E., Zambrano, P. & Moore, S. (2001). Community networks or networked 
308 
communities? Social Science Computer Review, 19(2), 201-212. 
Tönnies, F. (2001). Community and civil society, (J. Harris, ed.). Cambridge University Press. 
(Original published in 1887) 
Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010). The story of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. 
Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering social identity: Core sources. Psychology Press. 
University of Leicester. (n.d.). Doing a theoretical/library dissertation. Retrieved from 
http://www2.le.ac.uk/Members/mh64/research-methods/doing-a-theoretical-library-
dissertation. 
Upton, M. G. & Egan, T. M. (2010). Three approaches to multilevel theory building. Human 
Resource Development Review, 9, 333-356. 
Varela, F., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human 
experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Varian, H. R. (2009). How to build an economic model in your spare time. Retrieved from 
people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/how.pdf. (Original published in M. Szenberg 
(Ed.). (1994). Passion and craft: Economists at work. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press.) 
Vedder, R. (2010). The delta cost project report and true reform. The Chronicle Review, posted 
July 9, 2010. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com/blogPost/The-Delta-Cost-Project-
Report/25417/ 
Venkatesh, V. & Davis, F. D. (2000). A theoretical extension of the technology acceptance 
model: Four longitudinal field studies. Management Science, 46(2), 186–204. 
Venkatesh, V., Morris, M. G., Davis G. B. & Davis, F. D. (2003). User acceptance of 
information technology: Toward a unified view. MIS Quarterly, 27(3), 425-478. 
309 
vision. (2003). The American heritage dictionary of the English language (4th ed.). Retrieved 
from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/vision. 
Vizard, M. & Neel, D. (2000). Two views of the new economy. InfoWorld, 22(39): 24-25. 
Voosen, D. & Conneely, P. (2005). Building learning communities. Alexandria, VA: ASTD 
Press. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978 ). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes 
(M. Cole, Ed., Trans.). Harvard University Press. 
W. K. Kellogg Foundation. (2004). Logic model development guide (update edition). Battle 
Creek, MI: W. K. Kellogg Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.compact.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/03/LogicModelGuidepdf1.pdf 
Waldrop, M. M. (1992). Complexity: The emerging science at the edge of order and chaos. New 
York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
Weber, M. (1978). The nature of social action. In W. G. Runciman (Ed.), E. Matthews (Trans.), 
Selections in translation (pp. 7-32). Cambridge University Press. (Original published in 
1922) 
Weick, K. E. (1989). Theory construction as disciplined imagination. Academy of Management 
Review, 14(4), 516-553. 
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Weick, K. E. & Roberts, K. H. (1996). Collective mind in organizations: Heedful interrelating on 
flight decks. In M. D. Cohen & L. S. Sproull (Eds.), Organizational learning, 
Organization Science series (pp. 330-358). New York, NY: Sage. 
Weislogel, E. (2008). The transdisciplinary imperative. Global Spiral website. Metanexus 
Institute. Posted December 12, 2008. Retrieved from 
310 
http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10669/Default.aspx 
Wellman, B., Haase, A. Q., Witte, J. & Hampton, K. (2001). Does the internet increase, 
decrease, or supplement social capital? Social networks, participation, and community 
commitment. American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 436-455. 
Wenger, E., McDermott, R. & Snyder, W. M. (2002). Cultivating communities of practice. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Wenger, E., Trayner, B. & Laat, M. de (2011). Promoting and assessing value creation in 
communities and networks: a conceptual framework. Rapport 18. The Netherlands: Ruud 
de Moor Centrum, Open Universiteit. Retrieved from http://www.social-learning-
strategies.com/documents/Wenger_Trayner_DeLaat_Value_creation.pdf. 
Whetten, D. A. (1989). What constitutes a theoretical contribution? Academy of Management 
Review, 14(4), 490-495.  
Wholey, J. S. (1979). Evaluation: Promise and performance. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
Williamson, O. E. (1981). The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach. 
American Journal of Sociology. 87, 548-577. 
Williamson, O. E. (2000). The new institutional economics: Taking stock, looking ahead. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 595-613. 
Wilson, G. & Shpall, S. (2012). Action. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2012 edition). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Retrieved 
from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/action/.  
Wilson, R. A. & Foglia, L. (2011). Embodied cognition. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 edition). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/embodied-cognition/.  
311 
Wittrock, M. C. (1992). Generative learning processes of the brain. Educational Psychology, 
27(4), 531-541. 
Worstall, T. (2012). Does High Speed Broadband Increase Economic Growth? TECH. Forbes 
website. Posted August 26, 2012. Retrieved from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/08/26/does-high-speed-broadband-
increase-economic-growth/ 
Wozny, M. J. & Regli, W. C. (1996). Computer science in manufacturing. Communications of 
the ACM, 39(2), 32. 
Wu, I-L. & Chen, J-L. (2005). An extension of trust and TAM model with TPB in the initial 
adoption of on-line tax: An empirical study. International Journal of Human-Computer 
Studies, 62(6), 784-808. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1071581905000376. 
Yang, H., Shen, J. Cao, H. & Warfield, C. (2004). Multilevel evaluation alignment: An 
explication of a four-step model. The American Journal of Evaluation, 25, 4: 493-507. 
Yelle, L. E. (1979). The learning curve: Historical review and comprehensive survey. Decision 
Sciences, 10, 302–328. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-
5915.1979.tb00026.x/abstract 
Yi, M. Y. & Hwang, Y. (2003). Predicting the use of web-based information systems: self-
efficacy, enjoyment, learning goal orientation, and the technology acceptance model. 
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 59(4), 431-449. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1071581903001149. 
Yi, M. Y., Jackson, J. D., Park, J. S.  & Probst, J. C. (2006). Understanding information 
technology acceptance by individual professionals: Toward an integrative view. 
312 
Information & Management, 43(3), 350-363. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378720605000716. 
Yin, R. K. (2008). Case study research: Design and methods (4th ed.). Volume 5 of Applied 
Social Research Methods Series. SAGE. 
Young, J. (2010). Bill Gates Predicts Technology Will Make Place-based Colleges Less 
Important. Chronicle of Higher Education Blog, posted August 9, 2010. Retrieved from 
http://chronicle.com/blogPost/Bill-Gates-Predicts-
Technology/26092/?sid=wc&utm_source=wc&utm_medium=en 
Young, J. O. (2008). The coherence theory of truth. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford 
encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2008 ed.). Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of 
Language and Information. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ fall2008/entries/truth-coherence/. 
Youtie, J. & Shapira, P. (2008). Building an innovation hub: A case study of the transformation 
of university roles in regional technological and economic development. Research Policy, 
Special Section on University-Industry Linkages: The Significance of Tacit Knowledge 
and the Role of Intermediaries, 37(8), 1188-1204. 
Youtie, J., Shapira, P. & Laudeman, G. (2007). Supply, demand and ICT-based services: A local 
level perspective. Telecommunications Policy, 31(6-7), 347-358.  
313 
VITA 
 
Greg Laudeman, the middle of seven children of William and Annabelle Laudeman, grew up in 
east Tennessee, and graduated from Oak Ridge High School. He has a bachelor degree in Mass 
Communication from University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, and master degrees in 
Telecommunications from Michigan State University and in Public Policy from the Georgia 
Institute of Technology. Greg has professional experience in media production, software support 
and training, and as a small businessperson. He worked in customer-facing technical positions at 
MCI and BellSouth. Greg spent a decade doing technology-based economic development work 
with the Enterprise Innovation Institute at Georgia Tech, focused on how information and 
communications technologies make communities and organizations more competitive, 
innovative, and productive. He served as the past president and board member of the Rural 
Telecommunications Congress. Greg completed his doctorate of education in Learning and 
Leadership in May 2013. He is currently leading several projects as part of a social startup, 
Community-Learning.Org. He has also worked as a volunteer in advocacy and organizing for 
amateur sports and outdoor recreation. He lives in the Chattanooga area with his wife, Lynn, and 
children, Annabelle and Forest. 
